On Point blog, page 1 of 2
Seventh Circuit denies habeas petition because Supreme Court precedent was unclear whether de facto life sentence for juvenile considered capable of reform violated Eighth Amendment.
Curtis L. Walker v. Dan Cromwell, No. 23-2240, 6/16/25
Despite making a “strong case for relief” that his de-facto life sentence for a homicide committed when he was 17 violated the Eighth Amendment, the Seventh Circuit held that Curtis Walker’s habeas petition could not overcome the heavy burden imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to show that the state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court because the Court’s precedents were not “a model of clarity.”
7th Circuit denies habeas relief to Wisconsin prisoner by holding it cannot consider new evidence supporting petitioner’s claim
Breion S. Woodson v. Bradley Mlodzik, No. 22-3153, 2/28/25
Although Woodson has new evidence seeming to suggest he was sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information, the complex procedural rules of habeas litigation require affirmance.
Eastern District grants petition for writ of habeas corpus in case alleging inaccurate information at sentencing
Jared L. Spencer v. Michael Meisner, 21-cv-0326 (E.D. Wis. 4/26/24).
In an intriguing habeas win, the district court swats away the usual arguments about “reliance” and “harmlessness” in order to find that Spencer’s constitutional right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information was violated.
U.S. Supreme Court cases on juvenile life-without-parole don’t provide basis for habeas relief for discretionary, non-life sentence
Rico Sanders v. Scott Eckstein, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 19-2596 (Nov. 30, 2020)
Sanders was give a 140-year sentence for sexual assaults he committed when he was 15 years old. He’ll be eligible for parole in 2030, when he’s 51. He argues he’s entitled to habeas relief because the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unreasonably rejected his claim that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment under recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions dealing with life sentences for juveniles. The Seventh Circuit rejects his claim.
SCOTUS: Defense counsel was ineffective for injecting race into sentencing
Buck v. Davis, USSC No. 15-8049, 2017 WL 685534 (February 22, 2017), reversing and remanding Buck v. Stephens, 623 Fed. Appx. 668 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Buck was found guilty of capital murder. Under state law, the jury could impose a death sentence only if it found Buck was likely to commit acts of violence in the future. At sentencing Buck’s attorney called Walter Quijano, a psychologist, to give an opinion on that issue. Though the psychologist testified Buck probably would not engage in violent conduct, he also said that race is one factor in assessing a person’s propensity for violence and that Buck was statistically more likely to act violently because he is black. The jury sentenced Buck to death. The Supreme Court, by a 7-to-2 vote, holds Buck’s attorney was ineffective.
Appellate counsel not ineffective for failing to challenge habitual offender status
Charles Walker v. Kathy Griffin, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2147, 2016 WL 4501988, 8/29/16
Walker’s lawyer on his direct state appeal decided to challenge the reasonableness of Walker’s sentence, but he didn’t raise an issue about the sufficiency of the evidence to support applying an habitual offender enhancer to Walker. That failure didn’t constitute ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Counsel in capital case not ineffective for presenting negative evidence and missing mitigating evidence
Roy L. Ward v. Ron Neal, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 16-1001, 8/26/16
Ward’s trial lawyers weren’t ineffective when they failed to adequately investigate and present readily available mitigating evidence and then, due to lack of preparation, instead presented evidence Ward was a dangerous psychopath.
Divided Seventh Circuit Panel Rejects Habeas IAC Sentencing Claim
Michael Miller v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1869, 4/26/2016
An Indiana state court sentenced Michael Miller to a total of 120 years in prison on three counts of child molestation. On direct appeal, his lawyer raised challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of other-acts evidence, but did not contest the length of his sentence. Miller then filed a state collateral attack, alleging his original appellate counsel was ineffective for not attacking the sentence.
Seventh Circuit cracks open a door for juveniles challenging non-mandatory, de facto life sentences
Bernard McKinley v. Kim Butler, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 14-1944, 1/4/16
McKinley failed to raise an Eighth Amendment claim in his state court challenges to the sentence he received for a murder he committed at the age of 16. That means he procedurally defaulted the claim for purposes of his federal habeas challenge to the sentence. But instead of affirming the district court’s dismissal of McKinley’s habeas petition, a majority of this Seventh Circuit panel stays the habeas proceeding and, based on reasoning that could be useful to other juveniles seeking to challenge long sentences, gives McKinley a chance to go back to state court to challenge his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
Seventh Circuit gives retroactive effect to Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA’s residual clause
Benjamin Price v. United States, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2427, 8/4/15
Price seeks to bring a successive collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) to the enhancement of his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He claims that Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the residual clause of ACCA violates due process, announces a new substantive rule of constitutional law that the Supreme Court has categorically made retroactive to final convictions. The Seventh Circuit agrees.