On Point: C. Warrant unnecessary

State v. Sierra Ann Desing, 2017AP490-491, 10/11/17, District 2, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A citizen informant told 911 that he saw Desing pulled over on the side of the road hanging out her door. He asked if she was okay and was told “yes,” but he later saw her driving erratically on the highway. Deputies went to her house, knocked “loudly,” received no response, discovered her back door and patio door open on May 28 at 7:30 a.m., saw her dog running loose in the backyard, and, fearing that she might be choking on her own vomit, entered the house and searched until they found her asleep in the basement.

State v. Michael J. Mansfield, 2016AP2423-CR, 10/3/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mansfield argued police didn’t have reasonable suspicion to detain him based on a tip from an anonymous Turtle Lake Casino employee. The court of appeals holds the tipster should be treated as a citizen informant and, under the standard for citizen informants, the tip provided reasonable suspicion.

Collins v. Virginia, USSC No. 16-1027, cert granted 9/28/17; lower court opinion; USSC docket; SCOTUSblog page

Question presented: Whether the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception permits a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter private property, approach a house and search a vehicle parked a few feet from the house.

State v. Gerald Mitchell, 2015AP304-CR; certification granted 9/11/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law, where no exigent circumstances exist or have been argued, violates the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Robert Torres, 2017 WI App 60; case activity (including briefs)

It’s unclear why this opinion is recommended for publication–it seems to be a pretty straightforward application of the law to a particular fact situation.

State v. Michael A. Johnson, 2017AP331-CR, District 2, 8/23/17 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Officer Baldwin stopped Johnson for failing to dim his headlights, then cited him for that and failing to provide proof of insurance for the car he was driving (his mom’s). Baldwin told Johnson that he was free to go, so Johnson started to walk away. Baldwin asked “do you have drugs, weapons or alcohol in the car?” Johnson replied “no.” Baldwin asked if he could search the car.  Johnson replied that the car did not belong to him. 

State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2016AP2483-CR, 7/19/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 11/13/17, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 2018 WI 85; case activity (including briefs)

Patrick Dalton was badly injured in a car crash. He argues on appeal that there was no exigency justifying the warrantless blood draw that revealed his intoxication; he also argues the circuit court erred when it considered his refusal to consent to the blood draw as an aggravating factor for sentencing.

Review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from petition for review):

Whether the doctrine of hot pursuit always justifies a forcible warrantless entry into the residence of one suspected of minor criminal activity. In the present case, the court of appeals declined to consider Mr. Delap’s argument that the conduct of law enforcement in this case, even if justified as legitimate ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect, was nonetheless unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Although Mr. Delap’s argument presented a chain of reasoning and citation to legal authority, the court of appeals characterized the argument as ‘undeveloped’ and did not consider it.

Jeremy Perri guests posts on State v. Adam M. Blackman, 2017 WI 77, 7/7/17, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2016 WI App 69, 371 Wis. 2d 635, 886 N.W.2d 94; case activity (including briefs)

SCOW suppresses blood test, holding that the statutory Informing the Accused misrepresented the consequences of a refusal, the consent was coerced, and the exclusionary rule is necessary to deter future violations.

Mike Tobin guest posts on State v. Lewis O. Floyd, Jr., 2017 WI 78, 7/7/17, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 371 Wis. 2d 404; case activity (including briefs)

The majority opinion affirms the rulings of the lower courts that the defendant voluntarily consented to a frisk of his person following a traffic stop. The majority reached its decision without discussing the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion of criminal activity-an issue emphasized in the dissenting opinion and previously analyzed by the court of appeals.