On Point: 15. Evidence

State v. Jude W. Giles, 2018AP1967-CR, District 3, 10/8/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Jude’s sought to admit the results of his preliminary breath test results (.076) to lay a foundation for his expert’s opinion that alcohol was still being absorbed into his blood, making the state hygiene lab’s blood test result (.144) higher than his blood alcohol content at the time he was driving. (¶¶2-5). The circuit court properly disallowed the evidence because it runs smack dab into § 343.303 and State v. Fischer, 2010 WI 6, 322 Wis. 2d 265, 778 N.W.2d, both of which strictly prohibit the admission of PBT results.

State v. Michael K. Lorentz, 2018AP1515, 10/1/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state charged Lorentz with violating four injunctions. One count was brought under Wis. Stat. § 813.12(8)(a) (for violating a domestic abuse injunction regarding his ex-wife) and three under Wis. Stat. § 813.122(11) (for violating three child abuse injunctions–one for each of their three children). Each injunction required Lorentz to “avoid” the “residence” the mother and children shared.

State v. Eric L. Vanremortel, 2018AP417, 9/4/19, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vanremortel was charged with disorderly conduct for an incident in which he followed the wife of a retired police officer in her car, then repeatedly got out of his own car and shouted at her. The state sought to admit evidence of three prior incidents involving Vanremortel following and/or shouting at police officers, including one that happened a few weeks before the charged conduct and involved the wife’s retired-officer husband. The circuit court admitted the evidence, finding it satisfied the test of State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998), and Vanremortel appeals.

State v. Daniel A. Griffin, 2019 WI App 49; case activity (including briefs)

Someone killed a young child in Griffin’s home. Both Griffin and the child’s mother were present at the time. What evidence was the jury allowed to hear about who committed the crime? If you guessed “any remotely relevant evidence implicating Griffin” (whom the state had charged) and “no evidence implicating the mother” (whom it had not) then you are a scholar of Wisconsin evidentiary law.

State v. Christopher J. Durski, 2018AP1750-CR, District 2, 8/21/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Durski was arrested at a motel, where he had decamped after a family dispute. In investigating the family dispute police learned Durski drank alcohol before leaving for the motel, so they tracked him down. Durski wasn’t in custody during the officers’ initial questioning of him at the motel, so his statements were admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings. So was the state’s retrograde extrapolation evidence.

State v. Kevin B. Hutchins, 2018AP1144-CR, 7/16/2019, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hutchins had a jury trial for the alleged sexual assault, false imprisonment, and battery of the mother of his children. The judge permitted her to testify, over objection, that he had hit her on other, earlier occasions–the proffered purpose of this testimony being to show why she didn’t immediately go to the police after this incident (and thus, apparently, to defend the credibility of her story). The court of appeals affirms.

State v. David Gutierrez, 2019 WI App 41, petition for review granted, 11/13/19, reversed in part and affirmed in part, 2020 WI 52; case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court allowed the state to admit testimony that Gutierrez’s DNA wasn’t found after testing of relevant evidence state as well as testimony about why his DNA might not be found; it did not, however, allow Gutierrez to admit evidence that the DNA of other men had been found. This was error.

State v. Peter J. Hanson, 2019 WI 63, 6/5/19, affirming an unpublished decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

Hanson was called to testify at a John Doe proceeding looking into an unsolved homicide. He was eventually charged with the crime, and at his trial the jury heard  a portion of Hanson’s John Doe testimony. The supreme court held the admission of this evidence didn’t violate Hanson’s right to confrontation. The court also holds that Hanson’s John Doe testimony was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings because that warning isn’t required at a John Doe proceeding.

State v. Christopher L. Gee, 2019 WI App 31; case activity (including briefs)

Christopher Gee was accused of sexually assaulting two women at knifepoint; one of the women had come to Gee’s apartment building because someone there had agreed to pay her for sex. He admitted to police that he’d had sex with this second woman, but said it was consensual and he’d simply refused to pay her afterward–something he said he often did. (¶10).

State v. Alberto E. Rivera, 2018AP952-CR, 4/30, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).

The State charged Rivera with a homicide and an attempted homicide that occurred in 2015. Before trial, it moved to introduce “other acts” evidence–a homicide that Rivera committed in 1997. The trial court tentatively denied the motion. But then Rivera’s counsel made a “strategic” decision to offer the evidence as part of his defense.  So, as you might guess, the appellate challenge regarding the admission of this evidence failed.