On Point: 22. Habeas corpus

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas Review – IAC/Suppression Claim, Generally 

Under Strickland, Rann must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Grosshans, 424 F.3d at 590 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). When reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in habeas petitions, however, we must honor any reasonable state court decision,

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas Review – Miranda-Edwards 

Coleman’s argument that his confession violated Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (interrogation must cease immediately if suspect requests counsel) was rejected by the state court based upon a determination that he did not in fact assert his to counsel. Denial of relief is affirmed:

Coleman admits but downplays the crucial difference here: In Edwards,

seventh circuit court of appeals decision, denying habeas relief in 2008AP2735-CRNM (summary order)

Habeas Review – Speedy Trial 

Habeas relief denied on speedy trial challenge to 14-month delay between filing of complaint and scheduled start of trial, applying familar 4-part test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Although the first three aspects of the test work in West’s favor (length of,

seventh circuit decision, denying habeas relief in 783 N.E.2d 1140 (Ind. 2003)

Habeas – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Habeas challenge to counsel’s performance in this capital case is limited to imposition of the death penalty, in three respects, all of which the court rejects.

1) Failure to ask the trial judge to have courtroom spectators stop displaying pictures of the victim is controlled by Casey v.

Parker v. David Eugene Matthews, USSC No. 11-845, 6/11/12, reversing 651 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2011)

In this habeas case, the United States Court of Ap- peals for the Sixth Circuit set aside two 29-year-old murder convictions based on the flimsiest of rationales. The court’s decision is a textbook example of what the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) proscribes: “using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts.” Renico v.

State v. Jerred Renard Washington / Jerred Renard Washington v. State, 2012 WI App 74 (recommended for publication); case activity (974.06); case activity (writ)

Habeas (Knight Petition) – Laches 

Following his plea-based conviction in 1997, Washington’s retained counsel filed a postconviction 809.30 motion in 1998. Counsel did not file a notice of appeal, however, after the motion was denied. Then, in 2009,

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas Review – Batson Claim 

The State’s pattern of peremptory strikes – at least 15, possibly 17, out of 20, directed at African-Americans – was so “disproportionate” as to “give[] rise to an inference of discrimination.” This is so, despite Harris limiting his challenges to 9 of these 17 strikes: “that does not make the pattern of strikes any less probative.” The strongly deferential nature of habeas review notwithstanding,

Coleman v. Lorenzo Johnson, USSC No. 11-1053, 5/29/12 (per curiam), reversing 446 Fed. Appx. 531 (3rd Cir. 2011)

We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference. First, on direct appeal, “it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.

Question Presented (from cert petition): 

In Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), this Court held that criminal defendants receive ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment when their attorneys fail to advise them that pleading guilty to an offense will subject them to deportation. The question presented is whether Padilla applies to persons whose convictions became final before its announcement.

Patrick Wood v. Milyard, USSC No. 10-9995, 4/24/12, reversing 403 Fed. Appx. 335 (10th Cir 2010)

This case concerns the authority of a federal court to raise, on its own motion, a statute of limitations defense to a habeas corpus petition. After state prisoner Patrick Wood filed a federal habeas corpus petition, the State twice informed the U. S. District Court that it “[would] not challenge,