On Point: c. "Greater latitude" rule

State v. Morris V. Seaton, 2021AP1399-CR, 11/6/24, District II (recommended for publication); case activity

In a case confirming the changes wrought to other acts case law as a result of the codification of the greater latitude rule, COA reverses the circuit court’s order excluding evidence of a prior sexual assault

State v. Kenneth W. Hill, 2022AP1718-CR, 8/6/24, District III (recommended for publication); case activity

The state appealed after the circuit court denied its motion seeking to admit Hill’s 1984 conviction from Minnesota for “criminal sexual conduct in the first degree” pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(b)2. at his trials for two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child. The court of appeals reverses and remands with directions, outlining the relevant analysis, holding that the admissible evidence includes only the fact of the conviction, not the underlying details of the prior case, and concluding that the Sullivan analysis does not apply. (¶2).

State v. Alvin James Jemison, Jr., 2021AP2207-CR, 7/18/23, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After a jury trial, Jemison was convicted of second-degree sexual assault of an unconscious person (Teresa) as a repeater – serious sex crime and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release to extended supervision. See Wis. Stat. § 939.618(2)(b). After the circuit court denied his postconviction motion without a Machner hearing, Jemison raised three claims on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the completed sexual intercourse charge, (2) the court erred in its admission of other acts evidence, and (3) the court erroneously denied his claims without an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals rejects each of Jemison’s claims and affirms.

State v. Morris V. Seaton, 2021AP1399-CR, certification granted 3/24/23;  remanded, 2023 WI 69;District 2; case activity (including briefs) case activity (including briefs)

Question presented (from the court of appeals’ certification):

In light of the 2014 amendment of WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b) (2019-20), codifying and expanding the “greater latitude” rule and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶¶23-25, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158, interpreting and applying that amendment, are State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982), and State v. Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, 238 Wis. 2d 467, 618 N.W.2d 214, still controlling law as they relate to the admissibility of prior nonconsensual sexual wrongs in cases involving an adult victim of an alleged sexual assault where consent is the primary issue?

State v. Morris V. Seaton, 2021AP1399-CR, certification filed 2/8/23, certification granted, 3/24/23, remanded, 2023 WI 69;District 2; case activity (including briefs)

Question presented (from the court of appeals’ certification):

In light of the 2014 amendment of WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b) (2019-20), codifying and expanding the “greater latitude” rule and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶¶23-25, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158, interpreting and applying that amendment, are State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982), and State v. Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, 238 Wis. 2d 467, 618 N.W.2d 214, still controlling law as they relate to the admissibility of prior nonconsensual sexual wrongs in cases involving an adult victim of an alleged sexual assault where consent is the primary issue?

State v. Shane Allan Stroik, 2022 WI App 11; case activity (including briefs)

A jury convicted Stroik of the sexual assault of a then-five-year old girl, “Amy,” the daughter of his girlfriend. Postconviction, Stroik brought a slew of claims for a new trial; the circuit court rejected them all. The court of appeals now holds that trial counsel performed deficiently in not obtaining a report from child protective services detailing an accusation Amy had made about her cousin a few months before she accused Stroik–an accusation about an assault quite similar in its details to the one she would later say Stroik committed. The court also finds a reasonable probability that this evidence would have resulted in an acquittal, and thus grants Stroik a new trial.

State v. Omar S. Coria-Granados, 2019AP1989-CR, District 4, 2/11/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In this child sexual assault the circuit court denied the state’s motions to admit other-acts evidence under § 904.04(2) and to allow the use of an audiovisual statement of a complainant under § 908.08. In a long (39 page) decision addressing the multiple legal questions and fact specific issues, the court of appeals reverses the circuit court’s other-acts order but affirms the denial of the motion to admit the audiovisual statement.

State v. Frank P. Smogoleski, 2019AP1780-CR, District 2, 11/18/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state wins its appeal of two circuit court orders, one excluding the use of preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who is now dead, the other excluding other-acts evidence.

State v. David Gutierrez, 2020 WI 52, reversing in part a published court of appeals opinion, 6/3/20; case activity (including briefs)

In a 5-0 decision, SCOW affirms all parts of this published court of appeals decision but one. The court of appeals held that the circuit court erred in refusing to admit evidence that excluded Gutierrez as the source of male DNA in the underwear and around the mouth of a victim of child sexual assault. The assaults involved oral sex and attempted vaginal intercourse. SCOW reversed the court of appeals on that point.

State v. David Gutierrez, 2017AP2364-CR, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 11/13/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (based on the State’s Petition for Review):

1. Did the court of appeals violate the standard of appellate review of trial court evidentiary rulings by holding the trial court erred in deciding to exclude evidence offered by the defendant that DNA from other men was found on the clothing of the complainant in a child sexual assault prosecution?

2. Did the court of appeals improperly apply Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b), Wisconsin’s rape shield law, when it held the defendant was not offering the DNA evidence as evidence concerning the victim’s prior sexual conduct?