On Point blog, page 17 of 45
Lack of clear definition of “crimes involving moral turpitude” scuttles Padilla plea withdrawal claim
State v. Fernando Ortiz-Mondragon, 2014 WI App 114, petition for review granted 12/18/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 73; case activity
Ortiz-Mondragon’s trial counsel wasn’t ineffective under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), for failing to advise Ortiz-Mondragon that his convictions were “crimes involving moral turpitude” (CIMT) and would result in mandatory deportation and a permanent bar on reentry. Unlike the conviction in Padilla, CIMT is a “broad classification of crimes” that escapes precise definition, and there’s no clear authority indicating any of the crimes to which Ortiz-Mondragon pled were crimes of moral turpitude. Thus, the deportation consequences of Ortiz-Mondragon’s plea was unclear and uncertain, and his attorney wasn’t deficient in failing to unequivocally inform him that his plea would result in deportation and inadmissibility.
SCOW toughens standards for 974.06 postconviction motions and 971.08(2) plea withdrawal motions
State v. Andres Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, 7/23/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; majority opinion by Justice Prosser, dissenting opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity
Oliver Wendell Holmes said “hard cases make bad law.” This decision proves that simple cases can too. If you thought winning a §974.06 postconviction motion or a § 971.08(2) motion for plea withdrawal due to the trial court’s failure to give deportation warnings was tough before, wait until you read this decision.
Counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise defendant about deportation consequences of plea
State v. Hatem M. Shata, 2013AP1437-CR, District 1, 7/15/14 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted, 12/18/14, reversed, 2015 WI 74; case activity
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform Shata, an Egyptian foreign national, that pleading guilty to possession of more than 1,000 but less than 2,500 grams of THC with intent to deliver would result in his deportation.
SCOW holds prosecutor didn’t breach plea agreement, declines to reach challenge to State v. Sprang
State v. William F. Bokenyi, 2014 WI 61, 7/11/14, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity
In a decision that plows no new legal ground, a divided supreme court holds that a prosecutor’s remarks at sentencing did not breach the plea agreement, but were instead within the proper bounds of argument in support of a permitted recommendation for imprisonment. Because the prosecutor didn’t breach the plea agreement, the court doesn’t decide the primary issue presented for review: Whether the court should overrule State v. Sprang, 2004 WI App 121, ¶29, 274 Wis. 2d 784, 683 N.W.2d 522, which held that if defense counsel does not consult with the defendant when foregoing an objection to a breach of the plea agreement, counsel performs deficiently because that is “tantamount to entering a renegotiated plea agreement without [the defendant’s] knowledge or consent.”
Moones Mellouli v. Eric Holder, Jr., Attorney General, USSC No. 13-1034, cert. granted 6/30/14
To trigger deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), must the government prove the connection between a drug paraphernalia conviction and a substance listed in section 802 of the Controlled Substances Act?
Circuit court properly denied plea withdrawal after it found witness recantations to be incredible and uncorroborated
State v. John Francis Ferguson, 2014 WI App 48; case activity
The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Ferguson’s plea withdrawal motion, which was based on recantations by two witnesses who had previously said Ferguson fatally shot a man. The circuit judge applied the proper standard under State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997), when it found the recantations were incredible as a matter of law and uncorroborated by other newly-discovered evidence, and its findings are not clearly erroneous.
Court of Appeals clarifies prejudice standard for plea withdrawal motions under Padilla v. Kentucky
State v. Ivan Mendez, 2014 WI App 57; case activity
When Mendez pleaded guilty to maintaining a drug trafficking place his attorney failed to inform him that a conviction for charge would subject him to automatic deportation from the United States with no applicable exception and no possibility of discretionary waiver. Padilla v. Kentucky,
SCOW: State would suffer “substantial prejudice” where pre-sentence plea withdrawal means loss of admissibility of child victim’s audiovisual statement
State v. Minerva Lopez, 2014 WI 11, reversing an unpublished summary disposition of the court of appeals (available here: MINERVA LOPEZ ORDER 3 8 13); case activity
Allowing the defendant to withdraw her no contest pleas would cause substantial prejudice to the state because it would mean the defendant’s trial would occur after the child victim turned 16 and would thus preclude state from presenting video statements of child under § 908.08.
Defendant failed to prove her panic attack justified pre-sentencing plea withdrawal
State v. Gabriella Bernabei, 2013AP1734-CR & 2013AP1735-CR, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1734-CR; 2013AP1735-CR
The trial court properly denied Bernabei’s motion to withdraw her pleas before sentencing because the record supported its conclusion that she had not proven she was suffering a panic attack at the time she entered her pleas.
Bernabei was charged with child neglect and multiple counts of animal mistreatment.
State v. Myron C. Dillard, 2012AP2044-CR, petition for review granted 2/19/14
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issues (composed by On Point)
Whether Dillard is entitled to withdraw his plea because the primary feature of the plea bargain he accepted was the state’s dismissal of a persistent repeater enhancement, which would have mandated a sentence of life imprisonment without release, when in fact the persistent repeater enhancement never applied to him.
Whether Dillard is entitled to withdraw his plea on the alternative ground that his trial lawyer was deficient in failing to discern that Dillard was not subject to the persistent repeater enhancement.