On Point blog, page 5 of 9
After lawful arrest for OWI, police may search car for more evidence
State v. Darrell G. Lewis, 2014AP2289-CR, 2/12/14; District 4 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for briefs
After arresting Lewis for OWI, police searched his car and found marijuana. Lewis moved to suppress based on Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), which permits a warrantless search of a car and containers within incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime might be found there. Lewis lost his motion and appeal.
Pat-down search was lawful because police had probable cause to arrest
State v. Steven L. Kaulfuerst, 2014AP1428-CR, District 2, 12/10/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The pat-down search of Kaulfuerst was lawful because police had probable cause to arrest him for disorderly conduct, even though police had not arrested him for that offense.
Analysis of blood drawn without warrant before–but tested after–McNeely held admissible
State v. Andrew J. Kuster, 2014AP109-CR, District 2, 9/17/14 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
This seemingly run-of-the-mill OWI appeal has an interesting little wrinkle. The police conducted a warrantless blood draw on Kuster before SCOTUS decided Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.__, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), but they didn’t have the blood tested until after the decision came out. This sequence of events did not trouble the court of appeals because it views the seizure and subsequent analysis of a person’s blood as a single event.
Arresting officer provided accurate information regarding implied consent law
State v. Victor J. Godard, 2014AP396-CR, District 4, 8/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The arresting officer provided Godard with accurate information about the implied consent law and thus did not cause Godard to refuse to submit to the implied consent blood test or deny him his right to a second test.
SCOW: Stop and search of car based on officer’s misunderstanding of tail lamp statute violates 4th Amendment
State v. Antonio D. Brown, 2014 WI 69, 7/16/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity
Another defense victory! Police stopped Brown’s car due to an alleged violation of §347.13(1), which prohibits the operation of a vehicle at night unless its tail lamps are in “good working order.” In a 4-3 decision, the majority holds that the police here misunderstood the statute, so the stop was illegal. Furthermore, a stop based upon an officer’s mistake of law, is unlawful, and the results of the ensuing search must be suppressed. Justice Prosser, dissenting, predicts the majority’s interpretation will be “a bonanza for litigants seeking to challenge motor vehicle stops.” ¶79.
SCOTUS: A warrant is required to search a cell phone seized incident to arrest
Riley v. California, USSC No. 13-132 (together with United States v. Wurie, USSC No. 13-212), 2014 WL 2864483 (June 25, 2014), reversing People v. Riley, No. D059840 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2013) (unpublished) (and affirming United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)); Scotusblog case page (which includes links to briefs and commentary) and symposium page (additional opinion commentary)
In a sweeping and significant ruling, a unanimous Supreme Court holds that officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting such a search of a cell phone found on a defendant at the time of his or her arrest.
Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of life[.]” ... The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant. (Slip op. at 28).
Police officers who entered and searched home and seized firearm–all without a warrant– are not civilly liable
Krysta Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, No. 12-2272 (7th Cir. May 9, 2014)
Nine hours after obtaining a § 51.15 emergency detention order, Milwaukee police officers forcibly entered Sutterfield’s home without a warrant, opened a locked container, and seized the handgun and concealed carry licenses that were in the container. Sutterfield filed a civil rights suit against them, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirms in a long (76-page) decision with plenty to digest, even though it declines to resolve some of the constitutional issues raised because they were not preserved or fully argued. The court does conclude the entry was justified because the police reasonably believed Sutterfield was going to harm herself. And the court assumes the search of the closed container and seizure of the gun were unlawful, but holds the officers are immune from civil liability.
Reading old implied consent form didn’t taint admissibility of blood test results
State v. Lawrence A. Levasseur, Jr., 2013AP2369-CR, District 4, 2/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The arresting officer used an implied consent form that pre-dated the 2009 amendments to § 343.305, so it omitted language about accidents involving death or serious injury–language that did not apply to Levasseur’s situation. The use of the outdated form didn’t strip the resulting blood test result of its statutory presumption of admissibility and accuracy,
U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether warrantless search of cell phone incident to arrest violates Fourth Amendment
David L. Riley v. California, USSC 13-132
Whether evidence admitted at petitioner’s trial was obtained in a search of petitioner’s cell phone that violated petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Lower court opinion: People v. Riley, No. D059840 (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Feb. 8, 2013) (unpublished)
United States v. Brima Wurie,
State v. Antonio Brown, 2011AP2907-CR, petition for review granted 10/14/13
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issue (composed by the State’s petition for review)
In determining the legality of a vehicle stop under the Fourth Amendment, did the court of appeals properly conclude that a tail lamp that is sixty-six percent functional is in “good working order” as required under Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) and thus cannot serve as a basis for an officer’s probable cause to stop the vehicle?