On Point: H. Exclusionary rule

State v. Michael R. Hess, 2010 WI 82  affirming 2009 WI App 105; for Hess: George M. Tauscheck; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Exclusionary Rule – Good-Faith Rule – Void ab initio Warrant

¶2   We conclude that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to a situation in which: (1) no facts existed that would justify an arrest without a warrant;

Wisconsin supreme court decision, affirming 2008 WI App 131; for Dearborn: Eileen A. Hirsch,SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Search-Incident – Good-Faith Reliance on Judicial Precedent

¶2   Dearborn maintains, and the State concedes, that in the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 

State v. Robert L. Artic, Sr., 2010 WI 83, affirming 2009 WI App 12; for Artic: Keith A. Findley, James D. Cooley; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Notwithstanding an unlawful, forcible police entry into his residence, Artic voluntarily consented to the subsequent search of the house, which was also sufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry to purge the taint of the illegal entry.

7th Circuit decision

Terry Stop / Frisk
1. Pulling up in a patrol car and telling Gentry to keep his hands up amounted to a stop for purposes of Terry analysis.

2. The stop, which was based on a report of a “suspicious person,” without reference to any specific facts concerning a crime, was not supported by reasonable suspicion to believe Gentry had either committed a crime or was armed.

supreme court decision; court of appeals decision; for Carroll: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Frisk – Demand that Suspect Drop Object
Frisk analysis applies to police demand that suspect drop object in hand, ¶22.

¶23      Here, Carroll led officers on a high-speed chase in a car that the officers had been observing in connection with an armed robbery investigation, and exited his car quickly while holding an unknown object. 

court of appeals decision; for Pickens: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Reasonable Suspicion for Detention and “Collective Knowledge” Doctrine
Although, “under the collective knowledge doctrine, an investigating officer with knowledge of facts amounting to reasonable suspicion may direct a second officer without such knowledge to stop and detain a suspect,” the state must prove those underlying facts. “Proof is not supplied by the mere testimony of one officer that he relied on the unspecified knowledge of another officer,” ¶¶12-13.

State v. Michelle R. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 54, reversing 2007 WI App 16
For Popenhagen: James B. Connell

Issue/Holding:

¶62 …[E]vidence obtained in violation of a statute (or not in accordance with the statute) may be suppressed under the statute to achieve the objectives of the statute, even though the statute does not expressly provide for the suppression or exclusion of the evidence.

State v. Eric Dwayne Rogers, 2008 WI App 176, PFR filed 12/12/08
For Rogers: Mark D. Richards

Issue/Holding: Although warrantless entry of and remaining in a home while a warrant was prepared was illegal, the warrant wasn’t based on any information turned up by this illegality and evidence seized during its execution was therefore admissible:

¶21      Still, “evidence is not to be excluded if the connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is ‘so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’” Segura v.

State v. Ramon Lopez Arias, 2008 WI 84, on Certification
For Arias: Lora B. Cerone, SPD, Madison

Issue/Holding: A dog sniff is no more a “search” under the Wisconsin than the U.S. Constitution, at least with respect to vehicles:

¶22      We are unwilling to undertake such a departure here. First, we note that there is no constitutionally protected interest in possessing contraband under the United States Constitution, 

State v. Michelle R. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 54, reversing 2007 WI App 16
For Popenhagen: James B. Connell

Issue: Whether the person whose documents were produced by a bank pursuant to subpoena has standing to seek suppression of the documents.

Holding:

¶24 A person has standing to seek judicial intervention when that person has “a personal stake in the outcome”