On Point: 1. Certificate of appeal

Graham L. Stowe v. Gregory Van Rybroek, 18-CV-400-wmc (W.D. Wis. 11/6/23).

Having recently prevailed on a judicial bias claim in state court, Stowe makes a return appearance to the blog on his 2018 federal habeas petition. Unfortunately, the Western District of Wisconsin denied the petition, which had been pending for close 5 years. The petition sought relief from the Wisconsin courts’ denial of his 2016  petition for conditional release under Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d). In a novel reading of a nearly three-decades old Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995) (“Randall I”), the federal court concludes that “one can reasonably read Randall I to require a showing of both mental illness and dangerousness.”

Terez Cook v. Brian Foster, Warden, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 18-2214, 1/29/2020

Pursuing a federal writ of habeas corpus is always a long shot; in non-capital cases fewer than 1% of petitions are successful. Terez Cook gets it done here, convincing the Seventh Circuit his lawyer was ineffective at his trial for a home-invasion robbery (and that the Wisconsin court of appeals’ decision to the contrary was not just wrong, but unreasonable). The federal court is puzzled by a few aspects of our state court’s denial of Cook’s claims. But the thing that seems to push that denial over the line into unreasonableness–AEDPA‘s stringent requirement for habeas relief–is that it got a crucial fact wrong. The state court’s opinion relies on a confession by Cook–a confesssion for which there’s apparently no evidence. How did our court go astray? Well, the state described the (non-existent) confession in its brief, and then Cook’s direct-appeal counsel apparently didn’t check the facts, and neither did the court of appeals.

Buck v. Davis, USSC No. 15-8049, 2017 WL 685534 (February 22, 2017), reversing and remanding Buck v. Stephens, 623 Fed. Appx. 668 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Buck was found guilty of capital murder. Under state law, the jury could impose a death sentence only if it found Buck was likely to commit acts of violence in the future. At sentencing Buck’s attorney called Walter Quijano, a psychologist, to give an opinion on that issue. Though the psychologist testified Buck probably would not engage in violent conduct, he also said that race is one factor in assessing a person’s propensity for violence and that Buck was statistically more likely to act violently because he is black. The jury sentenced Buck to death. The Supreme Court, by a 7-to-2 vote, holds Buck’s attorney was ineffective.

Cesar Flores-Ramirez v. Brian Foster, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 15-1594, 1/22/16 (per curiam)

Flores-Ramirez is not entitled to a certificate of appealability in his challenge to the denial of his second federal habeas petition because two of his claims should have been brought in his first petition and the third claim doesn’t provide a basis for habeas relief.

Humberto Sanchez-Rengifo v. J.F. Caraway, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 14-2876, 8/14/15

Sanchez-Rengifo sought relief from his conviction for sexual assault by filing a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The district court dismissed the petition on the grounds that the petition should have been filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 unless that route is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention”—a showing Sanchez-Rengifo failed to make. Though the district court applied the wrong statute, it doesn’t matter because Sanchez-Rengifo hasn’t met the standard for getting a certificate of appealability.

Cory M. Welch v. Randall Hepp, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1164, 7/14/15

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Welch’s claim that he was denied a fair trial because of two improper comments by two witnesses. His habeas petition was denied by the district court, and the Seventh Circuit affirms, holding Welch has not shown that the Wisconsin appellate court’s decision was “so lacking in justification” that there is no possibility for “fairminded disagreement,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

Jennings v. Stephens, USSC No. 13-7211, 2015 WL 159277 (January 14, 2015), reversing Jennings v. Stephens, 537 Fed. Appx. 326 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

A federal district court granted Jennings’s habeas relief, ordering a new sentencing hearing based on two of the three theories of ineffective assistance of counsel that Jennings raised. The state appealed, and Jennings defended the district court judgment on all three theories. The Fifth Circuit held that Jennings’s claim on the third theory was procedurally barred because it was rejected by the district court and Jennings hadn’t cross-appealed or obtained a certificate of appealability. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia the Supreme Court reverses, holding that Jennings may defend the district court’s judgment based on the third theory.

Question Presented:

 Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that a federal habeas petitioner who prevailed in the district court on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must file a separate notice of appeal and motion for a certificate of appealability to raise an allegation of deficient performance that the district court rejected even though the Fifth Circuit acquired jurisdiction over the entire claim as a result of the respondent’s appeal?

Rafel Arriaza Gonzalez v. Thaler, USSC No. 10-895, 1/10/12, affirming 623 F. 3d 222 (5th Cir. 2010)

Habeas Procedure – Certificate of Appealability, Defects and Jurisdiction 

… 28 U. S. C. §2253(c), provides that a habeas petitioner must obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal a federal district court’s final order in a habeas proceeding. §2253(c)(1). The COA may issue only if the petitioner has made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,”

seventh circuit court of appeals decision, denying habeas relief on review of Wis. COA No. 2008AP1533-CR; prior history: 2001AP713-CR, 1995AP1856-CR

Habeas – Exculpatory Evidence – Available to Defendant

Jardine argues that the State suppressed exculpatory evidence, namely that post-conviction testing of the gun he admittedly possessed but denied using to club the victim didn’t reveal the presence of the victim’s DNA.