On Point: B. Selection process

court of appeals decision; for Sellhausen: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Issues (formulated by On Point):

Whether a trial judge has a sua sponte duty to strike a prosepctive juror who is an in-law of the judge.

Whether defense counsel’s use of a peremptory strike to remove the judge’s in-law renders harmless any error in the judge’s failure to remove that juror.

See prior post for further discussion.

State v. Sharon A. Sellhausen, 2010 WI App 175, reversed, 2012 WI 5; for Sellhausen: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

¶1        Sharon Sellhausen appeals her jury conviction based on the presence of the presiding judge’s daughter-in-law on the panel of potential jurors.  The daughter-in-law was not seated on the jury because Sellhausen’s trial counsel used a peremptory challenge to remove her. 

decision below:  unpublished summary disposition; for Funk: Michele Anne Tjader

Issue (from Table of Pending Cases):

Whether a juror was subjectively and/or objectively biased under the test set forth in State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999).

Briefs, appellate decision, petition for review: none is posted, so you can’t readily tell what the case is about. CCAP indicates that this is a sexual assault case and that the judge granted new trial because a juror failed to reveal on voir dire she’d been a sexual assault victim herself.

Berghuis v. Smith, USSC No. 08-1402, 3/30/10

Defendants have Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury drawn from fair cross section of community. To establish prima facie violation of this “fair-cross-section,” requirement, a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as “distinctive” (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) “systematic exclusion” in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation. Various methods have been proposed to test underrepresentation,

Thaler v. Haynes, USSC No. 09–273, 2/22/10 (per curiam)

Nothing in Supreme Court caselaw clearly requires “that a demeanor-based explanation for a peremptory challenge must be rejected unless the judge personally observed and recalls the relevant aspect of the prospective juror’s demeanor.” In other words, there’s no requirement that the judge have been present during jury selection in order to evaluate a Batson claim defended by the prosecutor as based on the juror’s demeanor.

State v. Mark H. Tody, 2009 WI 31, reversing unpublished opinion
For Tody: Byron C. Lichstein, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶32      … The correct principle of law that should have guided the circuit court judge is that a circuit court judge should err on the side of dismissing a challenged juror when the challenged juror’s presence may create bias or an appearance of bias. 

State v. Dale L. Smith, 2006 WI 74, affirming unpublished decision
For Smith: Allison Ritter

Issue/Holding:

¶16      The sole question we must address on appeal is whether Smith was denied the right to an impartial jury by the circuit court’s refusal to strikeCharlotte for cause. Smith argues that Charlotte should have been disqualified as objectively biased because she was employed by the prosecuting attorney.

State v. George Melvin Taylor, 2004 WI App 81, PFR filed 4/13/04
For Taylor: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶18. Accordingly, we must now turn to the Batson challenge itself. Our supreme court has adopted the Batson principles and analysis. State v. Lamon, 2003 WI 78, ¶22, 262 Wis. 2d 747,

State v. Nancy R. Lamon, 2003 WI 78, affirming unpublished decision of court of appeals, affirmed on habeas review, Lamon v. Boatwright, 7th Cir No. 05-4018, 11/8/06
For Lamon: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding: A trial judge is not required to make detailed findings in ruling on a Batson issue, ¶76.

Issue/Holding: That a prospective juror’s last name “is a well-known criminal name” in the locality,

State v. Bernell Ross, 2003 WI App 27, PFR filed 2/21/03
For Ross: Andrew Mishlove

Issue/Holding:

¶15. In a challenge to a Batson ruling, we review the trial court’s determination as to whether the State had a discriminatory intent as a finding of historical fact, which we shall not disturb unless clearly erroneous. State v. Gregory,