On Point blog, page 11 of 29
Lynch v. Dimaya, USSC No. 15-1498, cert. granted 9/29/16
Question presented:
Whether 18 U.S.C. 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provisions governing an alien’s removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague.
Nelson v. Colorado, USSC No. 15-1256, cert. granted 9/29/16
Question presented:
Colorado, like many states, imposes various monetary penalties when a person is convicted of a crime. But Colorado appears to be the only state that does not refund these penalties when a conviction is reversed. Rather, Colorado requires defendants to prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence to get their money back.
The Question Presented is whether this requirement is consistent with due process.
Habeas relief granted because penalty enhancement statute is unconstitutionally vague
Walker Whatley v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2534, 2016 WL 4269805, 8/15/16
The maximum penalty for Whatley’s drug possession conviction was dramatically increased—from 2-to-8 years to 20-to-50 years—under a now-repealed Indiana penalty enhancer for drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of a “youth program center,” defined as a “building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs” for youth. (Sound familiar? Sure it does: see §§ 961.01(22) and 961.49(1m)(b)5.) On habeas review, the Seventh Circuit holds that the statute’s failure to provide an objective standard for determining what “regular” means makes the statute unconstitutionally vague, so Whatley is entitled to resentencing under the non-enhanced penalty scheme.
SCOTUS: Governor setting meetings, calls, events in exchange for gifts not illegal
McDonnell v. United States, USSC No. 15-474, 2016 WL 3461561 (June 27, 2016), reversing United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
While he was governor of Virginia, Bob McDonnell, along with his wife, accepted gifts and favors worth about $175,000 from a businessman who was trying to get the state medical schools to run studies on a nutritional supplement his company had developed. As discussed in our post on the cert grant, a jury convicted McDonnell of various honest services fraud and extortion counts in relation to various actions he undertook related to the supplement, including arranging and attending meetings with other government officials about the supplement and hosting a private lunch with the businessman at which checks were given to university researchers.
Dennis A. Teague v. Brad D. Schimel, 2014AP2360, petition granted 6/15/16
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (from petition for review):
Does Wis. Stat. §19.356 preclude petitioners from seeking a declaratory judgment that the DOJ’s alias name policy violates Wisconsin’s public records law?
Don’t be misled by the bland statement of the first issue. Teague has asked SCOW to decide whether the DOJ should be allowed to hand out false criminal history records about innocent people in response to open records requests.
Defense win: State failed to meet burden at Kastigar hearing
State v. Karl L. Quigley, 2016 WI App 53; case activity (including briefs)
Karl Quigley confessed to sex offenses during an interrogation by a police detective, and later confessed to additional offenses while being questioned by his probation officer. The court of appeals rejects his Miranda challenge to his initial confession, but agrees that the state failed to show that evidence obtained after the statement to the P.O. was “derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of” that statement, as required by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Because Quigley’s plea bargain incorporated charges from both sets of offenses, the court remands for plea withdrawal.
SCOTUS: Due process required recusal of justice who helped prosecute habeas petitioner
Williams v. Pennsylvania, USSC No. 15-5040, 2016 WL 3189529 (June 9, 2016), vacating and remanding Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
When he was district attorney of Philadelphia, Ronald Castille authorized a subordinate to seek a death sentence in Terrance Williams’s murder trial. Thirty years later, as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Castille refused to recuse himself from the commonwealth’s appeal of Williams’ successful habeas petition, which alleged that the DA’s office had withheld exculpatory information contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled against Williams; SCOTUS now holds that Castille’s participation in that decision deprived Williams of due process.
SCOTUS: No Sixth Amendment speedy sentencing right; maybe try due process
Betterman v. Montana, USSC No. 14-1457 (May 19, 2016), affirming State v. Betterman, 342 P.3d 971 (Mont. 2015); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Brandon Betterman pled guilty to bail jumping, and then spent 14 months in jail before he was finally sentenced. He appealed, contending that the lengthy delay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Montana Supreme Court determined that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a speedy sentencing, and SCOTUS now agrees.
Privilege re: desire to shoot victim waived by statement of desire to shoot self
State v. Daniel L. Schmidt, 2016 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals rejects three challenges to Schmidt’s jury-trial conviction of two homicides.
SCOW: No right-to-testify colloquy needed in second NGI phase
State v. James Elvin Lagrone, 2016 WI 26, 4/22/2016, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Ziegler, dissent by A.W. Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)
Lagrone wasn’t told he had the right to testify during the second, mental responsibility phase of his NGI trial. He alleged in his postconviction motion that he didn’t know he had any such right. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The supreme court now affirms that denial in an opinion that neither (1) decides whether Lagrone had a right to testify during the second phase, nor (2) explains how the denial of that right, if it exists, can be raised in postconviction proceedings.