On Point: B. Procedure and colloquy

State v. Stephen LeMere, 2016 WI 41, 05/12/2016,  affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, case activity (including briefs)

In State v. LeMere, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not require defense counsel to advise a client that conviction for a pending charge of sexual assault could result in future commitment proceedings under chapter 980. The case could be appropriate for certiorari review in the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the scope of the right to counsel.

State v. Patrick K. Tourville, 2016 WI 17, 3/15/2016, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Patrick Tourville pled to four crimes in a deal that called on the state to recommend a sentence no higher than the one recommended by the PSI. The PSI recommended a prison term for each count; the state recommended that these terms be run consecutively. So when the state asked for consecutive time even though the PSI didn’t, did it honor its commitment to follow the PSI? If you answered “no,” the one thing we know about you is that you’re not a member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

State v. Jason D. Henderson, 2015AP1740-CR, District I, 3/1/16 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Henderson pled to two misdemeanor repeaters. He now seeks to withdraw his plea on the ground that counsel was ineffective for misinforming him that the two-year maximum sentence on each count was divided into one year of initial confinement and one year of extended supervision, rather than the correct 18 month/6 month split. 

State v. Melisa Valadez, 2016 WI 4, 1/28/2016, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

What looked like a case about the meaning of “likely to result in … deportation” has turned into something else entirely: in a fractured decision, the court holds that the defendant has successfully shown she is likely to be excluded from admission to the country and raises, but does not resolve, the possibility that plea withdrawal claims for failure to give the required immigration warning must be brought within the time limits of Wis. Stat. Rule 809.30 (or perhaps within the strictures of Wis. Stat. § 974.06).

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from the State’s petition for review)

When a defendant who pleads guilty or no contest is misinformed that the maximum penalty that could be imposed is lower than the maximum actually allowed by law, and the sentence imposed is more than the defendant was told he could get, is the defendant entitled to withdraw his plea, or may the defect be remedied instead by reducing the sentence to the maximum the defendant was informed he could receive?

Speaking of Padilla (see below), yesterday the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held in Dimaya v. Lynch that “the definition of a ‘crime of violence’ – one of over thirty categories of convictions that constitute an ‘aggravated felony’ under federal immigration law – is unconstitutionally void for vagueness.” Click here to see the ImmigrationProf Blog post about the decision and what it could mean for those of you defending immigrants.

This just in: “The Pressure Is On–Criminal Defense Counsel Strategies after Padilla v. Kentucky,” by Bill Ong Hing at the University of San Francisco Law School. When representing an immigrant defendant, trial counsel’s duties are now much more demanding than they were before Padilla. What qualifies as “competent” counsel in these circumstances? Click here for a new research paper attempting to answer this question.

State v. Timothy L. Finley, Jr., 2015 WI App 79, petition for review granted, 1/11/16, affirmed, 2016 WI 63; case activity (including briefs)

In an important decision addressing how to apply State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482, the supreme court’s recent muddling of plea withdrawal standards, the court of appeals holds that when a defendant is mistakenly told the maximum sentence is less than the law allows, the error “is not curable, after the fact, by ‘commutation’ of an otherwise lawful sentence down to the maximum amount of punishment the defendant was incorrectly informed he or she faced at the time of the plea.” (¶37). 

State v. Martin F. Kennedy, 2015AP475-CR, District 1, 9/29/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court erred in denying Kennedy’s plea withdrawal motion without a hearing, as the record of the plea shows he wasn’t advised about the domestic abuse modifier at the time of his plea and Kennedy alleged his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to advise him of the modifier.

Percell Dansberry v. Randy Pfister, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 13-3723, 9/15/15

The judge who took Dansberry’s guilty plea understated the mandatory minimum sentence Dansberry faced, and therefore Dansberry’s plea was not entered with a full understanding of the consequences, as required under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). But the Supreme Court has not held Boykin errors to be structural, so the state court’s rejection of his plea withdrawal motion on harmless error grounds was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.