On Point blog, page 1 of 145
COA finds consent to blood test was voluntary under since-repealed provision of Implied Consent Statute
State v. Richard A. Tourtillot, 2024AP1831, 7/7/26, District III (not recommended for publication); case activity
The COA determined the defendant’s consent to a blood draw was voluntary under a since-repealed portion of the Implied Consent Law.
COA affirms suppression order because officer’s mistake of law did not provide reasonable suspicion for traffic stop.
State v. Michael P. Bundy, 2025AP1072, 6/25/26, District IV (not eligible for publication); case activity
The COA affirmed the circuit court’s order suppressing the fruits of a traffic stop because an officer’s mistake of law regarding the driver’s suspected violation of the window tinting regulation did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.
SCOTUS holds that cell phone user has reasonable expectation of privacy in location history data; remands to court of appeals to assess whether a geofence warrant was reasonable.
Chatrie v. United States, USSC No. 25-112, 6/29/2026, reversing a decision of the 4th Circuit, Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
SCOTUS determined that police conduct a search when they gain access to location history data from a third party because a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in records about his or her cell phone’s location. The Court remanded to the federal court of appeals to determine whether the geofence warrant at issue was reasonable.
Defense win: COA affirms order suppressing blood test evidence due to coercion
City of Antigo v. John Paul Fermanich, 2023AP1834, 6/16/26, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity
The City of Antigo appeals an order granting John Paul Fermanich’s motion to suppress blood evidence because Fermanich’s consent to the blood draw was coerced. COA affirms in this “close case” as it is the city’s burden to demonstrate that Fermanich freely and voluntarily consented to the warrantless blood draw.
COA finds officer’s reference to an “automatic” revocation did not render consent to blood draw involuntary
City of Mequon v. Scott Sarver Lindvall, 2025AP1703, 5/13/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
Although Lindvall seizes on the officer’s word choice in discussing the consequences of refusing to consent to an evidentiary blood draw, the Court ultimately finds his arguments unavailing and affirms.
COA upholds traffic stop for suspicion of excessive window tint
State v. Ryan Alan Stenner, 2025AP503-CR, 5/7/26, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA applies general reasonable suspicion principles to reverse the circuit court’s order granting suppression for a traffic stop based on overly dark window tint. It holds that the circuit court applied the wrong standard, the officer’s testimony was sufficiently connected to his training, and the administrative code related to window tint is valid and enforceable.
COA: Community caretaking function does not justify seizing a witness to a traffic accident.
State v. William A. Anderson, 2025AP796, 4/29/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA reversed the circuit court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because law enforcement’s community caretaker function did not justify seizing a possible witness to a motorcycle accident.
COA concludes consent to blood draw was free and voluntary despite defendant’s aversion to needles.
Winnebago County v. Michael Jon Potratz, 2025AP1059, 4/29/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA affirmed the circuit court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of his blood draw based on the factors established by SCOW in Artic .
COA holds officers had reasonable suspicion to justify Act 79 search of vehicle
State v. Shawn Clarke Spottswood, 2023AP1763-CR, 4/28/26, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Spottswood appeals the circuit court’s denial of his suppression motion after having entered a plea to receiving or concealing stolen property. On appeal, he again challenges the warrantless search of his vehicle, contending that law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit an offense sufficient to justify the search under 2013 Wis. Act 79 and WIS. STAT. § 973.09(1d).
SCOTUS issues per curiam opinion concluding officer had reasonable suspicion for seizure
D.C. v. R.W., USSC No. 25-248, 2/25/2025, reversing In re R.W., 334 A.3d 593 (D.C. 2025); Scotusblog page (with links to briefs)
SCOTUS reverses DC Court of Appeals decision that an officer stopped R.W. without reasonable suspicion and in violation of the Fourth Amendment based on the totality of the circumstances.