On Point: 15. Evidence

State v. Dobbs, 2018AP319-CR, petition for review of a per curiam opinion granted 1/14/20; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (based on Dobbs’ petition for review and SCOW’s order granting review:

1. Did the trial court err in precluding the defense’s expert on false confessions from testifying where, consistent with State v. Smith, 2016 WI App 8, 366 Wis. 2d 613, 874 N.W.2d 610, his opinions were relevant to a material issue, but he would not be offering an opinion on the specific facts of the case?

2. Did the trial court err in allowing Mr. Dobbs’ statements to law enforcement into evidence despite the delay in reading him his Miranda rights and because his statements were involuntary due to his mental and physical conditions?

3. Whether the court of appeals’ decision that Dobbs was in custody for purposes of Miranda warnings is consistent with State v. Morgan, 2002 WI App 124, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 648 N.W.2d 23. If not, whether Morgan should be overruled?

State v. Andre David Nash, 2018AP1595-CR, 1/7/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).

Under Wisconsin law, once a defendant shows that an out-of-court identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive, the State has the burden of demonstrating that the identification was still reliable and should be admitted into evidence. Powell v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 51, 66 271 N.W.2d 610 (1978). In this case, the court of appeal held that the circuit court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the State, and so reversed.

Pennsylvania, like Wisconsin, has a statute permitting the prosecution at a drunk-driving trial to introduce evidence that a defendant refused a requested blood draw. Do such statutes comply with the Fourth Amendment where the defendant refused a warrantless blood draw and no constitutional exception applied? For an argument that they don’t, see the cert petition filed last month in Thomas Bell v. Pennsylvania.

State v. David Gutierrez, 2017AP2364-CR, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 11/13/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (based on the State’s Petition for Review):

1. Did the court of appeals violate the standard of appellate review of trial court evidentiary rulings by holding the trial court erred in deciding to exclude evidence offered by the defendant that DNA from other men was found on the clothing of the complainant in a child sexual assault prosecution?

2. Did the court of appeals improperly apply Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b), Wisconsin’s rape shield law, when it held the defendant was not offering the DNA evidence as evidence concerning the victim’s prior sexual conduct?

State v. Jeffrey D. Lee, 2018AP1507-CR, 11/5/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At a jury trial for child sexual assault, the circuit court admitted “other acts” evidence that Lee had similarly assaulted 5 other children. The court of appeals called the “other acts” evidence of the 3rd, 4th and 5th children “textbook hearsay,” held that the circuit court erred in admitting it, but affirmed based on the harmless error doctrine.

State v. Ross Harris, Jr., 2018AP1667, 10/24/2019, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The charges in this case, disorderly conduct and battery, arose from an altercation in a hospital elevator. The state said Harris, newly a grandfather, had attacked A.D., the fiancé of his newborn grandchild’s maternal grandmother, while both were visiting the baby. Harris said it was A.D. who had attacked him.

State v. Jude W. Giles, 2018AP1967-CR, District 3, 10/8/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Jude’s sought to admit the results of his preliminary breath test results (.076) to lay a foundation for his expert’s opinion that alcohol was still being absorbed into his blood, making the state hygiene lab’s blood test result (.144) higher than his blood alcohol content at the time he was driving. (¶¶2-5). The circuit court properly disallowed the evidence because it runs smack dab into § 343.303 and State v. Fischer, 2010 WI 6, 322 Wis. 2d 265, 778 N.W.2d, both of which strictly prohibit the admission of PBT results.

State v. Michael K. Lorentz, 2018AP1515, 10/1/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state charged Lorentz with violating four injunctions. One count was brought under Wis. Stat. § 813.12(8)(a) (for violating a domestic abuse injunction regarding his ex-wife) and three under Wis. Stat. § 813.122(11) (for violating three child abuse injunctions–one for each of their three children). Each injunction required Lorentz to “avoid” the “residence” the mother and children shared.

State v. Eric L. Vanremortel, 2018AP417, 9/4/19, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vanremortel was charged with disorderly conduct for an incident in which he followed the wife of a retired police officer in her car, then repeatedly got out of his own car and shouted at her. The state sought to admit evidence of three prior incidents involving Vanremortel following and/or shouting at police officers, including one that happened a few weeks before the charged conduct and involved the wife’s retired-officer husband. The circuit court admitted the evidence, finding it satisfied the test of State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998), and Vanremortel appeals.

State v. Daniel A. Griffin, 2019 WI App 49; case activity (including briefs)

Someone killed a young child in Griffin’s home. Both Griffin and the child’s mother were present at the time. What evidence was the jury allowed to hear about who committed the crime? If you guessed “any remotely relevant evidence implicating Griffin” (whom the state had charged) and “no evidence implicating the mother” (whom it had not) then you are a scholar of Wisconsin evidentiary law.