On Point blog, page 4 of 7
Administrative rule requiring permits for events in state buildings regardless of group size violates First Amendment
State v. Michael W. Crute, 2015 WI App 15; case activity
An administrative rule (§ Adm 2.14(2)(vm)(intro.) and 5.) requires a permit for any rally, meeting, or similar event held in a state building, and persons participating in an unpermitted event can be ticketed for “unlawful assembly.” But the rule did not contain a minimum group size, so it covered unpermitted events undertaken by as few as one person. The court of appeals holds the rule is not a valid time, place, and manner regulation under the First Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest. It also rejects the state’s attempt to save the rule by construing it to apply only to groups over 20 persons.
Comments posted on police department’s Facebook page weren’t “fighting words”
State v. Thomas G. Smith, 2013AP2516-CR, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The profane comments Smith posted on a police department’s Facebook page are not “fighting words” because that category of unprotected speech only covers statements made in the context of a face-to-face communication.
SCOTUS: Fixed buffer zone around abortion clinics unduly burdens free speech rights
McCullen v. Coakley, USSC No. 12-1168, 2014 WL 2882079 (June 26, 2014), reversing McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
In this decision the Supreme Court strikes down a Massachusetts law making it a crime to stand on a public road or sidewalk within thirty-five feet of a reproductive health care facility. While all the justices agree the law violates the First Amendment, they do not agree on the reasons for reaching that result.
Elonis v. United States, USSC No. 13-983, cert. granted 6/16/14
Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable person” would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort.
Whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.
Stalking statute was not unconstitutional as applied to defendant; letters on which stalking convictions were based constituted a “true threat”
State v. Donald W. Maier, 2013AP1391-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
The First Amendment did not preclude prosecuting Maier for stalking based on letters he sent because the letters constituted a “true threat” and thus were not protected speech.
Defendant’s rights to free speech and religious freedom were not violated by prosecution for conspiracy to commit child abuse based on his preaching the use of the rod for child discipline
State v. Philip B. Caminiti, 2013AP730-CR, District 4, 3/20/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The prosecution of Caminiti for conspiracy to commit child abuse, §§ 939.31 and 948.03(2)(b), based on his instructions to his congregants to use a rod to discipline their children did not violate his First Amendment rights to advocacy or freedom of religion.
First Amendment protects juvenile’s “crude and vulgar” YouTube video against disorderly conduct charge, but not against charge of unlawful use of computerized communication system
State v. Kaleb K., 2013AP839, District 4, 11/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Kaleb posted a video on YouTube that depicted him “rapping” a song about his Spanish teacher. The song used “crude and vulgar sexual language” about the teacher. (¶2). (The trial court was harsher, characterizing the video as “obscene and hate-filled” and “shocking, hard to watch, really disgusting.” (¶3).) Based on the video Kaleb was charged in juvenile court with disorderly conduct under § 947.01(1) and unlawful use of a computerized communication system under § 947.0125(2)(d).
Exposing genitals to a child, § 948.10, is limited to situations involving face-to-face contact and therefore doesn’t cover “sexting”
State v. Zachary P. Stuckey, 2013 WI App 98; case activty
The court of appeals concludes that the prohibition in § 948.10 against exposing genitals to a child is a “variable obscenity” statute, and to avoid unconstitutional application it must be read to require proof the defendant knew he was exposing himself to someone under the age of 18. Because the statute does not explicitly include that element,
McCullen v. Coakley, USSC No. 12-1168, cert granted 6/24/13
1. Massachusetts has a law that makes it a crime for speakers other than clinic employees or agents acting within the scope of employment to “enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk” within 35 feet of an entrance, exit, or driveway of “a reproductive health care facility.” Did the First Circuit err in upholding this law under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on its face and as applied to petitioners?
First Amendment — Speech — “True Threats.” Stalking and extortion — sufficiency of the evidence
State v. James D. Hills, 2012AP1901-CR, District 4, 4/11/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Hills sent letters and made at least one phone call to an assistant city attorney (ACA) who, he believed, had wrongfully prosecuted him under the city’s disorderly conduct ordinance. In those communications he berated the ACA (calling her incompetent, corrupt, dishonest, deceitful, worthless, and worse), accused her of prosecuting him with perjured testimony so she could collect money for the city,