On Point: A. Expectation of privacy

State v. David Allen Bruski, 2007 WI 25, affirming 2006 WI App 53
For Bruski: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶20 …Bruski, as the proponent of a motion to suppress, has the burden of establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the search. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); Rakas v. 

State v. David Allen Bruski, 2007 WI 25, affirming 2006 WI App 53
For Bruski: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶32 Bruski argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his travel case, even if he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Ms. Smith’s vehicle. The question of whether an individual may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal property found inside a vehicle that he or she does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in has not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court.

State v. Sylvester Sigarroa, 2004 WI App 16, PFR filed 1/2/04
For Sigarroa: John Pray, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶14. The State and Sigarroa propose different tests for determining the constitutionality of a warrantless garbage search… .

…

¶16. Both parties are able to cite case law in support of their competing approaches. However, upon close review of the relevant cases,

State v. Walter Leutenegger, 2004 WI App 127
For Leutenegger: Bill Ginsberg

Issue/Holding: ¶21 n. 5:

The State does not challenge the circuit court’s holding that the garage was part of the curtilage of Leutenegger’s house and subject to the warrant requirement. This implicit concession appears appropriate in this case. Published decisions on this topic consistently hold that an attached garage is part of the curtilage. 

State v. Juan M. Orta, 2003 WI App 93
For Orta: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶2 … (A)n individual who occupies a public restroom stall does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when he or she occupies it with another individual, leaves the door slightly ajar and unlatched, and evinces no indication that the stall is being used for its intended purpose.

State v. James L. Larson, 2003 WI App 150
For Larson: Rex Anderegg

Issue/Holding: A police officer’s stepping into the threshold of an apartment, preventing the occupant from closing the door, amounted to an “entry,” thereby triggering the fourth amendment warrant requirement. ¶¶10-11, following State v. Johnson, 177 Wis. 2d 224, 227, 501 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1993); and noting that “(t)he police practice of putting a foot in the doorway appears to be a common and widespread practice,

State v. Garry C. Eskridge, 2002 WI App 158, PFR filed 6/14/02
For Eskridge: Gregory Bates

Issue: Whether a tenant had an expectation of privacy in the basement area of a multiple unit apartment building.

Holding: A tenant’s expectation of privacy in the common areas of multiple unit buildings is decided on a case by case basis. ¶10. Because the state offered credible testimony —

State v. Charles A. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61
For Wallace: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether Wallace voluntarily consented, or merely acquiesced, to a strip search following arrest for a minor traffic violation.

Holding:

¶19. The police made their request during the booking process and before Wallace’s bond had been posted. We concur with the circuit court’s conclusion that thirty minutes,

State v. Charles A. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61
For Wallace: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether Wallace’s consent for a strip search encompassed the more intrusive body cavity search that ensued (Wallace bent over and spread his buttocks).

Holding:

¶29. We have concluded that Wallace voluntarily consented to a strip search, and the parties agree that a visual body cavity search was ultimately conducted.

State v. Charles A. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61
For Wallace: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶25. We conclude, however, that we need not address whether police may conduct a consensual strip search free of the statutory restrictions. Absent a constitutional violation, a court may not suppress evidence obtained in violation of a statute except where the statute ‘specifically requires suppression of wrongfully or illegally obtained evidence as a sanction.’