On Point: C. Warrant unnecessary

State v. Damon Keith Sutton, 2012 WI App 7 (recommended for publication); for Sutton: Maayan Silver; case activity

Reasonable Suspicion – “Frisk,” of Vehicle

Reasonable suspicion supported “protective search” of Sutton’s van following routine traffic stop: While the officer ran a document check, Sutton remained in the van. The officer discerned “distinct rocking motions,” which the officer’s training and experience informed her represented “someone who may be trying to retrieve or conceal a weapon.”

State v. Michael P. Parizanski, 2011AP395, District 2, 11/30/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Parizanski: Andrew Mishlove; case activity

Seizure of motorist who had parked by the side of a road, leading to an OWI arrest, was supported by community caretaker rationale as informed by State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598.

City of Sheboygan v. Benjamin B. Schultz, 2011AP904, District 2, 11/09/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Schultz: Casey J. Hoff; case activity

Stop of Schultz’s vehicle supported by community caretaker doctrine where, as Schultz drove past officer conducting an otherwise unrelated traffic stop, Schultz’s passenger door opened up and someone inside of Schultz’s vehicle yelled out.

¶7        While the community caretaker function is not like a typical search and seizure,

State v. Ricky O. Halverson, 2011AP240-CR, District 2, 9/14/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Halverson: Walter R. Andrew; case activity

Officer, whose investigation of single-car crash led him to Halverson’s home, wasn’t properly engaged in community caretaker exercise when he took Halverson into custody, supposedly for his own good, ¶¶8-14. Community caretaker test, State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14,

State v. Deandre A. Buchanan, 2011 WI 49, affirming unpublished CIA decision; for Buchanan: Tyler William Wickman; case activity

Frisk – Auto

Frisk of Buchanan, following routine traffic stop for speeding, was supported by reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous.

¶3   We hold that under the totality of the circumstances in this case, the trooper’s observation of Buchanan’s furtive movements and visible nervousness,

State v. Matthew P. Rick, 2010AP1521,District 4, 6/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Rick: Jonas B. Bednarek; case activity

Warrantless blood draw is permissible under exigent circumstances doctrine, upon lawful arrest for non–jailable, civil violation. State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), followed.

State v. Brian T. St. Martin, 2011 WI 44, on certification; for St. Martin: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Consent to Search – Co-Tenant – Georgia v. Randolph

Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) holds that a physically present resident’s objection trumps a co-tenant’s consent to a warrantless search of a residence.

State v. Deundra R. Lathan, 2011 WI App 104 (recommended for publication); for Lathan: George S. Tauscheck; case activity

Consent to Search, Co-Occupant

Consent to search premises given by one occupant overrides refusal to consent by co-occupant when neither is the subject of the search or ensuing arrest (resolving question expressly held open by Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 n.

State v. Jenny L. Nowak, 2010AP1499-CR, District 3, 5/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Nowak: Keith F. Ellison; case activity

Warrantless entry into Nowak’s garage was justified under hot pursuit doctrine, given “probable cause to believe Nowak committed a jailable offense—specifically, resisting by failure to stop,” § 346.17(2t) (punishable by 9 months imprisonment), ¶15. (Citing, State v. Richter,

Kentucky v. Hollis Deshaun King, USSC No. 09-1272, 5/16/11, reversing, King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649 (2010)

The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement (here, imminent destruction of evidence) isn’t circumscribed by whether the exigency was “police-created.”

It is well established that “exigent circumstances,” including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant.