On Point: 29. Postconv. Motions

State v. Anou Lo, 2003 WI 107, affirming unpublished opinion of court of appeals; habeas relief denied, Lo v. Endicott, 7th Cir No. 06-3948, 10/26/07
For Lo: Robert R. Henak
Amicus Briefs: Joseph N. Ehmann, Wm. J. Tyroler, SPD; Meredith J. Ross, Walter J. Dickey, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶2. The petitioner, Anou Lo, asks that we overrule our decision in State v.

State v. Larry G. Edwards, 2003 WI 68, reversing unpublished summary order of court of appeals
For Edwards: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether, after the trial court dismissed a criminal case due to violation of intrastate detainer act time limits, the state’s motion for reconsideration was supported by a “new issue,” namely whether the dismissal was with prejudice.

Holding: “We conclude that the State raised a ‘new issue’

State v. John A. Jipson, 2003 WI App 222
For Jipson: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶16. Jipson’s answers, while incriminating, have no bearing on the focus here. That is, the answers do not establish Jipson knew the State had to prove the purpose of the sexual contact was an element of the crime. The critical inquiry is whether Jipson otherwise knew at the time of entering his plea all of the essential elements of the offense so that it can be said he knowingly pled guilty to the crime.

State v. John A. Jipson, 2003 WI App 222
For Jipson: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶7. When challenging a guilty or no contest plea, the defendant has the initial burden to produce a prima facie case comprised of the following two parts. First, the defendant must show the trial court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea without conforming to Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other mandatory procedures.

State v. Frederick Robertson, 2003 WI App 84
For Robertson: Jefren Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Where principal issue concerned the complainant’s credibility, indication first revealed after conviction that she had been treated for depression with psychotic features around the time of the incident required in camera inspection to determine whether her mental health records must be disclosed to the defense.

This case arrives at the unmapped intersection of postconviction discovery and privileged records.

State v. Paul L. Polak, 2002 WI App 120, PFR filed 5/3/02
For Polak: Philip J. Brehm
Issue/Holding:

¶15. When an adequate colloquy is not conducted, and the defendant makes a motion for a new trial or other postconviction relief from the trial court’s judgment, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing on whether the waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, intelligent and voluntary….¶16.

State v. William L. Brockett, 2002 WI App 115, PFR filed 5/17/02
For Brockett: Hans P. Koesser

Issue/Hearing: The trial court has inherent authority to vacate or modify an order (including, as in this instance, on state’s motion). ¶¶13-15.

State v. John D. Tiggs, Jr., 2002 WI App 181

Issue/Holding:

¶9. We agree with Tiggs that once he has changed his legal name, he has a positive right to be called by that name. But he may also, by conduct, forfeit that right. If he calls himself by some other name, he has announced to the world that he goes by that other name and others then have the right not only to call him by that other name,

State v. Michael A. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106, PFR filed 5/23/02
For Grindemann: Leonard D. Kachinsky
Issue/Holding: The trial court erred in granting a motion to modify sentence without either seeking the state’s response or holding a hearing. Procedure on motion to modify sentence is similar to that for a post-conviction motion under § 974.06(3) — if the motion is obviously non-meritorious, the trial court should deny it outright;

State v. Robert L. Noll, 2002 WI App 273

Issue: Whether a new-factor based motion to modify sentence may be rejected as untimely under § 973.19.

Holding: The motion invoked the trial court’s inherent authority to modify, and therefore § 973.19 and its 90-day deadline was inapplicable. ¶5. The two procedures are distinct. Under § 973.19 a defendant may within 90 days of sentence “assert[] an erroneous exercise of discretion based on excessiveness,