On Point: 25. Jury

State v. Larry D. Harris, 229 Wis.2d 832, 601 N.W.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1999).
For Harris: William S. Coleman, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate.
Issue: Whether defendant’s rights to presence and counsel were violated by their absence from at least part of voir dire.
Holding: Defendant has both a nonwaivable statutory right to presence, and also a constitutional right to assistance of counsel, at jury selection.
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State v. Audrey A. Edmunds, 229 Wis. 2d 67, 598 N.W.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1999).
For Edmunds: Dean A. Strang.
Holding: Edmunds is held to have waived her right to be present when the parties and the court discussed dismissal of a juror for cause. The dismissal is upheld, where the juror conveyed opinions about the case, before hearing all evidence.

State v. Robert A. Mendoza, 227 Wis.2d 838, 596 N.W.2d 736 (1999), reversing State v. Mendoza 220 Wis.2d 803, 584 N.W.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Mendoza: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: Striking jurors (at state’s request) merely because they have criminal records is “an error of law,” ¶24. The court, however, goes on to review whether each such juror should have been struck for cause.

State v. James E. Erickson, 227 Wis.2d 758, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999), on certification
For Erickson: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Though a juror gave a seemingly hedged answer (“I think so”) to whether she’d be fair and impartial, the trial court’s refusal to strike for cause is upheld given appellate deference to trial-level determination of no subjective bias. ¶¶37-44.

State v. Edron D. Broomfield, 223 Wis.2d 465, 589 N.W.2d 225 (1999), affirming unpublished decision
For Broomfield: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether Broomfield was denied fair trial because juror overheard, prior to trial, prejudicial extraneous information relating to Broomfield’s past misconduct.

Holding: Exposure to extrinsic information implicates the rule against verdict-impeachment, R. 906.06(2). The party must first establish by competent testimony three things: extraneous (as opposed to merely deliberative) information;

State v. Judith L. Kiernan, 227 Wis.2d 736, 596 N.W.2d 760 (1999), affirming State v. Kiernan, 221 Wis.2d 126, 584 N.W.2d 203 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Kiernan: Chad A. Lanning, Dennis M. Melowski, Barry S. Cohen, S.C.

Issue: Whether prospective jurors who had been part of a jury that two days earlier returned a verdict of guilty in a case involving the same defense attorney,

State v. Edron D. Broomfield, 223 Wis.2d 465, 589 N.W.2d 225 (1999), affirming unpublished decision
For Broomfield: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: One prospective juror heard, before trial, other prospective jurors describe Broomfield as a “gangster” who beat up kids and was involved in “drive-bys.” The juror was chosen for the petit jury; he didn’t convey this information to the others, nor was it brought up during deliberations —

.State v. Bobby G. Grant, 230 Wis.2d 90, 601 N.W.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Grant: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether Grant’s waiver of jury trial was invalid because the trial court failed to advise that the verdict must be unanimous.

Holding: The procedure applicable to challenging guilty pleas, State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) applies to this context;

State v. LaVere D. Wenger, 225 Wis.2d 495, 593 N.W.2d 467 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Wenger: Richard L. Wachowski

Holding: Duty-to-retreat instruction, Wis JI-Crim 810, properly submitted, though retreat would have been into defendant’s own home:

Here, the trial court used the pattern instruction to inform the jury of the applicable law on retreat.  The jury instruction put squarely before the jury the disputed issue of whether Wenger’s use of deadly force was reasonably necessary to “prevent or terminate the interference,”

State v. Dennis Jones, 218 Wis. 2d 599, 581 N.W.2d 561 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Jones: Michael S. Holzman

Issue/Holding:

The State argues that Jones’s Batson objection, made after the jury was sworn, came too late. Jones responds that his objection was timely. We conclude that the defendant must make a Batson objection prior to the time the jury is sworn. If the objection is not made until after that time,