On Point: 5. PLRA

Artillis Mitchell v. Chris S. Buesgen & Kevin A. Carr, 2022AP1076, 2/22/24, District 4 (recommended for publication); case activity

This case concerns Mitchell’s appeal from the circuit court’s order dismissing his petition for a writ of certiorari. We recognize the case is a bit outside of our normal coverage, but in addition to the fact that D4 has recommended this decision for publication, the case presents an interesting, if somewhat technical, application of law to a factual scenario that is likely of some interest to our readers. The bottom line is that the denial of Mitchell’s petition is affirmed, despite the fact that he indisputably filed proof that he fully exhausted all available administrative remedies, because he failed to file “all documents related to the administrative process.” Op., ¶33-34.

Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, USSC No. 18-8369, 2020 WL 3038282, 6/8/20, affirming 754 Fed. Appx. 756 (10th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) bars a prisoner from being able to file a lawsuit without first paying filing fees if the prisoner has “three strikes”—that is, has had three or more prior suits dismissed because they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The issue here is whether the dismissal had to be with prejudice, or whether a dismissal without prejudice counts, too. It does, says a unanimous Court.

Ross v. Blake, USSC No. 15-339, 2016 WL 3128839 (June 6, 2016), vacating and remanding Blake v. Ross, 787 F.3d 693 (4th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court unanimously holds there is no unwritten “special circumstances” exception to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that a prisoner exhaust administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit.

Bruce v. Samuels, USSC No. 14-844, 2016 WL 112684 (January 12, 2016), affirming Pinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) of the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis must pay 20% of his or her existing income toward the filing fee of a case he or she files until the fee is paid. The federal circuit courts were split when it came to applying this requirement to prisoners who owed fees for more than one case. Some treated the 20% as a cap, so that the 20% would be taken out and applied to one case at a time till each fee was paid. Others assessed 20% per case, so that an inmate with, for example, three filing fees to pay would have 60% of his or her income taken. The Supreme Court unanimously adopts the second approach.

Question presented:

Is there a common law “special circumstances” exception to the Prison Litigation Reform Act that relieves an inmate of his mandatory obligation to exhaust administrative remedies when the inmate erroneously believes that he satisfied exhaustion by participating in an internal investigation?

Question presented:

When a prisoner files more than one case or appeal in the federal courts in forma pauperis, does 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) cap the monthly exaction of filing fees at 20% of the prisoner’s monthly income regardless of the number of cases or appeals for which he owes filing fees?

Coleman v. Tollefson, USSC No. 13-1333, 2015 WL 2340838 (May 18, 2015), affirming Coleman v. Tollefson, 733 F.3d 175 (6th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Ordinarily, an indigent litigant may proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which allows the litigant to file a civil action without paying fees or certain expenses. But under the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, a “three strikes” provision precludes IFP status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated …, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). But what if the prisoner is appealing one of the “strikes” and the appeal is still pending; does it still count as a “strike”? “Yes,” answers a unanimous Supreme Court.

State ex rel. Titus Henderson v. Raemisch, 2010 WI App 114; pro se; Resp. Br.

Partial dismissal of a prisoner lawsuit doesn’t counts as a “strike” within the meaning of the  § 801.02(7)(d) “three-strike” provision of the Wisconsin Prisoner Litigation Reform Act.

The PLRA regulates “prisoner” lawsuits. Typically, these relate to conditions of confinement, something the SPD doesn’t provide representation for, but our courts in their infinite wisdom apply the strictures of the PLRA to matters of SPD concern such as cert review of revocations,