On Point: 13. Due Process

State v. Geoffrey A. Herling, 2014AP565-CR, District 4, 12/18/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The circuit court did not err by requiring Herling to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had amnesia that prevented him from mounting an adequate defense.

Questions presented:

I.   Whether a state court that considers the evidence presented at a petitioner’s penalty phase proceeding as determinative of the petitioner’s claim of mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), has based its decision on an unreasonable determination of facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

II.   Whether a state court that denies funding to an indigent petitioner who has no other means of obtaining evidence of his mental retardation has denied petitioner his “opportunity to be heard,”

So asks the title of an excellent article published on The Atlantic’s website, which lays bare the flaws of the reasoning and result in Youngblood v. Arizona, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), by relating the details of the case and Youngblood’s ultimate, almost happenstance, exoneration. As noted here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court is reviewing whether the Wisconsin constitution’s due process guarantee requires greater protection than that afforded under Youngblood.

State v. Ryan P. O’Boyle, 2014AP80-CR, District 1, 11/4/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

O’Boyle’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are rejected because trial counsel’s performance wasn’t deficient.

Consolidated review of two published court of appeals decisions: State v. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73 (case activity); and State v. Luedtke, 2014 WI App 79 (case activity)

Issues (composed by On Point)

In light of State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, does the Wisconsin Constitution provide greater due process protection than the federal constitution, such that defendants charged with operating with a detectable amount of a controlled substance in their blood are denied due process under the Wisconsin Constitution when their blood samples are destroyed before the defendants had notice of the charges or test results and thus had no chance to get the blood independently tested?

Does the offense of operating with a detectable amount of controlled substances in the blood violate due process by failing to require the state to prove that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance?

On review of a published court of appeals decision in Kempainen (case activity) and a per curiam decision in Hurley (case activity)

Issues (adapted from the State’s  PFR in Hurley):

Did the amended complaint charging repeated sexual assault of a child, which alleged that Hurley assaulted his stepdaughter at least 26 times over a five or six-year charging period, satisfy Hurley’s due process right to prepare a defense?

Did the circuit court properly exercise its discretion in admitting “other acts” evidence that Hurley repeatedly assaulted his sister when she was 10 and he was 14 in view of the greater latitude shown “other crimes” evidence in child sexual assault cases?

Did the circuit court err in ordering a new trial due to the prosecutor’s unobjected-to remark in closing argument about Hurley’s failure in his trial testimony to make a strong denial of his sister’s allegations?

State v. Ricky H. Jones, 2013AP1731-CR, District 2, 7/30/14 (unpublished); case actvity

Exclusion of expert testimony about defendant’s lack of propensity toward child sexual assault

In defending Jones against two counts of 1st-degree sexual assault of a child, his lawyer wanted to elicit expert testimony that Jones posed a low risk of committing a sexual offense–a strategy authorized by State v. Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1998).  Unfortunately, trial counsel failed to give the expert report to the State pursuant to its discovery demand, so the trial court excluded it under §971.23(7m)(a) and State v. Gribble, 2001 WI App 227, 248 Wis. 2d 409, 636 N.W.2d 488.  Jones was convicted and appealed.

State v. Angelica Nelson, 2014 WI 70, 7/16/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority decision by Justice Roggensack; case activity

Nelson wanted to testify at her trial on child sexual assault charges, but after a colloquy with her about waiving her right to remain silent the trial judge wouldn’t let her because he concluded she was testifying against counsel’s advice and her testimony was “completely irrelevant” to the elements the State had to prove. (¶¶14-16). The supreme court assumes without deciding that the trial judge erred, but it follows the majority of jurisdictions in holding that erroneous denial of a defendant’s right to testify is subject to harmless error analysis because its effect on the outcome of the trial is capable of assessment.

State v. Jessica M. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73, petition for review granted 10/15/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 42; case activity

Saying it is bound by the rule from Youngblood v. Arizona, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), the court of appeals holds that the state’s destruction of a blood sample before the defendant was notified of her option to test the sample did not violate her due process rights because she has not shown the sample was “apparently exculpatory.” A vigorous dissent says the majority reads Youngblood too broadly, and concludes that because the evidence was inculpatory and necessary to the prosecution, destroying the evidence violated Weissinger’s due process rights even if the state didn’t act in bad faith.

State v. Russell S. Krancki, 2014 WI App 80; case activity

In the first Wisconsin case to address how Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013), affects the admission of evidence of a defendant’s silence, the court of appeals reads Salinas to apply to a narrow factual scenario not present in this case. The court goes on to assume that trial counsel should have objected to testimony about Krancki’s silence, but finds his failure to object wasn’t prejudicial. The court also concludes trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for saying in his opening statement that Krancki would testify or for failing to exclude references to the .02 blood alcohol limit.