On Point: 21. Guilty pleas

State v. Arttistis B. Hall, 2018AP1522-CR, District 1, 3/19/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After failing to comply with a family court child placement order, Hall was charged with two felony counts of interference with child custody; he ultimately pled to a reduced charge of contempt of court. (¶¶2-3). Though he expressed his displeasure with the situation, he got through what appears to be a pretty thorough plea colloquy. (¶¶4-6). Before sentencing he moved to withdraw his plea, but the court of appeals holds he didn’t show a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal.

Garza v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, reversing Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017);  Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved two plea agreements that included clauses stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. After sentencing, Garza told his lawyer that he wanted to appeal, but his lawyer refused due to the plea agreement. Garza filed claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Siding with Garza, SCOTUS held that counsel performed deficiently and that “prejudiced is presumed” because the failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Garza of an appeal altogether. Opinion at 1. 

State v. Pierre Deshawn Johnson, 2018AP595-CR, 2/12/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Johnson pled to operating a vehicle with a suspended license and injury by operating under the influence of a controlled substance. His lead issue–whether the victim’s failure to wear a seatbelt was a significant intervening factor that diminished his culpability and warranted a new sentence–failed based on State v. Turk, 154 Wis. 2d 294, 453 N.W.2d 163.

State v. Javien Cajujuan Pegeese, 2017AP741-CR, petition for review of a per curiam opinion granted 1/15/19; affirmed 5/31/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Whether the circuit court’s failure to personally insure that the defendant understood each constitutional right waived by his guilty plea entitled him to a Bangert evidentiary hearing to determine whether his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

State v. Devon Maurice Bowser, 2018AP313, 1/8/19, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Bowser was charged with several offenses in two cases; the two cases involved alleged drug sales on two different dates (one in 2015, one in 2016) to two different CIs. He and the state struck a deal in which he pleaded to some counts in each file with the rest dismissed. But before he could be sentenced, Bowser learned that the CI from the 2015 sale was recanting his claims that Bowser had sold him the drugs. Bowser moved to withdraw all his pleas in both cases.

State v. Dionte J. Nowels, 2018AP1171-CR, 1/8/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Nowels pled guilty to hit and run. He later sought plea withdrawal because during his colloquy the trial court failed to state 2 of the crime elements that the State would be required to prove at trial. The trial court agreed with him on this point, so for the plea withdrawal hearing the burden shifted to the State to prove that Nowles knew and understood those elements when he pled.

State v. Victor Yancey, Jr., 2018AP802-CR, 1/8/19, District 2 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Stormy applause for Godfrey & Kahn who took this appeal pro bono and then won it! The court of appeals held that Yancey alleged a prima facie claim for ineffective assistance of counsel when he pled guilty and was entitled to a Machner hearing.  It also held that the trial court incorrectly held that to establish prejudice Yancey had to show a “reasonable probability that he would have been able to mount a successful challenge to the State’s evidence at a trial.”

Hatem M. Shata v. Denise Symdon, No. 16-CV-574 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 12, 2018)

Shata’s case was one of two our supreme court decided on the same day–both held counsel not ineffective for failing to give accurate advice on immigration consequences. You can see our prior post for the facts and our analysis of those decisions. Basically, counsel told Shata that pleading to the charged drug count would carry a “strong chance” of deporation, when in fact deportation was mandatory. Unlike our supreme court, the federal court now says that this wasn’t good enough–and further, that the supreme court’s conclusion that it was good enough was an unreasonable application of the law that SCOTUS clearly established in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

State v. Tyrus Lee Cooper, 2016AP375, review of a per curiam opinion granted 12/12/2018; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (from the petition for review):

1. When defendant’s counsel has engaged in serious professional misconduct leading up to the trial date affecting defendant’s meaningful participation in his own defense, does that provide a sufficient reason to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing?
2. Did the the circuit court erroneously exercise its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing without an evidentiary record to support substantial prejudice to the State?

State v. Noah Yang, 2018AP1461, 11/28/18, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Yang pleaded to misdemeanor witness intimidation. He had been charged with felony child abuse, and, from the jail, had called his mother, telling her that if a witness didn’t show up, the prosecutor would drop the charge. In a later call, Yang’s mother acknowledged to Yang that she had been in touch with the alleged victim’s mother; the alleged victim did not, in fact, show up for trial.