On Point: J. Forfeiture of seized property

Steven Michael Leonard v. State of Wisconsin, 2015 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs) NOTE: This case’s analysis of whether DC is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is effectively overruled by Doubek v. Kaul, 2022 WI 31.

The court of appeals concludes that there’s no basis in the record for determining whether Leonard’s disorderly conduct conviction qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under the federal firearm prohibition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), and therefore he is not barred from possessing a firearm under that statute. The court also holds that Leonard’s disorderly conduct “involv[ed] the use of” one of Leonard’s guns and therefore § 968.20(1m)(b) bars the return of that gun.

Question presented:

Whether the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant’s legitimate, untainted assets (those not traceable to a criminal offense) needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

Henderson v. United States, USSC No. 13-1487, 2015 WL 2340840 (May 18, 2015), reversing  United States v. Henderson, Case No. 12-14628, 2014 WL 292169 (11th Cir. 2014) (unreported); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court unanimously holds that a defendant convicted of a felony retains “a naked right of alienation” in any firearms he or she owns and therefore may arrange for a court-supervised sale or transfer the guns without violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)’s ban on possession of a firearm.

Question presented:

Does a felony conviction extinguish all of a defendant’s property interests in a firearm, such that he or she may not even arrange for the sale or other transfer of any surrendered or seized firearms to another person because doing so would constitute “constructive” possession and thus violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)’s ban on possession of a firearm?

Aaron v. Ols v. City of Milwaukee, 2013AP1882, District 1, 6/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Ols is entitled to the return of his firearm under § 968.20 because there is insufficient evidence that Ols used the firearm in the commission of a crime.

State v. One 2010 Nissan Altima, 2013AP2176, District 2, 6/11/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Daughter’s possession of and control over a car titled and registered in her father’s name made her the “owner” of the car for purposes of the property forfeiture law, so the circuit court properly rejected her father’s claim that he was the “innocent owner.”

Kaley v. United States, USSC 12-464, 2/25/14

United States Supreme Court decision, affirming United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012)

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court holds that when a post-indictment, ex parte restraining order under 18 U.S.C. § 853(e) freezes assets that are potentially subject to forfeiture but which the defendant needs to retain counsel,

Question presented:

When a post-indictment, ex parte restraining order freezes assets needed by a criminal defendant to retain counsel of choice, do the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a pretrial, adversarial hearing at which the defendant may challenge the evidentiary support and legal theory of the underlying charges?

Lower court decision: United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012)

Docket

Scotusblog page

The issue of pretrial orders under the federal property forfeiture statute that freeze a defendant’s assets–and thereby impair (or destroy) the defendant’s ability to hire counsel of choice–obviously makes this case of interest to attorneys retained to defend federal criminal charges.

State v. Robert M. Schmitt, 2012 WI App 121 (recommended for publication); case activity

Although “the summons, complaint and the supporting affidavit must each be authenticated as a condition of personal jurisdiction when commencing a forfeiture action,” ¶1,  an authentication defect attributable to a clerk’s error is merely technical and doesn’t impair jurisdiction.

¶4        In Schmitt’s case, the first page of the summons and the first page of the complaint were each authenticated,

court of appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); pro se; Resp. Br.

Forfeiture
Refusal of request to return seized cash upheld, where Morton was convicted of drug offenses: separate forfeiture action was unnecessary (Leonard L. Jones v. State, 226 Wis.2d 565, 594 N.W.2d 738 (1999), controlling); trial court forfeiture decision is discretionary, and Morton’s failure to provide transcript of trial court reasoning dooms attack.