On Point: 6. Search incident to arrest

State v. Dawn M. Prado, 2020 WI App 42, cross petitions for review granted, 10/21/20, affirmed, 2021 WI 64; case activity (including briefs)

They must have gotten tired of waiting. After SCOW failed (or refused) to decide the question in Howes, Brar, Mitchell, and Hawley, and SCOTUS likewise punted in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, the court of appeals now does what those higher courts could or would not: it rules on the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 343.305‘s provisions that permit police to withdraw blood from an incapacitated or unconscious motorist on the theory that they’ve “consented” to this by driving. And, like the vast majority of jurisdictions to consider similar questions, our court holds this provision unconstitutional, rejecting the state’s argument that statutorily-imputed consent is the type of “consent” that provides an exception to the warrant requirement. But the court also says the statute was not, at the time of Prado’s arrest, so plainly unconstitutional that the officer could not rely on it in good faith. Thus the court declines to suppress the test results.

State v. Mose B. Coffee, 2020 WI 53, 6/5/20, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2018AP1209; case activity (including briefs)

Under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009), police can search a vehicle after arresting a recent occupant “when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” But how do courts decide when it’s “reasonable to believe” this: is it a typical totality-of-the-circumstances analysis examining all the facts around an arrest? Or, as many courts have concluded, do the elements of the crime suspected–the “offense of arrest”–determine categorically when a search is permitted and when it isn’t? A majority of justices in this case would adopt the former view, but, as we’ve often seen lately, their votes are split between the lead and dissenting opinions. This arguably means there’s no binding holding on the question of law; the only thing we know for sure is that the search in this case is upheld.

State v. Shannon G. Potocnik, 2019AP523, 4/14/20, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)

There’s a deep split nationwide about whether the community caretaker doctrine can ever permit entry into a home. Wisconsin has held that it can, and this pro se appeal is of course necessarily fact-bound. But the decision is thorough and provides a good summary of state community-caretaker law as it stands, along with a much briefer discussion of blood draws based on exigency.

State v. Anthony J. Madland, 2019AP146-CR, District 3, 1/28/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Madland asserted that he requested an alternative chemical test under § 343.305 and that the officer who read the “informing the accused” form to him misled him as to his right to request an alternative test. The court of appeals rejects the claims in light of the circuit court’s fact findings.

State v. Justin W. Paull, 2017AP1210, 8/15/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mr. Paull was found bloody and semi-conscious after a motorcycle accident. He smelled of intoxicants and had slurred speech. Police arrested him, and he was taken to the hospital. An officer read the informing the accused form to the now-unconscious Mr. Paull, then drew his blood.

State v. Jessica M. Randall, 2019 WI 80, 7/2/19, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

A majority of the supreme court holds that a person who has been arrested for OWI and consented to a blood draw cannot prevent the testing of the blood sample for alcohol or drugs by advising the state she is revoking her consent.

State v. Gerald J. Vanderhoef, 2016AP2052-CR, District 1, 4/30/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vanderhoef’s silence in response to the “Informing the Accused” form constituted a refusal to consent to a chemical test, so the subsequent blood draw was unlawful. However, the state subpoenaed the results of his urine test, and that evidence was admissible.

State v. Mose B. Coffee, 2019 WI App 25; affirmed 6/5/20; case activity (including briefs)

This published decision should make for an interesting petition for review. The court of appeals rejects a prior unpublished opinion, State v. Hinderman, to hold:

¶13 . . . [W]hen an officer lawfully arrests a driver for OWI, even if alcohol is the only substance detected in relation to the driver, a search of the interior of the vehicle, including any containers therein, is lawful because it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the offense of OWI might be found. Thus, the search of Coffee’s vehicle in this case was lawful and the circuit court properly denied his suppression motion.

State v. Jordan Bennett Micklevitz, 2018AP637-CR, District 1, 1/23/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals rejects Micklevitz’s challenges to the search of his apartment.

Gerald Mitchell v. Wisconsin, USSC No. 18-6210, certiorari granted 1/11/19

Question presented:

Whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.