On Point blog, page 2 of 15
SCOTUS will decide limits on developing evidence for federal habeas claims
Shoop v. Twyford, USSC No. 21-511, cert granted 1/14/22; SCOTUSblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)
Questions presented:
1. 28 U.S.C. §2241(c) allows federal courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering the transportation of a state prisoner only when necessary to bring the inmate into court to testify or for trial. May federal courts evade this prohibition by using the All Writs Act to order the transportation of state prisoners for reasons not enumerated in §2241(c)?
2. Before a court grants an order allowing a habeas petitioner to develop new evidence, must it determine whether the evidence could aid the petitioner in proving his entitlement to habeas relief and whether the evidence may permissibly be considered by a habeas court?
SCOTUS eliminates “watershed rule” exception to retroactivity doctrine
Edwards v. Vannoy, USSC No. 19-5807, 141 S.Ct. 1547 (May 17, 2021), affirming 2019 WL 8643258 (5th Cir. May 20, 2019) (denying certificate of appealability); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
This decision alters the long-standing doctrine for deciding whether new rules of criminal procedure established by a decision of the Supreme Court apply retroactively to cases that are final and, therefore, require the defendant to seek collateral review of his or her conviction. The result is that new rules of criminal procedure will no more forever apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
Eastern District grants habeas; COA unreasonably applied Miranda progeny
Ladarius Marshall v. Scott Eckstein, No. 15-CV-008 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 22, 2020)
Marshall pleaded to homicide and other charges. Before he did so, though, he moved to suppress statements he’d made during more than 12 hours of interrogation at the police station (he was 16 years old at the time). The trial court and our court of appeals held that the interrogating officers “scrupulously honored” Marshall’s multiple assertions that he didn’t want to talk with them anymore. The federal district court finds this conclusion unreasonable because the officers deflected his refusals to talk and cajoled him into continuing. What’s more, the court says that even his later statements–given to officers who did follow Miranda‘s rules–must be suppressed because they were too closely connected to his original, unlawfully-taken statements.
Seventh Circuit’s rare habeas grant notes COA misapplication of Strickland and upbraids state for false claims about the record
Terez Cook v. Brian Foster, Warden, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 18-2214, 1/29/2020
Pursuing a federal writ of habeas corpus is always a long shot; in non-capital cases fewer than 1% of petitions are successful. Terez Cook gets it done here, convincing the Seventh Circuit his lawyer was ineffective at his trial for a home-invasion robbery (and that the Wisconsin court of appeals’ decision to the contrary was not just wrong, but unreasonable). The federal court is puzzled by a few aspects of our state court’s denial of Cook’s claims. But the thing that seems to push that denial over the line into unreasonableness–AEDPA‘s stringent requirement for habeas relief–is that it got a crucial fact wrong. The state court’s opinion relies on a confession by Cook–a confesssion for which there’s apparently no evidence. How did our court go astray? Well, the state described the (non-existent) confession in its brief, and then Cook’s direct-appeal counsel apparently didn’t check the facts, and neither did the court of appeals.
SCOTUS to address second or successive habeas petition issue
Banister v. Davis, USSC No. 18-6943, certiorari granted 6/24/19
Whether and under what circumstances a timely Rule 59(e) motion should be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005).
SCOTUS: Ineffective postconviction counsel doesn’t excuse default of ineffective appellate counsel claim
Erick Daniel Davila v. Lorie Davis, USSC No. 16-6219, 2017 WL 2722418 (June 26, 2017), affirming Davila v. Davis, No. 15-70013 (5th Cir., May 31, 2016) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court holds that ineffective assistance of counsel in state postconviction proceedings does not provide cause to excuse, in a subsequent federal habeas proceeding, a procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
SCOTUS: Habeas court erred in excusing petitioner’s procedural default in death penalty case
Charlotte Jenkins v. Percy Hutton, USSC No. 16-1116, 2017 WL 2621321 (June 19, 2017) (per curiam), reversing Hutton v. Mitchell, 839 F.3d 486 (2016)( 6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Hutton filed a federal habeas petition challenging his death sentence on the grounds that the jury at the penalty phase of his trial hadn’t been sufficiently instructed to consider only the aggravating factors that had been proven during the guilt phase. But he didn’t object to the instructions at trial and didn’t raise instructional error on direct appeal, so his claim was procedurally defaulted. (Slip op. at 1-3). The Sixth Circuit reached the merits of his claim anyway, excusing the default because the jury hadn’t found the existence of aggravating factors and under Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992). The Sixth Circuit was wrong to do so, says the Supreme Court.
SCOTUS suggests it might not take much to satisfy Graham’s “meaningful opportunity for release” standard for juveniles serving life
Virginia v. Dennis LeBlanc, USSC No. 16-1177, 2017 WL 2507375 (June 12, 2017), reversing LeBlanc v. Mathena, 841 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Although this is a per curiam decision and it’s decided under the rubric of federal habeas review, the upshot of this opinion is that states won’t have to do too much to satisfy the requirement under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010), that a state give a juvenile serving life without parole “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on a demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”
Is simply mentioning a defendant’s young age enough to satisfy Miller v. Alabama?
McKinley Kelly v. Richard Brown, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1244, 3/16/17
Two judges on the Seventh Circuit apparently think so, based on their rejection of Kelly’s motion to file a second federal habeas petition so he can challenge his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life sentence for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional).
SCOTUS: Defense counsel was ineffective for injecting race into sentencing
Buck v. Davis, USSC No. 15-8049, 2017 WL 685534 (February 22, 2017), reversing and remanding Buck v. Stephens, 623 Fed. Appx. 668 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Buck was found guilty of capital murder. Under state law, the jury could impose a death sentence only if it found Buck was likely to commit acts of violence in the future. At sentencing Buck’s attorney called Walter Quijano, a psychologist, to give an opinion on that issue. Though the psychologist testified Buck probably would not engage in violent conduct, he also said that race is one factor in assessing a person’s propensity for violence and that Buck was statistically more likely to act violently because he is black. The jury sentenced Buck to death. The Supreme Court, by a 7-to-2 vote, holds Buck’s attorney was ineffective.