On Point: C. Warrant unnecessary

State v. George Steven Burch, 2019AP404-CR, District 3 (10/20/20), review granted 11/18/20, circuit court judgment affirmed, 2021 WI 68; case activity (including briefs)

Burch … contends the [Green Bay Police Department] and the [Brown County Sheriff’s Office] violated his Fourth Amendment rights in three ways: (1) the GBPD exceeded the scope of his consent to search his cell phone by downloading the phone’s entire contents, rather than only the text messages; (2) the GBPD unlawfully retained the entire cell phone download after it completed its June 2016 investigation into the vehicle incidents; and (3) the BCSO had no lawful authority to conduct a second search of the cell phone download in August 2016. Because these issues raise novel questions regarding the application of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the vast array of digital information contained in modern cell phones, we certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

Lange v. California, USSC No. 20-18, certiorari granted 10/19/20; vacated and remanded, 6/23/21

Question presented:

Does pursuit of a person who a police officer has probable cause to believe has committed a misdemeanor categorically qualify as an exigent circumstance sufficient to allow the officer to enter a home without a warrant?

State v. Heather Jan VanBeek, 2019AP447, certification granted 9/16/20; District 2; case activity (including briefs)

We wrote about this case less than a month ago, when the court of appeals issued its certification to the supreme court. Now the certification is granted, so SCOW will have a chance to deal with the inconvenient fact that our state’s cases permit police to seize people without reasonable suspicion in order to verify their identities.

State v. Ashley L. Monn, 2019AP640-CR, 9/9/20, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

When police executed an arrest warrant for a man at his trailer home, they found Monn there too. They cuffed her, conducted a protective search, confirmed she had no outstanding warrants, and told her she would be released without charges. Unfortunately, she asked to get her purse from the trailer.

State v. Heather Jan VanBeek, 2019AP447, 8/12/20, District 2; certification granted 9/16/2020; case activity (including briefs)

VanBeek was sitting with a companion in her parked truck when an officer approached. There’d been a tip that people were sitting in the truck for an hour and that someone had come to the truck with a backpack, then departed. The officer asked a few questions, got satisfactory answers, and then asked for ID, purportedly for his report of the contact. The truck’s occupants were reluctant to hand over their licenses, but the officer insisted, and they did. He held onto them for more than five minutes and summoned a drug dog, who eventually alerted. At some point in this time frame, reasonable suspicion developed, but it wasn’t present when the officer took the IDs. So, was the encounter, at that point, “consensual” (as the state argues) or were the truck’s occupants seized–which, without reasonable suspicion, would be unconstitutional?

State v. Yancy Kevin Dieter, 2020 WI App 49; case activity (including briefs)

Dieter called 911 at about 6 in the morning and reported that he’d crashed his car after drinking at a bar. The crash happened about four hours before Dieter made the call; he was badly injured and the car’s other occupant was killed.

State v. Donnie Gene Richards, 2020 WI App 48; case activity (including briefs)

Richards was found lapsing in and out of consciousness and severely injured behind the wheel of a crashed vehicle. There was evidence he was intoxicated, and he would soon be transported to a distant hospital by helicopter. Believing there wasn’t enough time to get a warrant by this time, the officer on scene requested that Richards’s blood be drawn before the flight, and it was.

State v. David M. Hay, 2020 WI App 35; case activity (including briefs)

Hay was pulled over in the early morning and blew a .032 on the PBT. He had several drunk-driving priors, so it would be illegal for him to drive with a BAC over .02. The officer never sought a warrant; instead he searched the car (though another officer on-scene could have done that), waited for another officer to show up to “sit” with the vehicle until a tow truck came, then headed to the hospital with Hay. Only then–about an hour after the initial stop–did the officer ask Hay whether he’d agree to a blood test. When Hay refused, the officer, in consultation with an ADA, decided the situation was exigent. The thinking was that given the low PBT result, further passage of time might reduce Hay’s BAC to .00 thus and make a blood test useless as evidence. So, the officer ordered a warrantless blood draw. Because there was only one phlebotomist in the hospital, that draw didn’t actually happen until 35 minutes had passed. Hay had no alcohol in his blood, but there was cocaine, so he was charged with the “restricted controlled substance” variety of OWI. He moved for suppression, the circuit court granted it, and the state appealed.

State v. Dawn J. Levanduski, 2020 WI App 53; case activity (including briefs)

This published decision resolves an issue arguably left open by Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).  The court of appeals holds that when an officer reads Wisconsin’s “Informing the Accused” form to an OWI suspect, and she refuses a blood draw, her refusal can be used against her at her OWI trial.

State v. Dawn M. Prado, 2020 WI App 42, cross petitions for review granted, 10/21/20, affirmed, 2021 WI 64; case activity (including briefs)

They must have gotten tired of waiting. After SCOW failed (or refused) to decide the question in Howes, Brar, Mitchell, and Hawley, and SCOTUS likewise punted in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, the court of appeals now does what those higher courts could or would not: it rules on the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 343.305‘s provisions that permit police to withdraw blood from an incapacitated or unconscious motorist on the theory that they’ve “consented” to this by driving. And, like the vast majority of jurisdictions to consider similar questions, our court holds this provision unconstitutional, rejecting the state’s argument that statutorily-imputed consent is the type of “consent” that provides an exception to the warrant requirement. But the court also says the statute was not, at the time of Prado’s arrest, so plainly unconstitutional that the officer could not rely on it in good faith. Thus the court declines to suppress the test results.