On Point: C. Warrant unnecessary

State v. Kent W. Hubbard, 2014AP738-CR, District 2, 8/13/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The totality of the circumstances established probable cause to arrest Hubbard for operating with a detectable level of restricted controlled substance. Further, the warrantless blood draw was justified under the exigent circumstances test articulated in State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), because there was evidence that Hubbard had used marijuana and alcohol, and evidence regarding the latter would be lost if the police took time to get a warrant.

City of LaCrosse v. Corina Ducharme, 2014AP374, District 4, 8/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The stop of Ducharme’s car was justified under the community caretaker doctrine because the officer had objectively reasonable grounds to be concerned about the safety of the driver, as the car was parked at a boat landing at 2:40 a.m. with its right blinker on, and a right turn would take the car toward the water.

State v. Jesse N. Schwartz, 2013AP1868-CR, District 2, 7/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement didn’t justify the search of Schwartz’s home because police did not have a reasonable basis to believe another individual was in the home at the time of the search.

State v. Bobby L. Tate, 2014 WI 89, 7/24/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack; case activity

State v. Nicolas Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, 7/24/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; lead opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

In two decisions consisting of 8 separate opinions spread out across almost 200 pages, the supreme court is unable to muster a majority on the central issue presented: Whether cell phone location tracking is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, in both cases a majority assumes without deciding that cell phone tracking is a search and then affirms the convictions, although on different grounds. If you’re looking only for the holdings, here they are: In Tate, a majority holds that the circuit court’s “order” that a cell phone service provide information about the cell phone location was reasonable because it met the requirements for a search warrant. In Subdiaz-Osorio, a majority holds that the warrantless acquisition of the cell phone location data was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. If you’re looking for more information, read on.

State v. Derik J. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, 7/11/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity

A four-justice majority of the supreme court holds that a police officer lawfully searched a briefcase found in a vehicle during a traffic stop because the driver consented to a search of the car and the passenger did not unequivocally withdraw the consent given by the driver. Three dissenting judges take a very different view, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer should have realized that Wantland was withdrawing consent to a search of the briefcase.

Riley v. California, USSC No. 13-132 (together with United States v. Wurie, USSC No. 13-212), 2014 WL 2864483 (June 25, 2014), reversing People v. Riley, No. D059840 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2013) (unpublished) (and affirming United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)); Scotusblog case page (which includes links to briefs and commentary) and symposium page (additional opinion commentary)

State v. Cordarol M. Kirby, 2014 WI App 74; case activity

The court of appeals holds that “while exigent circumstances may justify entry, the fact that entry has already been made does not necessarily invalidate reliance on the exigent circumstances doctrine.” (¶22). Thus, because in this case there were exigent circumstances justifying police entry into an apartment to locate a backpack the police believed contained firearms, it “does not matter” that an officer had earlier stepped over the threshold of the apartment door to converse with people inside. 

State v. Megan A. Padley, 2014 WI App 65; case activity

The implied consent statute that allows an officer to ask for a driver for a blood sample when the officer lacks probable cause to arrest for OWI but has “reason to believe” the driver committed a traffic violation, § 343.305(3)(ar)2., is not facially unconstitutional. In addition, Padley’s consent to the blood draw in this case was voluntary. Finally, the police had the requisite “reason to believe” that Padley had committed a traffic violation and, thus, the deputy could rely on § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to put to her the choice of consent to a blood draw or automatic penalties.

Krysta Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, No. 12-2272 (7th Cir. May 9, 2014)

Nine hours after obtaining a § 51.15 emergency detention order, Milwaukee police officers forcibly entered Sutterfield’s home without a warrant, opened a locked container, and seized the handgun and concealed carry licenses that were in the container. Sutterfield filed a civil rights suit against them, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirms in a long (76-page) decision with plenty to digest, even though it declines to resolve some of the constitutional issues raised because they were not preserved or fully argued. The court does conclude the entry was justified because the police reasonably believed Sutterfield was going to harm herself. And the court assumes the search of the closed container and  seizure of the gun were unlawful, but holds the officers are immune from civil liability.

Waukesha County v. Dushyant N. Patel, 2013AP2292, District 2, 5/14/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The result of a blood draw done in violation of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), are admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because police acted in conformity with clear, well-settled Wisconsin law that permitted the blood draw at the time it was done, even if the arresting officer didn’t cite that law in justifying the blood draw.