On Point: 1. Conditions

State v. Larry C. Lokken, 2017AP2087-CR, 9/17/19, District 3 (unpublished), case activity (including briefs)

Lokken, a long-time Eau Claire County Treasurer, pled “no contest” to 3 counts of misconduct in office and 5 counts of theft in a business setting for stealing $625,758.22 from taxpayers.  The circuit court ordered $681,846.92 in restitution  and imposed an unusual condition of probation on one of the counts: if Lokken failed to pay restitution in 4 1/2 years, the 10-year probation period  on Count 2 would be revoked.

State v. Marguerite Alpers, 2015AP1784-CR, 1/12/16, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering Alpers to install an ignition interlock device “on [her] husband’s car” as a condition of probation in her OWI cases because the record didn’t establish the condition was a reasonable and appropriate means of advancing the goals of rehabilitation and public protection, State v. Miller, 2005 WI App 114, 11, 283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 N.W.2d 47.

State v. Justin L. Garrett, Case No. 12AP1341-CR, District 2, 12/19/12

Court of appeals decision (1 judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Garrett failed to make a prima facie showing that his plea colloquy was defective, so his motion to withdraw plea was properly denied without an evidentiary hearing:

¶10      Garrett argues that he did not understand the meaning of the specific elements of the charge of fourth-degree sexual assault: sexual contact and consent.  

Wisconsin State v. Tally Ann Rowan, 2012 WI 60, on certification review ; case activity

Extended Supervision Conditions – Suspicionless Searches 

A condition of extended supervision “that allows any law enforcement officer to search [Tally]’s person, vehicle, or residence for firearms, at any time and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion,” was tailored to the particular facts and thus neither overbroad nor unrelated to Tally’s rehabilitative needs.

State v. Matthew O. Roach, 2011AP2105-CR, District 4, 5/17/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Roach: Brandon Kuhl; case activity

Mootness Doctrine – Generally 

¶8 n. 2:

The State also contends that this issue is moot because the condition of probation Roach challenges expired on January 19, 2012.  An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying controversy.  

State v. Tally Ann Rowan, 2010AP1398-CR, rev. granted 10/25/11

on certification request (District 3/4); for Rowan: LaZotte, Paul G.; case activity

Issue (from Certification): 

The issue presented by this appeal is whether a sentencing court violated the Fourth Amendment or Wis. Const. art. I, § 11, by setting a condition of extended supervision that allows any law enforcement officer to search the defendant’s person, vehicle,

certification; for Rowan: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; review granted, 10/25/11

Extended Supervision Conditions – Limits on Fourth Amendment Rights

The issue presented by this appeal is whether a sentencing court violated the Fourth Amendment or Wis. Const. art. I, § 11, by setting a condition of extended supervision that allows any law enforcement officer to search the defendant’s person,

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Luckett: Cheryl A. Ward; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Extended Supervision Conditions
ES condition barring Luckett from residing”with any person in any place in which children or women reside [without] Court’s permission” neither unreasonable nor unconstitutionally overbroad.

The court of appeals stresses that Luckett’s history “demonstrates domestic violence”; indeed, the immediate crime is itself DV-related.

court of appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); BiC; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

Conditional Jail Time
“Applying the plain language of § 973.09(4)(a), it is clear that straight confinement time may be imposed as a condition of probation, and that although the trial court ‘may grant’ work-release privileges, it is not required to do so.” It follows that such privileges may be revoked,