On Point: J. Presumptions

State v. Gerrod R. Bell, 2018 WI 28, 4/10/18, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2015AP2667-2668-CR; case activity (including links)

A defendant is presumed innocent until the State proves him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That’s what the Constitution says. Yet, in this child sexual assault case, the State cleverly told jurors that they could not acquit the defendant unless they believed his accusers had lied about the alleged assaults and unless they had evidence of the victims’ motive for lying.  Bell argued that this prosecution strategy impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him. In a 3-1-1 opinion, SCOW approved the strategy and ruled against him.

Review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

1. Whether the prosecutor’s closing argument impermissibly shifted the burden of proof by telling the jury that in order to acquit the defendant they would have to believe the complaining witnesses were lying, that there would have to be evidence of a reason for them to lie, and that the defendant had presented no reason to believe they were lying.
2. Whether the defendant was deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not object to the jury being given unredacted exhibits containing inadmissible information that one complainant had not had sexual intercourse before the assault alleged in this case.

State v. David Robert Brown, 2016AP83-CR, 12/14/2016, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

David Brown was arrested for OWI; the breathalyzer that he took about two hours later showed a .11 BAC. At trial he adduced expert testimony that, given what Brown told the expert he had drunk and when, his BAC would have been .078, just below the legal limit, at the time he was driving. He objects on due process grounds to the court’s instructing the jury, in accord with Wis JI-Criminal 2669, that it could find he was driving under the influence on the basis of the BAC reading alone.

State v. Sherry L. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, affirmed, 2005 WI 31

For Schultz: Stephen L. Morgan, Jennifer M. Krueger

Issue/Holding: Jury instructions on the elements of duty and intent under § 946.12(3) created mandatory conclusive presumptions:

¶10      Schultz contends that the following sentences in the jury instruction given by the trial court operated as mandatory conclusive presumptions on the issues of intent and duty: “The use of a state resource to promote a candidate in a political campaign or to raise money for a candidate provides to that candidate a dishonest advantage” (establishing the intent element);

State v. Sherry L. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257; companion case: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2007 WI App 256; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, affirmed, 2005 WI 31For Schultz: Stephen L. Morgan, Jennifer M. Krueger

Issue/Holding:

¶9        In State v. Kuntz,

State v. Sherry L. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, affirmed, 2005 WI 31
For Schultz: Stephen L. Morgan, Jennifer M. Krueger

Issue/Holding: Jury instructions on the elements of duty and intent under § 946.12(3) created mandatory conclusive presumptions:

¶10       Schultz contends that the following sentences in the jury instruction given by the trial court operated as mandatory conclusive presumptions on the issues of intent and duty: “The use of a state resource to promote a candidate in a political campaign or to raise money for a candidate provides to that candidate a dishonest advantage” (establishing the intent element);

State v. Eric Benjamin Gardner, 2006 WI App 92
For Gardner: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶9        In addressing this issue, it is first necessary to define what a presumption is and when a presumption denies a criminal defendant due process. A presumption allows a “trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime–that is, an ‘ultimate’ or ‘elemental’ fact–from the existence of one or more ‘evidentiary’ or ‘basic’ facts.” Ulster County Court v.