On Point blog, page 2 of 2
Officer’s statement about authority to search car didn’t taint driver’s consent to search of his person
State v. David M. Wagner, 2014AP842-CR, District 2, 2/25/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Wagner voluntarily consented to a search of his person, and was not merely “[a]cquiesc[ing] to an unlawful assertion of police authority,” State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, 16, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182, when he agreed to the search on the heels of the officer’s assertion of authority to search Wagner’s car.
Consent — Acquiescence – Response to Stated Intent to Search
State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether Johnson’s statement, “I don’t have a problem with that,” made in response to an officer’s assertion that they were “going to search the vehicle” was voluntary consent or mere acquiescence.
Holding:
¶19 As the record indicates,
Consent – Acquiescence – Generally
State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶16 When the purported legality of a warrantless search is based on the consent of the defendant, that consent must be freely and voluntarily given. State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) (citations omitted).
Consent — Acquiescence — Generally
State v. Jed A. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239
For Giebel: Robert E. Bellin, Jr.
Issue/Holding:
¶12 The test for voluntariness asks whether consent was given in the “absence of actual coercive, improper police practices designed to overcome the resistance of a defendant.” State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 245, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987). In making this determination, no single factor is dispositive.
Consent — Acquiescence — Assertion of Subpoena
State v. Jed A. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239
For Giebel: Robert E. Bellin, Jr.
Issue: Whether Giebel’s “consent” to a search of his computer, in response to a police claim of a subpoena and accompanied by an expression that Giebel assumed he had no choice, was voluntary or mere acquiescence to asserted police authority.
Holding:
¶17 Three considerations weigh heavily in our decision.
Consent — Acquiescence — Strip Search
State v. Charles A. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61
For Wallace: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether Wallace voluntarily consented, or merely acquiesced, to a strip search following arrest for a minor traffic violation.
Holding:
¶19. The police made their request during the booking process and before Wallace’s bond had been posted. We concur with the circuit court’s conclusion that thirty minutes,
Consent — Acquiescence — Entry to Residence
State v. John Tomlinson, Jr., 2002 WI 91, affirming 2002 WI App 212, 247 Wis. 2d 682, 635 N.W.2d 201
For Tomlinson: John J. Gray
Issue: Whether the actions of the defendant’s minor daughter, in opening the door to the police and then walking back into the house when they asked for permission to enter, amounted consent for the police to enter.
Consent — Acquiescence — Request Itself Unlawful Assertion of Authority
State v. David L. Munroe, 2001 WI App 104
For Munroe: Peter Koneazny, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue: Whether Munroe’s acquiescence, under false pretenses, to police entry of his motel room vitiated any consent for their subsequent search of that room, where Munroe refused their initial request to search.
Holding:
¶11 The officers entered Munroe’s room for, ostensibly, one purpose: to check his identification.
Consent — Acquiescence
State v. Michael Wilson, 229 Wis.2d 256, 600 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Wilson: Martha A. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate.
Holding: Consent to search was mere acquiescence and therefore involuntary. (“Depriving a defendant of necessities is an indicia that consent is involuntary.”)