On Point: A. Charging instrument

A prosecutor’s exercise of discretion can trigger or avoid collateral consequences for your client. This new law review article analyzes how and why prosecutors make these decisions.

State v. Brian R. Corvino, 2016 WI App 52; case activity (including briefs)

This decision examines § 967.055(2)(a), which requires the State to apply to the circuit court before amending an OWI charge. The court of appeals found that amending the charge here would be inconsistent with the public policy of deterring drunk-driving and held that the circuit court had the inherent authority to order the State to file an Information charging Corvino’s 4th OWI as a felony.

State v. A.C., 2015AP1604, 1/20/16, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

A petition alleging A.C. was delinquent contained sufficient facts to establish probable cause that A.C. acted as a party to the crime of operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent.

State v. Jeffrey L. Elverman, 2015 WI App 91; case activity (including state’s brief)

The court rejects all challenges to a conviction of theft of more than $10,000. The issues mostly spring from the state’s use of Wis. Stat. § 971.36(4), which permits, under certain circumstances, the aggregation of multiple thefts into a single count.

State v. Robert J. Tisland, 2012AP1570-CR, District 4, 1/22/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Even if two legislative acts made inconsistent changes to a criminal statute and meant the changes made by the earlier act were superseded by the later one, a charge filed under the provisions of the superseded act was not, under the circumstances of this case, a charge for a crime unknown to law that deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction or competency; instead, it was a technical charging error that didn’t prejudice the defendant.

Lopez v. Smith, USSC No. 13-946, 10/6/14 (per curiam), reversing Smith v. Lopez, 731 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2013); docket

When a state prisoner seeks federal habeas relief on the ground that a state court, in adjudicating a claim on the merits, misapplied federal law, a federal court may grant relief only if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We have emphasized, time and again, that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), … prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is “clearly established.” …. Because the Ninth Circuit failed to comply with this rule, we reverse its decision granting habeas relief to respondent Marvin Smith. (Slip op. at 1).

State v. Jeffrey D. Marker, 2013AP2725-CR, District 2, 3/26/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court erred in dismissing a complaint charging Marker with operating under the influence of a controlled substance because the complaint was sufficient to establish probable cause, applying Lofton v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 472, 478, 266 N.W.2d 576 (1978). After police received a tip about a reckless driver,

City of Lancaster v. Todd A. Chojnowski & Eric T. Chojnowski, 2013AP1593 & 2013AP1594, District 4, 2/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1593; 2013AP1594

Arrest under § 968.075, the mandatory arrest law for domestic abuse offenses, doesn’t preclude a charge under city disorderly conduct statute. While § 968.085(8) prohibits the issuance of a “citation” to a person arrested under § 968.075,

State v. Tina M. Jacobsen, 2014 WI App 13; case activity

Jacobsen was charged with 8 offenses for stealing $500,000 from her employer, and she was convicted on 3 counts.  The charges were based on 289 individual thefts occurring over 3 years.  On appeal she claimed her trial lawyer was ineffective for failing advise her that, and for failing to seek dismissal because, the charges were duplicitous or multiplicitous.  

State v. Dragisa Pavlovic, 2013AP1180-CR, District 2, 10/23/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Pavlovic was charged with bail jumping for violating bond conditions that included no contact with his wife or her residence. (¶2). One count alleged he had contact with his wife on July 23; the evidence at trial, however, showed only that he had contact with her residence that day;