On Point: 8. Curtilage

Jeremy Carroll v. Andrew Carman, et ux., USSC No. 14-212, 11/10/14 (per curiam), reversing and remanding Carman v. Carroll, 749 F.3d 192 (3rd Cir. 2014); docket

A police officer being sued under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Fourth Amendment doesn’t lose qualified immunity as a matter of law because he went to the back door of the plaintiff’s home instead than the front door, as it is not clearly established that an officer doing a “knock and talk” must go the front door.

Florida v. Jardines, USSC No. 11-564, 3/26/13

United States Supreme Court decision, affirming Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34 (2011)

In this 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court holds that using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s front porch to investigate the contents of the home is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Because the search was conducted without probable cause,

State v. Michael C. Christofferson, 2012AP571-CR, District 3, 10/30/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The officer didn’t develop probable cause (for OWI arrest; Christofferson was getting out of his car when the officer first saw him) until after illegal entry of the attached garage, therefore the ensuing arrest was unlawful.

¶10      Under the Fourth Amendment, police are prohibited from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. 

Village of Oregon v. Jeremy Florin, 2011AP1708, District 4, 8/16/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Suspected of drunk driving, Florin was followed by a police officer to his home, ignored the officer’s command to stop, and went inside via an open garage. The officer entered the still-open garage, knocked on the door to the home, induced Florin outside and eventually arrested him for drunk driving.

State v. Gary F. Wieczorek, 2011AP1184-CR, District 3, 11/8/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wieczorek: James R. Koby; case activity

Warrantless arrest of Wieczorek on his front porch for OWI, after he answered the officer’s knock was constitutional. The record doesn’t show that Wieczorek had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the porch. ¶¶10-11, distinguishing State v. Walker,

State v. Ralph H. Davis, 2011 WI App 74 (recommended for publication); for Davis: Chandra N. Harvey, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Warrantless Entry – Curtilage – Implied Invitation Doctrine

¶9      The protections of the Fourth Amendment extend beyond the walls of the home to the “curtilage.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). “[C]urtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a [person]’s home and the privacies of life,

State v. Robert L. Stokes, 2009AP919-CR, District 1, 2/1/11

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Stokes: John M. Bolger; case activity; Stokes BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Given trial court credibility findings, the resident’s consent to the police to enter and search was voluntary.

¶19      Finally, we are not convinced by Robert’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion regardless of whether Deborah’s consent was valid because police had no lawful reason to be in the Stokes’ yard and on their porch.  

seventh circuit decision

Milwaukee’s ordinance-created “winter rules” with respect to snow removal effectively establish an “easement” such that police could enter a yard and rifle through a homeowner’s garbage cart. Although the  cart is within what is normally considered “curtilage,” and thus protected by privacy concerns, the intrusion of the curtilage here is “lawful,” given this local law allowing garbage collectors to intrude on such areas.

But the fact that the defendant’s garbage carts were (we may assume) within the curtilage of his home does not conclude the constitutional analysis.

State v. Walter Leutenegger, 2004 WI App 127
For Leutenegger: Bill Ginsberg

Issue/Holding: ¶21 n. 5:

The State does not challenge the circuit court’s holding that the garage was part of the curtilage of Leutenegger’s house and subject to the warrant requirement. This implicit concession appears appropriate in this case. Published decisions on this topic consistently hold that an attached garage is part of the curtilage. 

State v. Thomas G. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, 231 Wis.2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552, reversing unpublished decision
For Martwick: Robert P. Rusch

Issue: Whether plants found on Martwick’s property were within his curtilage, and therefore subject to the warrant requirement, or in “open fields.”

Holding: The plants were in open fields, outside the curtilage, and therefore could be seized without a warrant.

The sheriff thought Martwick was growing marijuana on his property,