On Point: 19. First Amendment

State of Wisconsin ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. The Honorable Gregory Peterson et al.; State of Wisconsin ex rel. Francis D. Schmitz v. the Honorable Gregory Peterson, & State of Wisconsin ex rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners v. The Honorable Gregory Peterson, et al., 2015 WI 85, issued 7/16/15; case activity: Two Unnamed Petitioners; Schmitz v. Peterson; Three Unnamed Petitioners

Unless you’ve just returned from a trip to a remote corner of the globe that’s beyond the reach of news media, you know by now that the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided the so-called “John Doe” cases. The court’s decision ordered a halt into the investigation of coordinated fundraising and spending between candidate committees and certain independent groups during the 2011-12 recall campaigns. Gargantuan by any standard, the decision goes on for almost 400 pages, with a majority opinion, two concurrences (Prosser and Ziegler), and two dissents/concurrences (Abrahamson and Crooks). It contains almost nothing of relevance to ordinary criminal law practice. However, in the interest of helping orient readers who may want to look more closely at the decision, below the break is a summary of the major issues and how the various opinions address them.

Elonis v. United States, USSC No. 13-983, 2015 WL 2464051 (June 1, 2015), reversing United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved a prosecution of Elonis for threats he made in postings on his Facebook page, and it was being widely watched for the First Amendment question it raised. But the Court sidestepped the constitutional question, and holds instead that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the federal statute he was prosecuted under, requires the government to prove some sort of mental state regarding the threatening nature of the communication.

State v. William M. Gruber, 2014AP1069, 2/5/15, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs

The court of appeals bills this as “a State Capitol protester case with a twist.” The “twist” is that Gruber was cited for disorderly conduct under one administrative rule whereas other protesters were cited for lacking a permit under another rule. So when the circuit court dismissed the charges in this case based on the reasoning used in the “no permit” cases, it erred.

State v. Michael W. Crute, 2015 WI App 15; case activity

An administrative rule (§ Adm 2.14(2)(vm)(intro.) and 5.) requires a permit for any rally, meeting, or similar event held in a state building, and persons participating in an unpermitted event can be ticketed for “unlawful assembly.” But the rule did not contain a minimum group size, so it covered unpermitted events undertaken by as few as one person. The court of appeals holds the rule is not a valid time, place, and manner regulation under the First Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest. It also rejects the state’s attempt to save the rule by construing it to apply only to groups over 20 persons.

State v. Thomas G. Smith, 2013AP2516-CR, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The profane comments Smith posted on a police department’s Facebook page are not “fighting words” because that category of unprotected speech only covers statements made in the context of a face-to-face communication.

McCullen v. Coakley, USSC No. 12-1168, 2014 WL 2882079 (June 26, 2014), reversing McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In this decision the Supreme Court strikes down a Massachusetts law making it a crime to stand on a public road or sidewalk within thirty-five feet of a reproductive health care facility. While all the justices agree the law violates the First Amendment, they do not agree on the reasons for reaching that result.

Questions presented

Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable person” would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort.

Whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.

State v. Donald W. Maier, 2013AP1391-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The First Amendment did not preclude prosecuting Maier for stalking based on letters he sent because the letters constituted a “true threat” and thus were not protected speech.

State v. Philip B. Caminiti, 2013AP730-CR, District 4, 3/20/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

The prosecution of Caminiti for conspiracy to commit child abuse, §§ 939.31 and 948.03(2)(b), based on his instructions to his congregants to use a rod to discipline their children did not violate his First Amendment rights to advocacy or freedom of religion.

State v. Kaleb K., 2013AP839, District 4, 11/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Kaleb posted a video on YouTube that depicted him “rapping” a song about his Spanish teacher. The song used “crude and vulgar sexual language” about the teacher. (¶2). (The trial court was harsher, characterizing the video as “obscene and hate-filled” and “shocking, hard to watch, really disgusting.” (¶3).) Based on the video Kaleb was charged in juvenile court with disorderly conduct under § 947.01(1) and unlawful use of a computerized communication system under § 947.0125(2)(d).