On Point blog, page 5 of 29

SCOW will review more constitutional challenges to ch. 51’s recommitment scheme

Waupaca County v. K.E.K., 2018AP1887, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals decision granted 7/24/20; case activity

Issues presented:

  1. Did the circuit court lose competency to conduct a recommitment hearing because the County did not file the evaluation of K.E.K. at least 21 days before the expiration of her commitment, as required by § 51.20(13)(g)2r.?
  2. Is the recommitment standard in § 51.20(1)(am) facially unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment  because it violates the guarantees of substantive due process and equal protection of the law or abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens?
  3. Is the recommitment standard in § 51.20(1)(am) unconstitutional as applied to K.E.K.?
Read full article >

COA throws out a show up identification based on SCOW’s abrogation of Dubose

State v. K.L.G., 2019AP658, District 1, 6/16/20 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

What a bummer. K.L.G. moved to suppress an officer’s identification of him made after she looked up his booking photo from a previous incidence. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed. The State appealed, and the court of appeals reverses.

Read full article >

SCOTUS holds Constitution requires unanimous jury in state criminal trials

Ramos v. Louisiana, USSC No. 18-5924, 2020 WL 1906545, 4/20/20, reversing State v. Ramos, 231 So. 3d 44 (La. Ct. Apps. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The holding in this case has no relevance to Wisconsin practitioners, or indeed anyone outside of Louisiana or Oregon–the only two jurisdictions permitting 10-2 guilty verdicts in criminal trials. The Sixth Amendment requires unanimity in federal trials, and our state supreme court has long held the Wisconsin Constitution confers the same right. See Holland v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 138, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979). So if you’re interested only in the impact on your practice, there is none, and you can stop reading now.

Read full article >

SCOTUS: Constitution doesn’t require insanity defense to cover person whose mental illness prevents recognition of wrongfulness of conduct

Kahler v. Kansas, USSC No. 18-6135, 2020 WL 1325817, 3/23/20, affirming State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105 (Kan. 2018); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Kansas amended its insanity defense to limit to defendants whose mental illness prevents them from forming the required intent to commit a crime. A majority of the Supreme Court holds that does not violate due process.

Read full article >

Partial SCOW defense win; two charges for two different strength pills multiplicitous

State v. Brantner, 2020 WI 21, 2/25/20, affirming in part and reversing in part a summary order, 2018AP53; case activity (including briefs)

Brantner was arrested (for reasons unrelated to this case) in Kenosha County by Fond du Lac County detectives. They took him to jail in Fond du Lac, where a booking search revealed several different types of pills concealed in his boot. He was tried, convicted and sentenced in Fond du Lac on five counts of drug possession and five associated bail-jumping counts. The supreme court now rejects his argument that he didn’t “possess” any of the drugs in Fond du Lac County–that the arrest in Kenosha terminated his possession because he lacked control over the pills. But it agrees with him that his conviction on two of the counts (with their associated bail-jumping counts) is a double-jeopardy violation; the bare fact that he had pills with two different oxycodone dosages (5 and 20 milligram) will not support two different charges of possessing that drug.

Read full article >

SCOW does away with Dubose

State v. Stephan I. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, 12/3/19, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2017AP1894, case activity (including briefs)

The result here is simple, and expected, given the current makeup of the court: a five-two majority to overturn State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582. Dubose held that “show up” identifications–those where the police present a witness with only one suspect–were inherently suggestive, and identifications so obtained would be inadmissible unless circumstances rendered the procedure “necessary.” So, now, Wisconsin courts will review claims that a show-up identification should be excluded under the test of State v. Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d 234, 264, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995): a defendant must carry the initial burden to show the procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and if he or she does, the state must then prove that the identification is nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances.

Read full article >

COA upholds conviction for violating injunctions; rejects unfair prejudice, vagueness and sufficiency challenges

State v. Michael K. Lorentz, 2018AP1515, 10/1/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state charged Lorentz with violating four injunctions. One count was brought under Wis. Stat. § 813.12(8)(a) (for violating a domestic abuse injunction regarding his ex-wife) and three under Wis. Stat. § 813.122(11) (for violating three child abuse injunctions–one for each of their three children). Each injunction required Lorentz to “avoid” the “residence” the mother and children shared.

Read full article >

Only the state’s evidence is admissible

State v. Daniel A. Griffin, 2019 WI App 49; case activity (including briefs)

Someone killed a young child in Griffin’s home. Both Griffin and the child’s mother were present at the time. What evidence was the jury allowed to hear about who committed the crime? If you guessed “any remotely relevant evidence implicating Griffin” (whom the state had charged) and “no evidence implicating the mother” (whom it had not) then you are a scholar of Wisconsin evidentiary law.

Read full article >

SCOTUS declares federal penalty enhancer unconstitutionally vague

United States v. Davis, USSC No. 18-431, June 24, 2019, affirming and vacating in part, United states v. Davis, 903 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

No surprise here.  Section 18 U.S.C. §924(c) makes it a crime to use a firearm during a crime of violence and 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(B) defined a crime of violence as an offense that by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force would be used in committing it. SCOTUS declared similar language unconstitutionally vague in  Sessions v. Dimaya, and it followed suit here.

Read full article >

Challenges to use of CHIPS information at sentencing rejected

State v. Dominique M. Anwar, 2018AP2222-CR, 6/25/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals rejects Anwar’s arguments that she’s entitled to resentencing because the State offered certain information at her sentencing hearing without first disclosing the information and giving her notice it would use the information.

Read full article >