On Point blog, page 25 of 29
Jury Instructions – Conclusive Presumptions – Misconduct in Public Office, § 946.12(3), Elements of Duty and Intent
State v. Sherry L. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, affirmed, 2005 WI 31
For Schultz: Stephen L. Morgan, Jennifer M. Krueger
Issue/Holding: Jury instructions on the elements of duty and intent under § 946.12(3) created mandatory conclusive presumptions:
¶10 Schultz contends that the following sentences in the jury instruction given by the trial court operated as mandatory conclusive presumptions on the issues of intent and duty: “The use of a state resource to promote a candidate in a political campaign or to raise money for a candidate provides to that candidate a dishonest advantage” (establishing the intent element);
Due Process – Identifcation Procedure – Photo Array: Analysis Unchanged by Dubose Show-up Standard<
State v. Ryan W. Drew, 2007 WI App 213, PFR filed 9/27/07
For Drew: Steven Zaleski
Issue/Holding: Analysis of admissibility of photo array ID remains unchanged by the new standard for show-ups set by State v. Tyrone L. Dubose, 2005 WI 126:
¶2 We conclude that Dubose did not alter the standard for determining whether admission of an out-of-court identification from a photo array violates due process.
Due Process – Right to Present Defense – Misconduct in Public Office, § 946.12(3) – Intent to Obtain Dishonest Advantage – Testimony of Long-Standing Legislative Practice
State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2007 WI App 256; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89,affirmed, 2005 WI 31
For Jensen: Robert H. Friebert, Matthew W. O’Neill
Issue/Holding:
¶36 We agree with the State that the testimony of Jensen’s defense witnesses as to the practices of both Democrats and Republicans in the legislature of using state resources for campaign purposes is not relevant to show whether Jensen intended to obtain a dishonest advantage by doing the same.
Distribution of Harmful Material to Children, § 948.11(2)(am) – Internet Chat Room Communication is “Verbal” Communication, within Statute
State v. Shawn B. Ebersold, 2007 WI App 232
For Ebersold: Lester A. Pines
Issue: Whether message sent via Internet chat room supports prosecution for § 948.11(2)(am), verbally communicating harmful material to child.
Holding:
¶9 In this case, the parties dispute whether Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(am) prohibits communication of a harmful description or narrative account to a child via an Internet chat message.
§ 903.03, Conclusive Presumptions — Generally
State v. Sherry L. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257; companion case: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2007 WI App 256; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, affirmed, 2005 WI 31For Schultz: Stephen L. Morgan, Jennifer M. Krueger
Issue/Holding:
¶9 In State v. Kuntz,
§ 903.03, Conclusive Presumptions – Limiting Language Required on Matters of Law as Well as Fact
State v. Sherry L. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, affirmed, 2005 WI 31
For Schultz: Stephen L. Morgan, Jennifer M. Krueger
Issue/Holding: Jury instructions on the elements of duty and intent under § 946.12(3) created mandatory conclusive presumptions:
¶10 Schultz contends that the following sentences in the jury instruction given by the trial court operated as mandatory conclusive presumptions on the issues of intent and duty: “The use of a state resource to promote a candidate in a political campaign or to raise money for a candidate provides to that candidate a dishonest advantage” (establishing the intent element);
Impeachment with Post-Miranda Silence – Generally: Due Process Analysis
State v. Caltone K. Cockrell, 2007 WI App 217, PFR filed
For Cockrell: Paul R. Nesson, Jr.
Issue/Holding:
¶14 Although Cockrell describes his challenge to the prosecutor’s use of his post- Miranda silence as a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the substance of his argument is the due process analysis employed in Doyle v. Ohio,
Self-Incrimination – Impeachment with Post-Miranda Silence – Generally: Partial Exercise of Rights
State v. Caltone K. Cockrell, 2007 WI App 217, PFR filed
For Cockrell: Paul R. Nesson, Jr.
Issue/Holding:
¶16 Building on footnote 11 in Doyle, courts have recognized situations in which it is not a violation of due process for the prosecutor to elicit on cross-examination the fact of the defendant’s post- Miranda silence for the purpose of impeaching the defendant’s testimony about his or her interactions with the police after the arrest.
Waiver of Issue: Judicial Communications with Jury during deliberations – Defendant’s Right to Presence
State v. Lionel N. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, reversing 2005 WI App 238
For Anderson: Harry R. Hertel
Issue/Holding:
¶36 The parties agree with the court of appeals that the circuit court’s communications with the jury outside the presence of the defendant is error, violating the defendant’s constitutional and statutory right to be present. We agree with the parties.…
¶63 (W)hatever the requirement for an accused’s waiver of the right to be present when a circuit court communicates with the jury,
Due Process – Right to Present Defense – Expert Testimony, Identification Procedure
State v. Forest S. Shomberg, 2006 WI 9, affirming unpublished decision
For Shomberg: Charles W. Giesen; Morris D. Berman
Issue/Holding:
¶27 In St. George, this court held that the circuit court’s exclusion of testimony of a defense expert about the victim’s recantation, and about interview techniques particular to child sexual assault cases, unconstitutionally deprived the defendant of his right to present a defense.