On Point: 15. Evidence

Waupaca County v. G.T.H., 2022AP2146, District IV, 8/24/23, 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (briefs not available)

Contrary to what has seemed like a steady stream of unsuccessful hearsay-based Chapter 51 appeals, see e.g., here, here, here, here, and here, G.T.H. succussfully convinces the court of appeals to reverse his recommitment, which was based on extensive hearsay testimony.

Kenosha County v. L.A.T., 2022AP1730, District II, 8/23/23, 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (briefs not available)

L.A.T. (“Linda”) convinced the court of appeals the circuit court erred by admitting and relying on hearsay testimony from a psychiatrist to support its dangerousness finding. However, the court holds that sufficient non-hearsay evidence established that “Linda’s pattern of anger and aggressive behavior that caused others to seek law enforcement assistance…was sufficient to establish that others were in reasonable fear of violent behavior and/or serious physical harm at Linda’s hands.” (Op., ¶3).

State v. Jose A. Arevalo-Viera, 2021AP1937, 7/25/23, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In a case alleging a disturbing sexual assault, the court of appeals exercises a deferential standard of review to uphold the lower court’s decision to admit other-acts evidence regarding an alleged attempted assault occurring on the same day.

State v. Alvin James Jemison, Jr., 2021AP2207-CR, 7/18/23, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After a jury trial, Jemison was convicted of second-degree sexual assault of an unconscious person (Teresa) as a repeater – serious sex crime and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release to extended supervision. See Wis. Stat. § 939.618(2)(b). After the circuit court denied his postconviction motion without a Machner hearing, Jemison raised three claims on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the completed sexual intercourse charge, (2) the court erred in its admission of other acts evidence, and (3) the court erroneously denied his claims without an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals rejects each of Jemison’s claims and affirms.

C.T.L. v. M.L.K., 2023AP402, District III, 7/11/23, 1-judge decision ineligible for publication; case activity (briefs not available)

The court of appeals confronts two alleged errors stemming from M.L.K.’s TPR jury trial and affirms based on harmless error.

State v. Conrad M. Mader, 2022AP382-CR, District 2, 6/7/23 (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mader was convicted of repeated sexual assault of his stepdaughter. He argues his trial lawyer was ineffective in numerous ways. The court of appeals agrees trial counsel performed deficiently in three respects, but holds trial counsel’s mistakes weren’t prejudicial and therefore Mader isn’t entitled to a new trial.

State v. Danny Arthur Wright, 2021AP1252-CR, District 3, 05/16/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state charged Wright with first degree sexual assault with use of a dangerous weapon. The alleged dangerous weapon at issue was a ZAP STICK. Wright filed a motion in limine to bar the state from calling a Detective to offer expert opinion testimony under Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) and Daubert. The circuit court permitted the testimony after the state cautioned that it would not ask the detective whether the ZAP STICK used in Wright’s case was a dangerous weapon under the relevant statute. The court of appeals affirms on essentially the same basis: the detective’s testimony was permissible “expositional” testimony under State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, 392 Wis. 2d 505, 945 N.W.2d 609, and not subject to the heightened reliability standard for expert opinion testimony.

State & T.A.J. v. Alan S. Johnson, 2023 WI 39, 05/16/2023, reversing a published court of appeals decision, case activity (including briefs)

As the dissent aptly describes it, “[t]his case has traveled a long and winding road to this point, and Johnson’s trial has not yet begun.” (Opinion, ¶110, Bradley, A.W., dissenting). As discussed in On Point’s prior posts, here and here, this case was originally about whether “Marsy’s Law” gave crime victims standing to intervene in Shiffra–Green litigation. After the court appeals held that it did and after Johnson petitioned for review, the supreme court took up the case. Then, in a footnote in its response brief, the state asserted that, “Shiffra is incorrect to the extent that it holds that Ritchie applies to records outside the State’s possession.” (Op., ¶110, Bradley, A.W., dissenting). Thereafter, the supreme court ordered supplemental briefing on a new question: “Should the court overrule State v. Shiffra…?” (Op., ¶4). And, now the majority has done just that.

State v. Tomas Jaymitchell Hoyle, 2023 WI 24, 3/31/22, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

This split decision is important for two reasons. First, it authorizes the State to penalize the defendant for exercising his 5th Amendment right to remain silent at trial. Second, it foreshadows how Justice Hagedorn will likely rule in cases involving a broad range of criminal and civil constitutional rights that were established after the framers wrote the United State Constitution.

State v. Morris V. Seaton, 2021AP1399-CR, certification granted 3/24/23;  remanded, 2023 WI 69;District 2; case activity (including briefs) case activity (including briefs)

Question presented (from the court of appeals’ certification):

In light of the 2014 amendment of WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b) (2019-20), codifying and expanding the “greater latitude” rule and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶¶23-25, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158, interpreting and applying that amendment, are State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982), and State v. Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, 238 Wis. 2d 467, 618 N.W.2d 214, still controlling law as they relate to the admissibility of prior nonconsensual sexual wrongs in cases involving an adult victim of an alleged sexual assault where consent is the primary issue?