On Point: 13. Due Process

State v. Michael L. Washington, 2018 WI 3, 1/9/18, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court determines that, despite the absence of any colloquy, a defendant who was not present for his trial waived his statutory right to be there.

State v. Gary Lee Wayerski, 2015AP1083-CR, District 3, 10/31/17 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 3/13/18, and modified, and afford as modified, 2019 WI 11; case activity (including briefs)

Rejecting Wayerski’s argument to the contrary, the court of appeals holds that a police officer alleged to have sexually assaulted two teenage boys could be convicted under § 948.095(3)(a), which prohibits a person over age 21 “who engages in an occupation or participates in a volunteer position that requires him or her to work or interact directly with children” from having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a child “whom the person works or interacts through that occupation or volunteer position.” The court also rejects the challenges Wayerski makes to the conduct of his trial.

McCoy v. Louisiana, USSC No. 16-8255, cert granted 9/28/17

Question presented:

Is it unconstitutional for defense counsel to concede an accused’s guilt over the accused’s express objection?

Some states say “no.” The Marshall Project just ran this article on the practice.  For the Connecticut case mentioned in the article, click here.

Jeremy Perri guests posts on State v. Adam M. Blackman, 2017 WI 77, 7/7/17, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2016 WI App 69, 371 Wis. 2d 635, 886 N.W.2d 94; case activity (including briefs)

SCOW suppresses blood test, holding that the statutory Informing the Accused misrepresented the consequences of a refusal, the consent was coerced, and the exclusionary rule is necessary to deter future violations.

State v. Matthew Ray Taylor, 2016AP682-CR, District 1, 6/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Taylor argues he should get a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals rejects his claims.

Charles Turner, et al., v. United States, USSC Nos. 15-1503 & 15-1504, 2017 WL 2674152 (June 22, 2017), affirming Turner v. U.S., 116 A.3d 894 (D.C. App. 2015); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In granting cert in this case the Court told the parties to brief one issue: Whether the convictions of the petitioners must be set aside under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We thought the case might be the occasion for the Court to say something important about Brady, but that didn’t happen. The Court simply says the issue before it “is legally simple but factually complex” (slip op. at 11), applies the Brady standard without alteration or elaboration, and concludes the convictions stand.

State v. Jesse T. Riemer, 2017 WI App 48; case activity (including briefs)

In what appears to be the first case of its kind, the court of appeals addresses the standard for reviewing the sentence imposed on a member of the Wisconsin National Guard after he was convicted of various offenses. Concluding it should apply the same standard as civilian criminal cases—erroneous exercise of discretion—it affirms the military judge’s sentence.

Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order has a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel where his lawyer fails to object to, prevent the admission of, or request a curative instruction to address, evidence of his prisoner status during his jury trial?

Whether the subject of a §51.20(1)(a) extension of involuntary commitment and medication order is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice where the jury repeatedly sees and hears evidence of his prisoner status?

Tamara M. Loertscher v. Eloise Anderson, et al., No. 14-cv-870-jdp (W.D. Wis. April 28, 2017)

Under § 48.193, which was created by 1997 Wisconsin Act 292, a juvenile court may treat an unborn child of any gestational age as a child in need of protection or services if the “expectant mother’s habitual lack of self-control in the use of alcohol beverages, controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a severe degree, [poses] a substantial risk” of harm to the unborn child. A federal judge has ruled the statute is void for vagueness.