On Point: 19. First Amendment

State v. Christopher Baron, 2009 WI 58, affirming 2008 WI App 90
For Baron: Daniel P. Dunn

Issue/Holding: The charge of identity theft, based on Baron’s alleged conduct in sending emails from Fischer’s account without authorization and with intent to harm his reputation, is “content based” within the meaning of First Amendment analysis:

¶38      In the case at hand, we conclude that Wis.

State v. Christopher Baron, 2009 WI 58, affirming 2008 WI App 90
For Baron: Daniel P. Dunn

Issue/Holding: First amendment analysis applies to an identity theft charge alleging that Baron sent emails from Fischer’s account without authorization and with intent to harm his reputation:

¶16      In order to determine if a First Amendment analysis is required, we must first consider whether conduct alone or speech,

State v. Robert T., 2008 WI App 22For Robert T.: Bradley J. Bloch

Issue: Whether § 947.015 (2003-04) (“Bomb Scares”) is overbroad and therefore cannot support prosecution for a phoned-in but false bomb threat.

Holding:

¶12      Robert T. argues that the statute suffers from overbreadth because it prohibits speech that could be protected. We disagree. Prior Wisconsin opinions have held that only “true threats” are punishable,

Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2004)

Issue/Holding:

In order not to offend the First Amendment, a statute that regulates the time, place, and manner of expression must be (1) content neutral, (2) narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) allow for ample alternative channels for the expression. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S. Ct. at 2753.

State v. James F. Brienzo, 2003 WI App 203, PFR filed 10/10/03
For Brienzo: Jerome F. Buting

Issue/Holding: Prosecution for attempted sexual assault of a child initiated over the Internet isn’t barred by the first amendment. ¶¶23-24, applying State v. Robins, 2002 WI 65, 253 Wis. 2d 298, 646 N.W.2d 287 (permitting prosecution for enticement). Same re: attempted enticement, ¶2:

We conclude that pursuant to State v.

Predick v. O’Connor, 2003 WI App 46

Issue/Holding: Banishment from victims’ county, under harassment injunction, § 813.125, upheld:

¶18 Thus, banishment is not a per se constitutional violation. As the previous discussion demonstrates, there is no exact formula for determining whether a geographic restriction is narrowly tailored. Each case must be analyzed on its own facts, circumstances and total atmosphere to determine whether the geographic restriction is narrowly drawn.

State v. Brian D. Robins, 2002 WI 65, on bypass
For Robins: Craig W. Albee

Issue: Whether  prosecution for child enticement initiated over the Internet violates the first amendment.

Holding: The first amendment doesn’t extend to speech that is incidental to or part of the criminal course of conduct.

¶43. The child enticement statute regulates conduct, not speech. The statute protects against the social evil and grave threat presented by those who lure or attempt to lure children into secluded places,

State v. John T. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, affirming unpublished decision
For Trochinski: James L. Fullin, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether § 948.11(2) is unconstitutional because it doesn’t require proof of knowledge of the age of the person to whom harmful materials are displayed (minority being the sole differentiating factor between noncriminal/protected and criminal conduct.

Holding:

¶39. We conclude that the constitutionality of Wis.

City of Milwaukee v. Tanya M. Bean, et al., 2001 WI App 258, PFR filed 11/8/01
For Bean: Jerome F. Buting, Pamela S. Moorshead

Issue1: Whether prostitution activities in the area encompassed by the injunction were shown sufficiently to constitute a nuisance.

Holding:

¶13. Although it is true, as the appellants argue, that the infusion of prostitution in the affected areas can, on one level at least,

State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725, reversing unpublished court of appeals decision
For Douglas D.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether purely written speech may be punished as disorderly conduct, § 947.01, even where no disturbance results.

Holding: The disorderly conduct statute, applied to speech alone, is neither overbroad nor “underbroad” (i.e., discriminating on the basis of content),