On Point blog, page 1 of 1
SCOW allows DAs to comment indirectly on a defendant’s decision to remain silent
State v. Tomas Jaymitchell Hoyle, 2023 WI 24, 3/31/22, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)
This split decision is important for two reasons. First, it authorizes the State to penalize the defendant for exercising his 5th Amendment right to remain silent at trial. Second, it foreshadows how Justice Hagedorn will likely rule in cases involving a broad range of criminal and civil constitutional rights that were established after the framers wrote the United State Constitution.
SCOW will decide whether DA improperly commented on defendant’s decision not to testify
State v. Tomas J. Hoyle, 2020AP1876-CR, petition for review of an unpublished opinion granted 9/14/22; case activity (including briefs)
Issue: (adapted from the State’s PFR):
The 5th Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from commenting on defendant’s failure to to the stand. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); Bies v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 322, 325-26, 193 N.W.2d 46 (1972). In a case where the defendant exercises his right not to testify, does the prosecution violate this prohibition by telling the jury that the victim’s account is “uncontroverted” and no evidence was offered to dispute it?
Defense win! DA’s closing argument was improper comment on defendant’s exercise of right not to testify
State v. Tomas Jaymitchell Hoyle, 2020AP1876-CR, 4/26/22, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Hoyle chose to remain silent at his trial for child sexual assault. During closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly argued that the testimony from “Hannah” (the complaining witness) was “uncontroverted” and told the jury it had “heard no evidence” and that there was “absolutely no evidence” disputing her account of the alleged sexual assault. Under the circumstances of this case, the court of appeals holds that the prosecutor’s arguments violated Hoyle’s Fifth Amendment rights.
Defense win: Prosecutor improperly questioned defendant at trial about his exercise of right to remain silent when he was arrested
State v. Nestor Luis Vega, 2021AP126-CR, District 4, 12/23/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Vega testified at his trial on drug delivery charges and denied he had sold drugs to the informant and that the informant was not telling the truth. (¶12). On cross examination, the prosecutor, over defense counsel’s objections, asked Vega why he failed to give police his exculpatory version of events when he was arrested. (¶¶13-15). These questions violated Vega’s due process rights under State v. Brecht, 143 Wis. 2d 297, 421 N.W.2d 96 (19880, and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and the trial court’s error in allowing the questions was not harmless.
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to comment on defendant’s silence or for telling jury defendant would testify
State v. Russell S. Krancki, 2014 WI App 80; case activity
In the first Wisconsin case to address how Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013), affects the admission of evidence of a defendant’s silence, the court of appeals reads Salinas to apply to a narrow factual scenario not present in this case. The court goes on to assume that trial counsel should have objected to testimony about Krancki’s silence, but finds his failure to object wasn’t prejudicial. The court also concludes trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for saying in his opening statement that Krancki would testify or for failing to exclude references to the .02 blood alcohol limit.
Salinas v. Texas, USSC 12-246, cert. granted 1/11/13
Whether or under what circumstances the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause protects a defendant’s refusal to answer law enforcement questioning before he has been arrested or read his Miranda rights.
Lower court opinion (Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012))
This case could have a significant impact on Wisconsin law.
Keith Bland, Jr. v. Hardy, 7th Cir No. 10-1566, 2/13/12
Habeas – Knowing Use of False Testimony (“Napue”)
Due process prohibits knowing prosecutorial use of false testimony, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). However, the prosecutor’s exploitation of Bland’s incorrect testimony on a potentially important point (the date his gun was confiscated) doesn’t support habeas relief on a Napue-type theory.
Napue and Giglio hold that a prosecutor may not offer testimony that the prosecutor knows to be false.
Closing Argument – Reference to Defendant’s Failure to Testify
State v. Carmen L. Doss, 2008 WI 93, reversing 2007 WI App 208
For Doss: Robert R. Henak
Issue/Holding: Closing argument remarks addressed to Doss’s failure to explain missing funds did not amount to a comment on her failure to testify:
¶81 …
[F]or a prosecutor’s comment to constitute an improper reference to a defendant’s failure to testify,
Impeachment with Post-Miranda Silence – Generally: Due Process Analysis
State v. Caltone K. Cockrell, 2007 WI App 217, PFR filed
For Cockrell: Paul R. Nesson, Jr.
Issue/Holding:
¶14 Although Cockrell describes his challenge to the prosecutor’s use of his post- Miranda silence as a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the substance of his argument is the due process analysis employed in Doyle v. Ohio,
Self-Incrimination – Impeachment with Post-Miranda Silence – Generally: Partial Exercise of Rights
State v. Caltone K. Cockrell, 2007 WI App 217, PFR filed
For Cockrell: Paul R. Nesson, Jr.
Issue/Holding:
¶16 Building on footnote 11 in Doyle, courts have recognized situations in which it is not a violation of due process for the prosecutor to elicit on cross-examination the fact of the defendant’s post- Miranda silence for the purpose of impeaching the defendant’s testimony about his or her interactions with the police after the arrest.