On Point: 15. Evidence

Nicole Marie Thomas v. Korry Ardell, 2014AP295, District 4, 11/13/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in refusing to admit cell phone records because the proponent of the evidence didn’t provide a proper foundation by presenting either the testimony of a qualified witness or a proper certification proving authenticity.

State v. Ryan P. O’Boyle, 2014AP80-CR, District 1, 11/4/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

O’Boyle’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are rejected because trial counsel’s performance wasn’t deficient.

State v. Sean T. Pugh, 2013AP1522-CR, District 3, 10/21/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

If the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Pugh had a prior conviction for an offense similar to the ones he was on trial for, the error was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence against him. In addition, the trial court properly allowed the state to amend the information to add party-to-a-crime modifiers because Pugh wasn’t prejudiced by the amendment.

State v. Anthony E. Henderson, 2013AP2515, District 1, 10/7/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

If the trial court erred in excluding a witness’s attorney from testifying to information that would have impeached the witness, that error was harmless.

State v. Anthony Herman Williams, 2014AP447-CR & 2014AP448-CR, District 1, 9/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity: 2014AP447-CR; 2014AP448-CR

Cell phone records that corroborate a claim Williams’s trial lawyer made at sentencing regarding contact between Williams and the victims don’t show that the sentencing court relied on inaccurate information because the records do little to corroborate the contact or support Williams’s version of events.

State v. Landris T. Jines, 2014AP132, District 1, 9/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The recantations of Bartee, the victim, and Griffin, another state’s witness, don’t satisfy the newly-discovered evidence test because they are not sufficiently corroborated. Nor is there a reasonable probability a different result would be reached in a new trial with the recantation evidence.

State v. John M. Lattimore, 2013AP911-CR, District 4, 9/11/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Lattimore was convicted of 2nd-degree sexual assault with use of force and false imprisonment against S.M.  He appealed trial court decisions to: (1) join a count of 3rd-degree sexual assault against a different victim, M.H., to S.M.’s trial, (2) exclude the text of a Facebook message sent by S.M.’s brother to the defendant right after the assault, and (3) admit testimony about S.M.’s personality change after the assault.  He had no luck with the court of appeals.

State v. Todd J. Giese, 2014 WI App 92; case activity

Expert testimony regarding retrograde extrapolation of Giese’s blood alcohol concentration is admissible under new version of § 907.02(1) despite the fact some experts doubt its reliability because it was the product of reliable principles and methods and based upon sufficient facts and data.

State v. Ricky H. Jones, 2013AP1731-CR, District 2, 7/30/14 (unpublished); case actvity

Exclusion of expert testimony about defendant’s lack of propensity toward child sexual assault

In defending Jones against two counts of 1st-degree sexual assault of a child, his lawyer wanted to elicit expert testimony that Jones posed a low risk of committing a sexual offense–a strategy authorized by State v. Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1998).  Unfortunately, trial counsel failed to give the expert report to the State pursuant to its discovery demand, so the trial court excluded it under §971.23(7m)(a) and State v. Gribble, 2001 WI App 227, 248 Wis. 2d 409, 636 N.W.2d 488.  Jones was convicted and appealed.

State v. Jessica A. Nellessen, 2014 WI 84, 7/23/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

Under the two-step procedure for determining whether a confidential informant’s identity should be disclosed, a court must first determine whether there is reason to believe that the informant “may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.” If so, the court must determine (usually after an in camera examination of either affidavits or the informant) whether “there is a reasonable probability that the informer can give the testimony.” § 905.10(3)(b); State v. Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d 112, 124-26, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982). In this case, the supreme court elaborates on what a defendant must show to satisfy the first step, concludes that the required showing is “a reasonable possibility, grounded in the facts and circumstances of the case, that a confidential informer may have information necessary to the defendant’s theory of defense” (¶2), and applies the test in a way that ultimately collapses the previous two-step procedure into a single step.