On Point: B. Procedure and colloquy

State v. Noah M. Sanders, 2016AP2387-CR, 4/27/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The complaint’s summary of the allegations in support of the charges provided a sufficient factual basis for Sanders’s pleas to intimidation of a victim.

State v. Erika Lisette Gutierrez, 2014AP1983-CR, 3/7/2017 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Gutierrez pleaded guilty to intentional physical abuse of a trial and had a bench trial on her plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. She asserts she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea because the circuit court didn’t give the full § 971.08(1)(c) immigration warning and because her plea was premised on incorrect advice from her lawyer. The court of appeals disagrees.

Petition for review of State v. Jose Alberto Reyes Fuerte, 2016 WI App 78, granted 1/18/2017; case activity (including briefs)

Issue presented (from the State’s petition for review):

Now that criminal defense attorneys are obligated to advise their clients about the immigration consequences of their pleas, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), should the Wisconsin Supreme Court overturn its decision in State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1, and reinstate the harmless error rule to prohibit a defendant who was aware of the potential immigration consequences of his plea from being able to withdraw the plea just because the circuit court failed to give a statutory immigration warning that complied with Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c)?

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR; District 2, 11/9/16; certification refused 1/9/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Does the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitute “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent?

State v. Brandon E. Jordan, 2015AP2062-CR, 10/6/16, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Jordan violated the terms of his Deferred Prosecution Agreement and received a warning letter which resulted in a 6-month extension of the agreement with new conditions. He then violated the conditions of the extension, and was terminated from the Deferred Prosecution Program. He argued that his termination violated the terms of the DPA.

State v. Jose Alberto Reyes Fuerte, 2016 WI App 78, petition for review granted 1/18/2017, reversed, 2017 WI 104; case activity (including briefs)

This decision is important to anyone who litigates claims for plea withdrawal under § 971.08(2) because it helps clarify the law in two ways. First, it provides two examples of a circuit court’s failure to comply with § 971.08(1)(c)’s requirement that the defendant be warned about the immigration consequences of a plea. Second, it explains what a defendant must allege to make a sufficient showing that his or her plea is likely to result in deportation.

The Immigration Professors Blog says Arias v. Lynch, No. 14-2839 (7th Cir. 8/2/4/16) would be the “hand down winner” of the “immigration case of the week,” if such a category existed. It highlights the confusion in federal courts over how to define a crime involving moral turpitude a.k.a “CIMT.” Or you can just skip to Judge Richard Posner’s concurrence which argues that “[it] is preposterous that that stale, antiquated, and worse,

A prosecutor’s exercise of discretion can trigger or avoid collateral consequences for your client. This new law review article analyzes how and why prosecutors make these decisions.

State v. Timothy L. Finley, Jr., 2016 WI 63, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2015 WI App 79, 365 Wis. 2d 275, 872 N.W.2d 344; case activity (including briefs)

Reaffirming the long-standing law governing plea withdrawal that was established in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and limiting the reach of two recent cases that muddied the Bangert procedure, the supreme court holds, 5 to 2, that Finley is entitled to withdraw his plea because the circuit court misadvised Finley of the maximum penalty during the plea colloquy and the state failed to prove Finley knew the actual maximum penalty.

State v. Richard J. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, 6/14/16, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Sulla entered a plea agreement requiring him to plead “no contest” to two counts and the State to dismiss and “read in” two other counts for purposes of sentencing and restitution. But after he was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment, Sulla moved for plea withdrawal arguing that he was misinformed of, and did not understand, the effect that a read-in charge could have at sentencing. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. Don’t be fooled. SCOW’s decision here affects more than plea withdrawal. It changes appellate procedure.