On Point: G. Opinions/experts, Ch. 907

State v. Juan J. Castillo, 2020AP983, 6/29/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Castillo was tried for the alleged sexual assault of his five-year-old cousin when he was sixteen. He wished to call an expert to testify about the factors that can affect the reliability of a child’s allegations of assault; the circuit court disallowed this testimony. The court of appeals upholds the circuit court’s ruling on that matter, concluding that the testimony didn’t “fit” the facts of this case. But the court does order a new trial, holding the circuit court should have granted the mistrial Castillo requested after the now-8-year-old alleged victim “blurted out” on the stand that Castillo had assaulted three other girls, and after his sister gave testimony suggesting he was incarcerated at the time of trial.

State v. Markell Hogan, 2021 WI App 24; case activity (including briefs)

A police officer who has experience investigating human trafficking cases and who has training from various prosecutorial and law enforcement conferences about the methods traffickers use may testify as an expert under §907.02 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

State v. C.A.A., 2020AP1194, District 1, 10/13/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

At the trial on the petition to terminate C.A.A.’s parental rights, the case manager handling the CHIPS case pertaining to C.A.A.’s child testified that, in her opinion, C.A.A. would not likely satisfy the conditions of return under the CHIPS order within the 9-month period prescribed by § 48.415(2)(a)3. (2015-16) (a requirement eliminated by 2017 Wis. Act 256). (¶6 & ¶9 n.3). The court of appeals holds this was admissible lay opinion testimony.

State v. Timothy E. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, 7/3/20, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2018AP319; case activity (including briefs)

There’s really only one important holding here: despite adoption of the Daubert standard, Wisconsin continues to permit expert testimony in the form of “dissertation or exposition.” That is, an expert can educate the jury about the principles or findings of his or her field without talking about the facts of the case, and an expert who does so is not subject to the requirement that he or she “appl[y] the principles and methods” of that field “reliably to the facts of the case.” Though the court also decides a separate Miranda issue, the discussion is fact-intensive and breaks no legal ground. What’s notable (and regrettable) about the Miranda decision is a meandering three-justice concurrence that repeats the court’s error in State v. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 906 N.W.2d 684, by grafting a third step onto the familiar two-part Miranda-custody inquiry.

State v. Mark J. Bucki, 2020 WI App 43; case activity (including briefs)

[UPDATED POST – Scroll to the bottom for very useful commentary by Chris Zachar. Many thanks to him for sharing his knowledge.]

The headline tells you the only legal proposition you need to take from this soon-to-be-published case: under Daubert, evidence that trained dogs indicated the defendant had been at a particular location, and also that there had once been human remains in other locations, is not subject to a per se rule requiring corroboration before it can be admitted at trial. In a given case, a circuit court could conclude that particular dog-sniff evidence is not sufficiently reliable to come in (with or without corroboration). But Bucki’s argument–that dog-sniff evidence is so inherently unreliable that it necessarily requires corroboration–is rejected. We read the 50-page opinion, so you don’t have to.

State v. Dobbs, 2018AP319-CR, petition for review of a per curiam opinion granted 1/14/20; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (based on Dobbs’ petition for review and SCOW’s order granting review:

1. Did the trial court err in precluding the defense’s expert on false confessions from testifying where, consistent with State v. Smith, 2016 WI App 8, 366 Wis. 2d 613, 874 N.W.2d 610, his opinions were relevant to a material issue, but he would not be offering an opinion on the specific facts of the case?

2. Did the trial court err in allowing Mr. Dobbs’ statements to law enforcement into evidence despite the delay in reading him his Miranda rights and because his statements were involuntary due to his mental and physical conditions?

3. Whether the court of appeals’ decision that Dobbs was in custody for purposes of Miranda warnings is consistent with State v. Morgan, 2002 WI App 124, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 648 N.W.2d 23. If not, whether Morgan should be overruled?

State v. Christopher J. Durski, 2018AP1750-CR, District 2, 8/21/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Durski was arrested at a motel, where he had decamped after a family dispute. In investigating the family dispute police learned Durski drank alcohol before leaving for the motel, so they tracked him down. Durski wasn’t in custody during the officers’ initial questioning of him at the motel, so his statements were admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings. So was the state’s retrograde extrapolation evidence.

State v. Johnnie Lee Tucker, 2017AP840-CR, District 1, 8/28/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Applying State v. Small, 2013 WI App 117, 351 Wis. 2d 46, 839 N.W.2d 160, and the lay opinion rule, § 907.01, the circuit court properly allowed a detective to narrate the events recorded on multiple surveillance cameras based on his having viewed the recordings “many times.”

State v. Natalie N. Murphy, 2017AP1559-CR, 8/16/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

To no avail, Murphy challenges the circuit court’s decision to exclude her expert’s testimony and its decision to allow certain testimony from the state’s expert.

State v. R.D.J., 2017AP547, 8/7/18, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.D.J. appeals the termination of his parental rights to his daughter, T.S.J. He argues that his lawyer was ineffective for not challenging the state’s expert’s report on Daubert and undue prejudice grounds, that his due process rights were violated because T.S.J.’s removal from the home made it impossible for him to show a substantial parental relationship, and that the CHIPS order itself established that such a relationship existed.