On Point blog, page 9 of 19
Court of Appeals clarifies prejudice standard for plea withdrawal motions under Padilla v. Kentucky
State v. Ivan Mendez, 2014 WI App 57; case activity
When Mendez pleaded guilty to maintaining a drug trafficking place his attorney failed to inform him that a conviction for charge would subject him to automatic deportation from the United States with no applicable exception and no possibility of discretionary waiver. Padilla v. Kentucky,
SCOW: State would suffer “substantial prejudice” where pre-sentence plea withdrawal means loss of admissibility of child victim’s audiovisual statement
State v. Minerva Lopez, 2014 WI 11, reversing an unpublished summary disposition of the court of appeals (available here: MINERVA LOPEZ ORDER 3 8 13); case activity
Allowing the defendant to withdraw her no contest pleas would cause substantial prejudice to the state because it would mean the defendant’s trial would occur after the child victim turned 16 and would thus preclude state from presenting video statements of child under § 908.08.
Defendant failed to prove her panic attack justified pre-sentencing plea withdrawal
State v. Gabriella Bernabei, 2013AP1734-CR & 2013AP1735-CR, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1734-CR; 2013AP1735-CR
The trial court properly denied Bernabei’s motion to withdraw her pleas before sentencing because the record supported its conclusion that she had not proven she was suffering a panic attack at the time she entered her pleas.
Bernabei was charged with child neglect and multiple counts of animal mistreatment.
State v. Myron C. Dillard, 2012AP2044-CR, petition for review granted 2/19/14
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issues (composed by On Point)
Whether Dillard is entitled to withdraw his plea because the primary feature of the plea bargain he accepted was the state’s dismissal of a persistent repeater enhancement, which would have mandated a sentence of life imprisonment without release, when in fact the persistent repeater enhancement never applied to him.
Whether Dillard is entitled to withdraw his plea on the alternative ground that his trial lawyer was deficient in failing to discern that Dillard was not subject to the persistent repeater enhancement.
Defendant can’t withdraw plea based on claim he wasn’t informed of the domestic abuse modifier, but there was no basis to assess the domestic abuse surcharge
State v. Ryan P. O’Boyle, 2013AP1004-CR, District 1, 2/4/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
O’Boyle’ claimed his lawyer was ineffective for failing to move to strike the references in the complaint to “domestic abuse” because that isn’t a separate, stand-alone charge. He also claimed counsel failed to explain that the disorderly conduct count to which O’Boyle entered a plea was charged as an act of domestic abuse under § 968.075(1)(a).
Victim’s injuries provided sufficient factual basis for plea to first degree reckless injury
State v. Antonio Reyes-Ortiz, 2013AP268-CR, District 1, 11/26/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Reyes-Ortiz argued there was an insufficient factual basis for his plea to first degree reckless injury because the victim’s injuries rose only to the level of “substantial bodily harm” under § 939.22(38), not “great bodily harm” under § 939.22(14), as required by § 940.23(1)(a).
Hearing on motion for plea withdrawal granted; trial court failed to ensure mentally-impaired defendant understood plea
State v. Matthew Allen Lilek, Appeal No. 2012AP1855, District 1; 11/13/13, (not recommended for publication), case activity
The dispositive issue in this appeal was whether the defendant, who is legally blind and has suffered cognitive disabilities his entire life, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a no-contest plea to second degree sexual assault, with use of force, and to aggravated battery. During the plea colloquy, defense counsel assured the court that experts had examined his client and,
Probable cause finding establishes defendant’s breach of plea agreement; State chooses remedy of partial recission
State v. Carl A. Reed, 2013 WI App 132; case activity
Reed pled no contest to substantial battery in exchange for the State’s agreement to dismiss 3 other counts and to refrain from making a sentencing recommendation. The State also received the right to withdraw from the agreement if Reed “commits any new or additional crimes.” Reed was later charged with new crimes. So, the State presented a recommendation at sentencing.
Court’s deviation from the exact language of immigration warning in § 971.08(1)(c) doesn’t entitle defendant to plea withdrawal
State v. Ali Mursal, 2013 WI App 125; case activity
Before accepting a defendant’s guilty or no contest plea the court is required to advise the defendant there may be immigration consequences. Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c). While that statute prescribes a text for the required warning—complete with quotation marks—the court of appeals holds in this case that a judge’s failure to repeat that language verbatim is not by itself grounds for plea withdrawal.
Plea withdrawal granted because bargain was “illusory”
State v. Myron C. Dillard, 2013 WI App 108, petition for review granted, 2/19/14, affirmed, 2014 WI 123; case activity
Dillard accepted a plea bargain under which a persistent repeater allegation was dismissed, thus apparently reducing his maximum penalty exposure by avoiding a mandatory life sentence without prospect of release. But Dillard was not really subject to the persistent repeater law,