On Point: J. Forfeiture of seized property

State v. Andre L. Jones, 2023AP1535-CR, 2023AP1536-CR, 2023AP1537-CR and 2023AP1538-CR, 5/16/24, District IV(not recommended for publication); case activity

In a rare appeal of an order denying a motion for return of property, COA rejects a novel statutory construction argument by adhering to what it views as binding precedent.

State v. Troy Allen Lanning, 2021AP1849, 9/19/2023, District 3, recommended for publication; case activity (including briefs)

Here’s an odd one. The state charged Lanning in a meth trafficking operation and separately filed a civil action seeking forfeiture of some real property that he owned, had lived in, and, said the state, distributed meth from. See Wis. Stat. § 961.55. Eventually Lanning and the state reached a deal involving a plea to one criminal count and Lanning’s forfeiture of his cash proceeds from the meth operation. The state also agreed to dismiss the action for forfeiture of Lanning’s real estate. In fact, the elected DA told the court a junior prosecutor had filed the real-estate forfeiture case without authorization, and that the DA believed it would be “a nightmare” for the state to try to obtain title.

State v. John Dean Pleuss, 2021AP504-CR, District 4, 8/25/22 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The deadline for filing a return of property application under § 968.20 is “directory” rather than mandatory, so failing to comply with the deadline doesn’t deny a circuit court the competency to decide the application if the petitioner can establish excusable neglect for not complying with the deadline. Further, the state can’t meet its burden of proving the property was used in the commission of a crime, and thus shouldn’t be returned, by simply referring to the contents of a criminal complaint related to the seizure of the property.

Village of Greendale v. Matthew R. Derzay, 2019AP2294, District 1, 3/30/31 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The burden of proof for a petitioner under § 968.20 is preponderance of the evidence, but the circuit court applied the clear and convincing standard and demanded Derzay provide certain kinds of proof to meet that burden. This was error.

State v. Michael J. Scott, et al., 2019 WI App 22; case activity (including briefs)

Applying long-standing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the court of appeals holds that the exclusionary rule can be used to defend against a civil forfeiture complaint filed by the state. But it also holds the state should have a shot at arguing the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule also applies, despite the state’s failure to assert this claim in the circuit court.

Tyson Timbs v. Indiana, USSC 17-1091, certiorari granted 6/18/18

Question presented:

Whether the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Terry Michael Honeycutt v. United States, USSC No. 16-142, 2017 WL 2407468 (June 5, 2017), reversing United States v. Honeycutt, 816 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A federal statute—21 U.S.C. § 853—mandates forfeiture of “any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of” certain drug crimes. This case concerns how § 853 operates when two or more defendants act as part of a conspiracy. Specifically, the issue is whether, under § 853, a defendant may be held jointly and severally liable for property that his co-conspirator derived from the crime but that the defendant himself did not acquire. The Court holds that such liability is inconsistent with the statute’s text and structure. (Slip op. at 1).

Sila Luis v. United States, USSC No. 14-419, 2016 WL 1228690 (March 30, 2016), vacating and remanding U.S. v. Luis, 564 Fed. Appx. 493 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The question presented in this case is whether the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant’s legitimate, untainted assets—that is, assets not traceable to a criminal offense—needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court answers “yes,” though for different reasons.

State v. One 2013 Toyota Corolla, 2015 WI App 84; case activity (including briefs)

While a co-owner’s interest in a car didn’t make her the owner for purposes of the “innocent owner” exception to property forfeiture under § 961.55(1)(d)2., forfeiture of her full financial interest violated the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against the levying of excessive fines.

State v. Tommy Lee Branch, 2015 WI App 65; case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court had no authority to order cash seized from Branch on his arrest to be used to pay court obligations because there was no basis for concluding the money was not subject to return under § 968.20. As the court of appeals puts it, the cash Branch had at the time of his arrest was no different from any other personal property he had when arrested. “Had [Branch] been wearing a $200 Stetson hat, a $300 Gucci belt, or a pair of $500 Allen Edmonds shoes, the State would not be allowed to seize those items of personal property and sell them on eBay to pay Branch’s debts.” (¶10).