On Point: C. Warrant unnecessary

State v. Walter J. Kugler, 2014AP220, District 2, 9/17/14 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Kugler challenged his first OWI conviction by arguing that the state trooper who stopped him did not have the requisite probable cause and improperly requested, as a community caretaker, that he submit to a PBT (which he refused). The court of appeals reframed the issue as whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion of an OWI when he detained Kugler for field sobriety tests. You can guess the result. The court of appeals also rushed ahead to decide a McNeely issue that the Wisconsin Supreme Court is literally poised to decide.

State v. Andrew J. Kuster, 2014AP109-CR, District 2, 9/17/14 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This seemingly run-of-the-mill OWI appeal has an interesting little wrinkle.  The police conducted a warrantless blood draw on Kuster before SCOTUS decided Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.__, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), but they didn’t have the blood tested until after the  decision came out.  This sequence of events did not trouble the court of appeals because it views the seizure and subsequent analysis of a person’s blood as a single event.

State v. Kent W. Hubbard, 2014AP738-CR, District 2, 8/13/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The totality of the circumstances established probable cause to arrest Hubbard for operating with a detectable level of restricted controlled substance. Further, the warrantless blood draw was justified under the exigent circumstances test articulated in State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), because there was evidence that Hubbard had used marijuana and alcohol, and evidence regarding the latter would be lost if the police took time to get a warrant.

City of LaCrosse v. Corina Ducharme, 2014AP374, District 4, 8/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The stop of Ducharme’s car was justified under the community caretaker doctrine because the officer had objectively reasonable grounds to be concerned about the safety of the driver, as the car was parked at a boat landing at 2:40 a.m. with its right blinker on, and a right turn would take the car toward the water.

State v. Jesse N. Schwartz, 2013AP1868-CR, District 2, 7/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement didn’t justify the search of Schwartz’s home because police did not have a reasonable basis to believe another individual was in the home at the time of the search.

State v. Bobby L. Tate, 2014 WI 89, 7/24/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack; case activity

State v. Nicolas Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, 7/24/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; lead opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

In two decisions consisting of 8 separate opinions spread out across almost 200 pages, the supreme court is unable to muster a majority on the central issue presented: Whether cell phone location tracking is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, in both cases a majority assumes without deciding that cell phone tracking is a search and then affirms the convictions, although on different grounds. If you’re looking only for the holdings, here they are: In Tate, a majority holds that the circuit court’s “order” that a cell phone service provide information about the cell phone location was reasonable because it met the requirements for a search warrant. In Subdiaz-Osorio, a majority holds that the warrantless acquisition of the cell phone location data was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. If you’re looking for more information, read on.

State v. Derik J. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, 7/11/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity

A four-justice majority of the supreme court holds that a police officer lawfully searched a briefcase found in a vehicle during a traffic stop because the driver consented to a search of the car and the passenger did not unequivocally withdraw the consent given by the driver. Three dissenting judges take a very different view, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer should have realized that Wantland was withdrawing consent to a search of the briefcase.

Riley v. California, USSC No. 13-132 (together with United States v. Wurie, USSC No. 13-212), 2014 WL 2864483 (June 25, 2014), reversing People v. Riley, No. D059840 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2013) (unpublished) (and affirming United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)); Scotusblog case page (which includes links to briefs and commentary) and symposium page (additional opinion commentary)

State v. Cordarol M. Kirby, 2014 WI App 74; case activity

The court of appeals holds that “while exigent circumstances may justify entry, the fact that entry has already been made does not necessarily invalidate reliance on the exigent circumstances doctrine.” (¶22). Thus, because in this case there were exigent circumstances justifying police entry into an apartment to locate a backpack the police believed contained firearms, it “does not matter” that an officer had earlier stepped over the threshold of the apartment door to converse with people inside. 

State v. Megan A. Padley, 2014 WI App 65; case activity

The implied consent statute that allows an officer to ask for a driver for a blood sample when the officer lacks probable cause to arrest for OWI but has “reason to believe” the driver committed a traffic violation, § 343.305(3)(ar)2., is not facially unconstitutional. In addition, Padley’s consent to the blood draw in this case was voluntary. Finally, the police had the requisite “reason to believe” that Padley had committed a traffic violation and, thus, the deputy could rely on § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to put to her the choice of consent to a blood draw or automatic penalties.