On Point: C. Exculpatory Evidence

State v. Frank V. Blonda, 2015AP2431-CR, 4/11/17, District 1, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).

 M.L., the victim in this case, called her sister, Vincenza, and allegedly told her that Blonda had hit her in the head with a telephone. Vicenza reported this to the police.  Later, M.L. told the DA’s victim advocate that she did not want to press charges, Blonda did not hit her with the phone, and she had been drinking and wasn’t sure how she had been injured. She also filed a victim impact statement, which said that her injury was due to an accident that happened in Blonda’s absence. Unfortunately, the State didn’t disclose these statements to Blonda until the first and second days of his trial.

State v. Karl W. Nichols, 2016AP88-CR, 3/20/17, District IV (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Nichols was convicted, at trial, of a sexual assault of a four-year-old child; the child did not report the alleged assault to anyone until she was 10 years old. Nichols’s postconviction motion alleged that the state had failed to turn over a list, prepared by the child, of changes she wished to make to statements she made during her first forensic interview. The circuit court found the state had acted in bad faith in withholding the list, vacated Nichols’s conviction, and dismissed the charges with prejudice. The court of appeals now reverses and remands for the circuit court to consider Nichols’s sentence modification claim.

Turner v. United States, USSC No. 15-1503, and Overton v. United States, USSC No. 15-1504, cert. granted, consolidated for argument and decision, 12/14/16

Question presented (as formulated by SCOTUS)

Whether the petitioners’ convictions must be set aside under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

State v. A.S.W./State v. J.P.W., 2015AP2119 & 2015AP2120, District 2, 10/5/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Douglas Yanko was convicted of sexually assaulting a child. Postconviction, he sought access to the juvenile court records of the child’s brothers, A.S.W. and J.P.W., who were also charged with sexually assaulting the child. Yanko asserts there may be exculpatory evidence in the records—in particular, evidence the child is untruthful or otherwise incredible—because the delinquency petitions were amended to charge misdemeanor battery and A.S.W. and J.P.W. were given in-home placement. (¶¶2-4). The court of appeals rejects all Yanko’s arguments for getting access to the records.

Michael Wearry v. Burl Cain, USSC No. 14-10008, 2016 WL 854158 (per curiam) (March 7, 2016); reversing the 21st Judicial District Court, Livingston Parish, No. 01-FELN-015992, Div. A, application for writ denied, 161 So.3d 620 (La. 2015); Scotusblog page

The state violated Wearry’s due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding evidence that would have affected the credibility of witnesses implicating Wearry in a capital murder. Wearry is therefore entitled to a new trial.

State v. Tiron Justin Grant, 2014AP2965-CR, District 1, 11/24/2015 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court serially takes up and rejects each of Grant’s challenges to his conviction, at trial, of possessing cocaine with intent to deliver, as well as the sentencing court’s denial of ERP/SAP and CIP eligibility.

State v. Michael R. Luedtke/State v. Jessica M. Weissinger, 2015 WI 42, 4/24/15, affirming two published decisions of the court of appeals: Luedtke; Weissinger; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs): Luedtke; Weissinger

Brushing aside the argument that the Wisconsin Constitution’s due process clause provides greater protection to its citizens than the federal constituiton, the supreme court affirms the existing Wisconsin rule governing claims that the destruction of evidence by the state violates a defendant’s right to due process.

So asks the title of an excellent article published on The Atlantic’s website, which lays bare the flaws of the reasoning and result in Youngblood v. Arizona, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), by relating the details of the case and Youngblood’s ultimate, almost happenstance, exoneration. As noted here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court is reviewing whether the Wisconsin constitution’s due process guarantee requires greater protection than that afforded under Youngblood.

Consolidated review of two published court of appeals decisions: State v. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73 (case activity); and State v. Luedtke, 2014 WI App 79 (case activity)

Issues (composed by On Point)

In light of State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, does the Wisconsin Constitution provide greater due process protection than the federal constitution, such that defendants charged with operating with a detectable amount of a controlled substance in their blood are denied due process under the Wisconsin Constitution when their blood samples are destroyed before the defendants had notice of the charges or test results and thus had no chance to get the blood independently tested?

Does the offense of operating with a detectable amount of controlled substances in the blood violate due process by failing to require the state to prove that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance?

State v. Jessica M. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73, petition for review granted 10/15/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 42; case activity

Saying it is bound by the rule from Youngblood v. Arizona, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), the court of appeals holds that the state’s destruction of a blood sample before the defendant was notified of her option to test the sample did not violate her due process rights because she has not shown the sample was “apparently exculpatory.” A vigorous dissent says the majority reads Youngblood too broadly, and concludes that because the evidence was inculpatory and necessary to the prosecution, destroying the evidence violated Weissinger’s due process rights even if the state didn’t act in bad faith.