On Point blog, page 1 of 144
COA finds officer’s reference to an “automatic” revocation did not render consent to blood draw involuntary
City of Mequon v. Scott Sarver Lindvall, 2025AP1703, 5/13/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
Although Lindvall seizes on the officer’s word choice in discussing the consequences of refusing to consent to an evidentiary blood draw, the Court ultimately finds his arguments unavailing and affirms.
COA upholds traffic stop for suspicion of excessive window tint
State v. Ryan Alan Stenner, 2025AP503-CR, 5/7/26, District IV (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA applies general reasonable suspicion principles to reverse the circuit court’s order granting suppression for a traffic stop based on overly dark window tint. It holds that the circuit court applied the wrong standard, the officer’s testimony was sufficiently connected to his training, and the administrative code related to window tint is valid and enforceable.
COA: Community caretaking function does not justify seizing a witness to a traffic accident.
State v. William A. Anderson, 2025AP796, 4/29/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA reversed the circuit court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because law enforcement’s community caretaker function did not justify seizing a possible witness to a motorcycle accident.
COA concludes consent to blood draw was free and voluntary despite defendant’s aversion to needles.
Winnebago County v. Michael Jon Potratz, 2025AP1059, 4/29/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA affirmed the circuit court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of his blood draw based on the factors established by SCOW in Artic .
COA holds officers had reasonable suspicion to justify Act 79 search of vehicle
State v. Shawn Clarke Spottswood, 2023AP1763-CR, 4/28/26, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Spottswood appeals the circuit court’s denial of his suppression motion after having entered a plea to receiving or concealing stolen property. On appeal, he again challenges the warrantless search of his vehicle, contending that law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit an offense sufficient to justify the search under 2013 Wis. Act 79 and WIS. STAT. § 973.09(1d).
SCOTUS issues per curiam opinion concluding officer had reasonable suspicion for seizure
D.C. v. R.W., USSC No. 25-248, 2/25/2025, reversing In re R.W., 334 A.3d 593 (D.C. 2025); Scotusblog page (with links to briefs)
SCOTUS reverses DC Court of Appeals decision that an officer stopped R.W. without reasonable suspicion and in violation of the Fourth Amendment based on the totality of the circumstances.
COA: Defendant not entitled to return of property after he was charged with carrying a firearm where alcohol is sold, but charge was dismissed and read in.
State v. Joseph A. Wheat, 2024AP2369-CR, 4/8/26, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA held that the defendant was not entitled to have his firearm and ammunition returned to him or sold to a third party for his benefit after they were seized by police when he was charged with carrying a handgun where alcohol is sold and consumed. Although the charge was dismissed and read in, the COA considered the defendant admitted to committing the offense when he agreed to have it dismissed and read in.
Seventh Circuit: Plaintiff alleged viable claim that civil rights were violated if officers entered home to arrest him based on a temporary felony want, but without a warrant.
Ryan W. Milbeck v. Allison George, et al., Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals No. 25-1061, 3/30/26 (per curiam)
Ryan Milbeck filed a federal civil suit alleging the defendants – including the Village of Rothschild, Kenosha County, and individual law enforcement officers – violated his civil rights by entering his home and arresting him without a warrant or probable cause. Milbeck appealed the district court’s order dismissing all claims because the officers had probable cause to arrest Milbeck and some of the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity. (Slip op. at p. 2). Although the case primarily concerned the pleading requirements for federal civil rights claims, which are beyond this publication’s purview, the Seventh Circuit provided a useful primer on Wisconsin’s temporary felony want procedure.
COA upholds Act 79 vehicle search where officer seized suspect while performing community caretaking function and subsequently developed reasonable suspicion of drug use
State of Wisconsin v. Brandon L. Strickland, 2024AP2376-CR, 3/17/26, District III (not recommended for publication); case activity
The COA determined that law enforcement’s community caretaking function justified an officer to direct a person out of his vehicle after the officer found the person asleep at the wheel while the car was parked in his driveway. And because the officer developed reasonable suspicion that the suspect used and possessed a controlled substance and was on probation, the officer lawfully searched the vehicle under Act 79.
COA rejects facial challenge to Implied Consent Law; affirms denial of motion to suppress blood results
State v. Conor Alexander Noble, 2025AP811-CR, 3/11/26, District II (1 judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects Noble’s facial unconstitutionality challenge to Wisconsin’s Implied Consent Law (ICL) and affirms the circuit court’s denial of Noble’s motion to suppress the blood draw results for lack of voluntary consent.