On Point: 22. Habeas corpus

Wetzel v. John Lambert, USSC No. 11-38, 2/21/12, vacating and remanding 633 F.3d 126 (3rd Cir. 2011)

Lambert claimed that state prosecutors withheld exculpatory information: a “police activity sheet” that arguably suggested someone other than, or perhaps in addition to, himself committed the offense (robbery and murder); and that could have been used to impeach the principal state’s witness. The state (Pennsylvania) court deemed the information too ambiguous to show that someone else had committed the robbery,

Howes v. Randall Lee Fields, USSC No. 10-680, 2/21/12, reversing 617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir 2010); arguably abrogating, State v. Tonnie D. Armstrong, 223 Wis.2d 331, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999)

Habeas – Review, Generally 

Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus if the state-court adjudication pursuant to which the prisoner is held “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

seventh circuit decision

Habeas – Knowing Use of False Testimony (“Napue”) 

Due process prohibits knowing prosecutorial use of false testimony, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). However, the prosecutor’s exploitation of Bland’s incorrect testimony on a potentially important point (the date his gun was confiscated) doesn’t support habeas relief on a Napue-type theory.

Napue and Giglio hold that a prosecutor may not offer testimony that the prosecutor knows to be false.

Marilyn Mulero v. Thompson, 7th Cir No. 10-3875, 2/7/12

seventh circuit decision

Habeas – Procedural Bar 

Muleros’ failure to present various claims “through one complete round of state court review” operates as procedural default; citing, Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 382 (7th Cir. 2010).

… While Mulero did present numerous other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to the Illinois state trial court and in her petition for review to the Illinois Supreme Court,

7th circuit decision, denying habeas in relief

Habeas – Standard of Review – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

When “no state court has squarely addressed the merits” of a habeas claim, however, we review the claim under the pre-AEDPA standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Under this “more generous standard,” George v. Smith, 586 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2009), “we review the petitioner’s constitutional claim with deference to the state court,

Cory R. Maples v. Thomas, USSC No. 10-63, 1/18/12, reversing 586 F.3d 879 (11th Cir. 2009)

On “the uncommon facts presented here,” the Court finds that cause existed to excuse on federal habeas review Maples’ procedural default, namely his failure to file a timely appeal of his state (Alabama) postconviction petition.

The sole question this Court has taken up for review is whether,

Rafel Arriaza Gonzalez v. Thaler, USSC No. 10-895, 1/10/12, affirming 623 F. 3d 222 (5th Cir. 2010)

Habeas Procedure – Certificate of Appealability, Defects and Jurisdiction 

… 28 U. S. C. §2253(c), provides that a habeas petitioner must obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal a federal district court’s final order in a habeas proceeding. §2253(c)(1). The COA may issue only if the petitioner has made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,”

Hardy v. Irving L. Cross, USSC No. 11-74, 12/12/11, reversing Cross v. Hardy, 7th Cir No. 09-1666

The Seventh Circuit grant of habeas relief, on the ground “the state failed to demonstrate that it employed good faith efforts to locate the complainant” before declaring her “unavailable” and allowing her prior testimony to be read to the jury, is reversed:

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of1996 (AEDPA),

Gregory L. Payne v. Basinger, 7th Cir No. 10-1869, 11/10/11

seventh circuit decision

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Guilty Pleas – Prejudice 

The state court erroneously concluded that, because Basinger would have been convicted anyway had he gone to trial, he suffered no prejudice from counsel’s erroneous advice as to the maximum sentence he faced on acceptance of the plea bargain:

That was a mistake.

Samuel Morgan v. Hardy, 7th Cir No. 10-3155, 11/7/11

seventh circuit decision

Habeas – Recantation 

The Illinois state court didn’t mishandle either the facts or applicable law, and its rejection of State witness Prater’s post-trial recantation as incredible wasn’t unreasonable. The petitioner’s task is to “show[] that the state court determined an underlying factual issue against the clear and convincing weight of the evidence” – though the recantation here is consistent with the physical evidence,