On Point: 21. Guilty pleas

State v. Jeromy Miller, 2014AP1246-CR, 2/24/15, District 2 (not recommended for publication); click here for docket and briefs

This decision smells like SCOW bait.  Miller pleaded guilty believing that he had the right to appeal the circuit court’s denial of his pre-trial motion to dismiss. Both the court and defense counsel told him so. The State concedes they were wrong. The court of appeals held the error harmless because the motion had no merit. In doing so it bungled case law re plea withdrawal and the “prejudice” prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

State v. Nelson Luis Fortes, 2015 WI App 25; case activity (including briefs)

A “misunderstanding” about what sentence the state could recommend under the plea agreement did not entitle Fortes to plea withdrawal or resentencing because after the misunderstanding became evident at the sentencing hearing, Fortes elected to proceed rather than seek an adjournment with a possible eye toward plea withdrawal.

State v. Johnny E. Miller, 2014AP1392-CR, 2/18/05, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Miller argued that the State breached its plea agreement with him when, at sentencing, it recommended that he be eligible for the Earned Release Program only after he served a specified period of prison time. The State, he claimed, impermissibly advocated a harsher sentence than recommended. The court of appeals rejected Miller’s argument because he and the State simply “did not have any agreement as to ERP eligibility.”

State v. Lavonte M. Price, 2014AP1189-CR, District 1, 2/13/15 (not recommended for publication); click here for briefs

This decision examines the line between a trial court’s active participation in the plea negotiation process, which Wisconsin law prohibits, and trial court’s comments, suggestions and lectures, which are permitted under Wisconsin law.  What the trial court did here was just fine, said the court of appeals.

State v. Melisa Valadez, 2014AP678, 2014AP679, 2014AP680; District 2, 1/21/15, certification granted 3/16/15; circuit court reversed 1/29/16; case activity

Issue presented (from certification):

How definite or imminent must deportation be in order for it to be “likely,” such that a defendant may withdraw a guilty or no contest plea on the basis that he or she was not informed of the immigration consequences at the plea colloquy?  If, in order to withdraw the plea, the defendant must show that deportation proceedings are underway, how does this standard fit in with the time limits for a motion to withdraw the plea?

Review of two court of appeals decisions (one published, one unpublished) that will be argued together. State v. Shata (case activity) and State v. Ortiz-Mondragon (case activity)

Issue in Shata (composed by On Point)

Whether the defendant, a foreign national, should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because his trial counsel failed to provide him with “complete and accurate” information about the deportation consequences of pleading guilty?

State v. Douglas E. Hanson, 2014AP623-CR, District 4, 12/11/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Hanson failed to present sufficient credible evidence that he did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty to second offense OWI.

State v. Myron C. Dillard, 2014 WI 123, 11/26/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2013 WI App 108; majority opinion by Chief Justice Abrahamson; case activity

Dillard accepted a plea bargain under which the state dropped a persistent repeater allegation, which carried a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of release. But Dillard was never really subject to the persistent repeater law. When he discovered this fact after he was sentenced, he moved to withdraw his plea on the ground his decision to accept the plea bargain was based on his mistaken belief—one shared by the prosecutor, his lawyer, and the court—that he was facing a mandatory life sentence if he was convicted after a trial. The supreme court holds he is entitled to plea withdrawal because his plea was not knowing and voluntary and because his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to discover the persistent repeater law never applied to Dillard.

Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by SCOW). See order granting review.

1.  Where a defendant seeks to plead guilty or no contest to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), or with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), do State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) and due process principles require that the number of prior offenses that count for sentence enhancement be determined prior to entry of the defendant’s plea?

2.  Is a court of appeals’ decision ordering remand to the circuit court with instructions to: (1) issue an amended judgment of conviction reflecting a conviction for operating with a PAC, as a seventh offense, and (2) hold a resentencing hearing, and impose a sentence consistent with the penalty ranges for a seventh offense, constitutionally impermissible under Bangert and due process principles where the defendant specifically entered a plea of guilty to PAC as a sixth offense, where the circuit court sentenced the defendant in accordance to proper penalties for PAC as a sixth offense, and where the defendant has already served the confinement portion of such sentence?

State v. Stephanie M. Przytarski, 2014AP1019-CR, District 1, 11/18/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Przytarski can’t withdraw her plea even if her trial lawyer erroneously told her that she could appeal the trial court’s pretrial order that barred her from introducing certain evidence to defend against charges of interference with child custody.