On Point: 5. Particular issues

seventh circuit decision

Habeas – Procedural Default Defense: Waiver by State 

Procedural default (here, failure to perfect the appeal in state court, hence failure to exhaust the claim) is an affirmative defense which may be forfeited or waived by the State. The State expressly waived any failure-to-exhaust objection, hence the court proceeds to the merits.

Habeas – PLRA and Right to Access the Courts 

During the course of litigating an otherwise unrelated 42 U.S.C.

seventh circuit decision

Habeas Review – Right to Counsel – Collateral Attack 

Resendez litigated an unsuccessful pro se challenge to revocation of his state court parole, on the ground that he had completed service of that sentence therefore wasn’t in fact on parole. Forced to litigate the issue on his own, he argues on federal habeas that he was denied his right to counsel.

“[A] criminal defendant enjoys [a] right to counsel through his first appeal of right .

seventh circuit decision

Habeas Review – Confessions – Voluntariness 

Given the deferential nature of habeas review, the state court reasonably determined that a 16-year-old’s confession after 55 hours of interrogation was voluntary:

Particularly in light of the highly deferential standard due to the state court, we have no reason to doubt that it took into account all of the relevant facts, highlighting only those that seemed especially pertinent to the voluntariness of the confession.

seventh circuit decision

Habeas Procedure – Appellate Jurisdiction 

Where a party has filed a timely notice of appeal to a judgment, and the district court subsequently enters an amended judgment nunc pro tunc (“now for then”) conforming language in the original judgment, an amended notice of appeal isn’t necessary to confer appellate jurisdiction:

… The district court’s February 3, 2012 judgment thus had retroactive legal effect back to August 26,

seventh circuit court of appeals decision, affirming habeas grant following remand in 539 F.3d 766 (further case history: here)

Habeas Review – Evidentiary Hearing 

The rule of Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), that 2254(d)(1) review is limited to the state-court record, doesn’t apply where the state court didn’t address a component part of the claim (here, 

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas Review – IAC/Suppression Claim, Generally 

Under Strickland, Rann must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Grosshans, 424 F.3d at 590 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). When reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in habeas petitions, however, we must honor any reasonable state court decision,

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas Review – Miranda-Edwards 

Coleman’s argument that his confession violated Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (interrogation must cease immediately if suspect requests counsel) was rejected by the state court based upon a determination that he did not in fact assert his to counsel. Denial of relief is affirmed:

Coleman admits but downplays the crucial difference here: In Edwards,

seventh circuit court of appeals decision, denying habeas relief in 2008AP2735-CRNM (summary order)

Habeas Review – Speedy Trial 

Habeas relief denied on speedy trial challenge to 14-month delay between filing of complaint and scheduled start of trial, applying familar 4-part test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Although the first three aspects of the test work in West’s favor (length of,

seventh circuit decision, denying habeas relief in 783 N.E.2d 1140 (Ind. 2003)

Habeas – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Habeas challenge to counsel’s performance in this capital case is limited to imposition of the death penalty, in three respects, all of which the court rejects.

1) Failure to ask the trial judge to have courtroom spectators stop displaying pictures of the victim is controlled by Casey v.

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas Review – Batson Claim 

The State’s pattern of peremptory strikes – at least 15, possibly 17, out of 20, directed at African-Americans – was so “disproportionate” as to “give[] rise to an inference of discrimination.” This is so, despite Harris limiting his challenges to 9 of these 17 strikes: “that does not make the pattern of strikes any less probative.” The strongly deferential nature of habeas review notwithstanding,