On Point blog, page 1 of 2
COA concludes testimony alone, with no physical evidence, is sufficient to affirm conviction for driving faster than was reasonable and prudent.
Dane County v. Trent Joseph Meyer, 2024AP1630, 8/14/25, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA affirmed a conviction for driving faster than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions where the defendant drove 20 miles-per-hour above the speed limit and came “close” to other cars’ bumpers.
Habeas win! 7th Circuit orders new trial due to denial of right to present complete defense
Shan Fieldman v. Christine Brannon, __F.3d__ (7th Cir. 2020)
Shan Fieldman climbed into a truck and told a hit man that he wanted his ex-wife and her boyfriend killed. Turns out the hit man was an undercover cop who videotaped their conversation. At trial the State played the video. Fieldman testified that he did not intend for the hit man to actually commit the murders, but he was barred from fully explaining why. He was convicted of soliciting murder for hire, lost his direct appeal, won habeas relief in the Southern District of Illinois, and now the 7th Circuit has affirmed.
SCOW to decide whether directing a verdict for the State at the close of its case is structural error
State v. C.L.K., 2017AP1414, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion granted 3/14/18; case activity
Issues:
1. Where, during the grounds phase of a TPR trial, the circuit court errs by directing a verdict in favor of the State without giving the respondent an opportunity to present evidence, has the court committed structural error, or is the error subject to a harmless error analysis?
2. If the error in this case is not structural, then was it harmless?
Convictions for battery, violation of no contact order upheld
State v. Earnest Lee Nicholson, 2015AP2154-CR & 2015AP2155-CR, 3/7/2017, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Nicholson challenges the validity of the no-contact order he was convicted of violating, and also argues his rights to confrontation and to testify were violated. The court of appeals rejects his claims.
SCOW: No right-to-testify colloquy needed in second NGI phase
State v. James Elvin Lagrone, 2016 WI 26, 4/22/2016, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Ziegler, dissent by A.W. Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)
Lagrone wasn’t told he had the right to testify during the second, mental responsibility phase of his NGI trial. He alleged in his postconviction motion that he didn’t know he had any such right. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The supreme court now affirms that denial in an opinion that neither (1) decides whether Lagrone had a right to testify during the second phase, nor (2) explains how the denial of that right, if it exists, can be raised in postconviction proceedings.
SCOW holds defendant may forfeit constitutional right to testify at trial
State v. Eddie Lee Anthony, 2015 WI 20, affirming unpublished COA decision; click here for docket and briefs
Resolving an issue of first impression, SCOW has decided that a defendant may forfeit his constitutional right to testify by stating an intent to bring up irrelevant matters or by engaging in conduct incompatible with the assertion of that right. Also, the erroneous denial of the right to testify is subject to a harmless error analysis–even where the record shows the defendant would testify to both relevant and irrelevant matters.
SCOW: Denial of defendant’s right to testify is subject to harmless error analysis
State v. Angelica Nelson, 2014 WI 70, 7/16/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority decision by Justice Roggensack; case activity
Nelson wanted to testify at her trial on child sexual assault charges, but after a colloquy with her about waiving her right to remain silent the trial judge wouldn’t let her because he concluded she was testifying against counsel’s advice and her testimony was “completely irrelevant” to the elements the State had to prove. (¶¶14-16). The supreme court assumes without deciding that the trial judge erred, but it follows the majority of jurisdictions in holding that erroneous denial of a defendant’s right to testify is subject to harmless error analysis because its effect on the outcome of the trial is capable of assessment.
Due Process – Defendant’s Right to Testify – Retraction of Waiver – Offer of Proof Required
State v. Ronnie Lee Winters, 2009 WI App 48, PFR filed 4/8/09
For Winters: Ralph Sczygelski
Issue/Holding: Where the defendant validly waived his right to testify but then, after the state had rested and released its rebuttal witnesses, sought to retract the waiver, his failure to make an offer of proof as to the substance of his proposed testimony, either at trial or on postconviction motion,
Due Process – Defendant’s Right to Testify – Exercise of Right: Knowing, Voluntary Waiver of Right Not to Testify
State v. Mark A. Jaramillo, 2009 WI App 39
For Jaramillo: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether the trial court must conduct a colloquy before a defendant testifies to determine whether waiver of the right not to testify is knowing and voluntary.
Holding:
¶16 We have previously noted that we do “not possess any supervisory authority which would permit [us] to promulgate rules of criminal practice and procedure.” State v.
Due Process – Defendant’s Right to Testify – Waiver
State v. David Arredondo, 2004 WI App 7, PFR filed 1/22/04
For Arredondo: James A. Rebholz
Issue:Whether the defendant’s explicit waiver of his right to testify was conditional (on the outcome of two defense witnesses) such that another colloquy should have been conducted; or, if the waiver is deemed binding, whether the trial court nonetheless erroneously exercised discretion in refusing the defendant’s request, after the close of evidence,