On Point blog, page 1 of 2
Defense win! Absent hearsay, evidence insufficient for ch. 51 extension
Winnebago County v. D.E.S., 2023AP460, 9/20/23, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
This is a nice case to know, both for its careful, thorough analysis of a common ch. 51 problem–commitments based entirely or extensively on hearsay–and its collection of other cases analyzing the same issue. The sole witness at D.E.S. (“Dennis”)’s extension hearing was a Dr. Anderson, who had witnessed none of the behaviors she relied on to conclude that Dennis was dangerous, instead reading them from his institutional records. Over objection, the trial court relied on them anyway. The court of appeals now reverses the commitment because absent the hearsay, there was no evidence tending to show that Dennis would be dangerous if treatment were withdrawn.
Defense Win! COA rejects “case manager exception” to hearsay rules and reverses recommitment
Brown County v. Z.W.L., 2022AP2201, District 3, 9/12/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (briefs not available)
In yet another hearsay-based sufficiency challenge to a Chapter 51 commitment, Z.W.L. (“Zeb”) succeeds because the circuit court relied on inadmissible hearsay and no other evidence established that Zeb was dangerous. Specifically, while Zeb made admissible “party-opponent” statements to a crisis worker and a police officer, the county failed to call either direct witness to Zeb’s statements and instead relied on two witnesses who read about Zeb’s history. While the circuit court relied on a case manager’s testimony because “this is what case managers are supposed to do” and “to me, that’s an exception to any of the hearsay rules,” the court of appeals disagrees.
No error in excluding text message containing purported apology for getting defendant in trouble
State v. Salar Zangana, 2020AP1228-CR, District 1, 6/29/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for appeal); case activity (including briefs)
At his trial on battery and disorderly conduct charges, Zangana tried to introduce a text message he received that purported to be an apology one of the complaining witnesses. (¶¶2-4). The message was properly excluded as hearsay and evidence about what the message meant was inadmissible because it involved privileged communication between spouses.
SCOW muddles confrontation, hearsay analysis; addresses Miranda at John Doe proceeding
State v. Peter J. Hanson, 2019 WI 63, 6/5/19, affirming an unpublished decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
Hanson was called to testify at a John Doe proceeding looking into an unsolved homicide. He was eventually charged with the crime, and at his trial the jury heard a portion of Hanson’s John Doe testimony. The supreme court held the admission of this evidence didn’t violate Hanson’s right to confrontation. The court also holds that Hanson’s John Doe testimony was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings because that warning isn’t required at a John Doe proceeding.
Seventh Circuit rejects habeas claim, but cautions about improper use of “course of investigation” rationale for getting around hearsay objections
Renardo Carter v. Timothy Douma, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 13-3312, 8/6/15
Carter’s trial counsel failed to object to a police officer’s testimony about the hearsay statements of a confidential informant who said Carter was involved in drug dealing. While the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that the failure to object didn’t prejudice Carter, the Seventh Circuit issues a useful warning about the improper use of the “course of investigation” rationale for admitting out-of-court statements.
Reference to contents of DOC records at ch. 980 trial wasn’t improper
State v. Jon F. Winant, 2014AP1944, District 1, 7/21/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Paperwork created by DOC during the revocation of Winant’s parole and probation for having unsupervised contact with A.G., a minor, was properly admitted at Winant’s ch. 980 trial under § 908.03(8), the public records and reports exception to the hearsay rule.
Counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to request certain jury instructions or objecting to prosecutor’s closing
State v. Ryan P. O’Boyle, 2014AP80-CR, District 1, 11/4/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
O’Boyle’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are rejected because trial counsel’s performance wasn’t deficient.
Admission of other-acts evidence wasn’t error; trial court properly denied mistrial motion
State v. Timothy A. Jago, 2013AP1084-CR, District 1, 2/4/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move in limine to exclude other-acts evidence–specifically, evidence that Jago told the victim he has only pointed a gun at two people in his life, the victim and the man he killed in Illinois. (¶¶4, 16, 19). Jago’s trial lawyer reasonably relied on an agreement with the prosecutor to keep this statement out of evidence.
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to testimony about recorded conversations in Spanish between the defendant and the victim
State v. Adamis Figueroa, 2013AP47-CR, District 1, 12/3/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of a police department employee about the content of two recorded conversations in Spanish between Figueroa and J.R., who alleged Figueroa had sexually assaulted her several years ago, when she was a child. (During one conversation J.R. wore a wire and spoke with Figueroa in person;
Erroneous admission of other acts evidence was harmless; letter written by attorney to victim at defendant’s behest was properly admitted
State v. Jeffrey A. Adamczak, 2013 WI App 150; case activity
Admission of other acts evidence
Adamczak was charged with sexual exploitation by a therapist in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.22 for having sexual contact with Sabrina. He testified the contact occurred, but only after the patient-therapist relationship was over. (¶¶3, 5). Before trial the state moved to admit the testimony of Sarah and Gail,