On Point: 13. Due Process

Some states say “no.” The Marshall Project just ran this article on the practice.  For the Connecticut case mentioned in the article, click here.

Jeremy Perri guests posts on State v. Adam M. Blackman, 2017 WI 77, 7/7/17, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2016 WI App 69, 371 Wis. 2d 635, 886 N.W.2d 94; case activity (including briefs)

SCOW suppresses blood test, holding that the statutory Informing the Accused misrepresented the consequences of a refusal, the consent was coerced, and the exclusionary rule is necessary to deter future violations.

State v. Matthew Ray Taylor, 2016AP682-CR, District 1, 6/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Taylor argues he should get a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals rejects his claims.

Charles Turner, et al., v. United States, USSC Nos. 15-1503 & 15-1504, 2017 WL 2674152 (June 22, 2017), affirming Turner v. U.S., 116 A.3d 894 (D.C. App. 2015); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In granting cert in this case the Court told the parties to brief one issue: Whether the convictions of the petitioners must be set aside under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We thought the case might be the occasion for the Court to say something important about Brady, but that didn’t happen. The Court simply says the issue before it “is legally simple but factually complex” (slip op. at 11), applies the Brady standard without alteration or elaboration, and concludes the convictions stand.

State v. Jesse T. Riemer, 2017 WI App 48; case activity (including briefs)

In what appears to be the first case of its kind, the court of appeals addresses the standard for reviewing the sentence imposed on a member of the Wisconsin National Guard after he was convicted of various offenses. Concluding it should apply the same standard as civilian criminal cases—erroneous exercise of discretion—it affirms the military judge’s sentence.

Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order has a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel where his lawyer fails to object to, prevent the admission of, or request a curative instruction to address, evidence of his prisoner status during his jury trial?

Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice where the jury repeatedly sees and hears evidence of his prisoner status?

Tamara M. Loertscher v. Eloise Anderson, et al., No. 14-cv-870-jdp (W.D. Wis. April 28, 2017)

Under § 48.193, which was created by 1997 Wisconsin Act 292, a juvenile court may treat an unborn child of any gestational age as a child in need of protection or services if the “expectant mother’s habitual lack of self-control in the use of alcohol beverages, controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a severe degree, [poses] a substantial risk” of harm to the unborn child. A federal judge has ruled the statute is void for vagueness.

State v. George D. Taylor, 2015AP1325-CR, 4/27/17, District 1/4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Taylor raises a host of challenges to his felony murder conviction. The court of appeals rejects all of them except one: an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which the court orders must be assessed at a Machner hearing.

State v. Frank V. Blonda, 2015AP2431-CR, 4/11/17, District 1, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).

 M.L., the victim in this case, called her sister, Vincenza, and allegedly told her that Blonda had hit her in the head with a telephone. Vicenza reported this to the police.  Later, M.L. told the DA’s victim advocate that she did not want to press charges, Blonda did not hit her with the phone, and she had been drinking and wasn’t sure how she had been injured. She also filed a victim impact statement, which said that her injury was due to an accident that happened in Blonda’s absence. Unfortunately, the State didn’t disclose these statements to Blonda until the first and second days of his trial.

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Whether a defendant may, by voluntary absence or other conduct, waive the statutory right to be present at trial before the trial has begun?