On Point: 21. Guilty pleas

State v. Darold M., 2012AP1020, District 1, 10/10/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Juvenile was not entitled to evidentiary hearing on his plea-withdrawal motion, which was premised on an unchecked box on the plea questionnaire signifying whether he understood the charges.

¶2        We conclude that Darold has not met his burden of showing that plea withdrawal is necessary to prevent a manifest injustice under the juvenile plea statute, 

State v. Frederick L. Lucht, 2011AP1644-CR, District 4, 9/27/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

The record supports the existence of an agreement between Lucht and another to commit the crime of first-degree intentional homicide.

¶28      Lucht refers us to cases standing for propositions that a conspiracy cannot be based on a mere “agreement to negotiate,” see United States v.

on review of unpublished decision; case activity

Issues (composed by on Point) 

1. Whether Burton is entitled to a Machner hearing on his postconviction motion asserting that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise that Burton could pursue a bifurcated (NGI) plea along with his guilty plea, and have a jury determine whether he was not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.

State v. Reginald Scott Williams, 2011AP1379-CR, District 1, 9/18/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Williams drove at an excessive speed (30+ over the limit), and crashed into another car, resulting in death and serious injuries. He pleaded no contest to one count of homicide by negligent use, § 940.10 and one count of reckless driving / GBH, § 346.62(4). At the time of the pleas,

State v. Alvin C. Harris, 2012AP518-CR, District 2, 9/12/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Plea-Withdrawal 

Harris failed to make a prima facie showing that his plea colloquy was defective, therefore his motion to withdraw plea was properly denied without an evidentiary hearing:

¶7        Here, Harris’s motion alleged that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because of a defect in the plea colloquy.  

State v. Michael L. Frey, 2012 WI 99, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Sentencing Discretion – Reliance on Dismissed Charge 

The sentencing court may consider charges “dismissed” or “dismissed outright” (as opposed to read-ins)

¶47  To discharge its obligation to discern a defendant’s character, “[a] sentencing court may consider uncharged and unproven offenses,” State v. Leitner,

State v. Jon Anthony Soto, 2012 WI 93, on certification; case activity

A guilty plea defendant has a statutory right under § 971.04(1)(g) to be present in court when the plea is accepted and judgment pronounced, but the right may be waived (as distinguished from forfeited), as it was here.

¶2   We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) provides a criminal defendant the statutory right to be in the same courtroom as the presiding judge when a plea hearing is held,

State v. Abraham C. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, affirming summary order; case activity

Negrete’s motion to withdraw his 1992 guilty plea, on the ground that he wasn’t personally advised of deportation consequences, § 971.08(2), was denied by the circuit court without a hearing. The court upholds that result:

¶2   In support of his motion, Negrete stated in an affidavit that he “do[es] not recall”

State v. Lee Roy Cain, 2012 WI 68, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Post-Sentencing Plea-Withdrawal, Generally 

When a defendant satisfies the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of a “manifest injustice,” the plea should be withdrawn as a matter of right:

¶26  …  State v. Daley sets out the following list of circumstances where manifest injustice occurs:[6]

1.

State v. Matthew J. Laughrin, 2011AP1600-CR, District 1, 6/12/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Laughrin, after pleading guilty to second-degree reckless homicide for providing a controlled substance (Suboxone) to someone who died after ingesting it, sought pre-sentencing plea-withdrawal on the basis of an expert’s report that Suboxone alone generally doesn’t cause death. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals now affirms.